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

RMP-221-0006794-A

Witness name: Delme John Williams

Statement Number: 1

Dated: 3 June 2025

Exhibits: 10

INDEPENDENT INQUIRY RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN

WITNESS STATEMENT OF DELME JOHN WILLIAMS

DATED 3 JUNE 2025

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1. I, Delme John Williams, am making this statement in response to a Rule 9 Request dated 18 November 2024.

2. I am providing this statement in relation to my time as Deputy Senior Investigative Officer ("DSIO") in Operation Northmoor ("Op Nm") from approximately April 2017 until June 2019.

Training and Experience

3. I will set out a brief summary of my service history. I joined the Army in 1995 as a Royal Engineer and left in 1999. I re-enlisted into the Royal Military Police ("RMP") in 2001 and was posted to the Cyprus Joint Police Unit where I was employed in the Unit Investigation Element. I was then posted to 110 Provost Coy, Sennelager, Germany. During this time, I was deployed on Operation TELIC 5. Details of additional training in support of covert policing activity [redacted] In 2009 I completed a Special Investigation Branch ("SIB") attachment and was posted to 70 Section SIB,

Hohne, as an investigator. I was then deployed on Operation OLYMPIC as an intelligence officer. I was posted to 4 Investigation Company and joined Williams provides career details of working in support of an ongoing investigation into a historic allegation. [redacted]. I was promoted to Staff Sergeant ("SSgt") in June 2014 and deployed on Operation HERRICK.

4. On return to the UK, I re-joined 4 Investigation Company ("4 Inv Coy") in Bulford. I became involved in the periphery of Op Nm for a time as I was waiting to be posted to my next assignment. Having looked at my workbook (D2469-OS), I understand that there were a number of actions allocated to 4 Inv Coy from Op Nm decision-makers and I would have ensured that the actions were allocated and carried out. At that time, I would not have known what the aim would have been of these actions within the context of the wider investigation and how that would have been inputted into the investigation. Having looked at my workbook, I cannot recall any of those actions but believe they would have been to support investigators rather than carrying out direct investigative actions myself. I was not read into the Operation by which I mean that I did not have access to information I had later when I was deployed to Op Nm such as the terms of reference or lines of enquiry etc. I do not recall the time period for when I undertook this work.

5. I was then posted to 32 Section in June 2015.

6. On promotion to Warrant Officer Class 2 ("WO2") I was posted as DSIO to Op Nm in approximately April 2017. The nature of my duties was to: (a) ensure the direction of senior investigating officer ("SIO") / SILVER was carried out as per the investigative direction / lines of enquiry; (b) manage Team 1 investigators; (c) allocate manpower resources; and (d) provide advice and direction to investigators and managing leave, training and courses etc. I reported to and received direction from SIO / SILVER.

7. There was only one DSIO in Team 1 and this was the usual structure.

8. I managed around 9 investigators in Team 1. I can recall Sergeant ("Sgt") Nick Smith, Staff Sergeant ("SSgt") Matt Butler, SSgt Lee Smith, N2462 [redacted], Cpl Emma Redwood, Cpl Bradford, Sgt Steve Cook, Sgt Bennet, Sgt Luke Fabry and SSgt Pip McLean-Inglis (who was based in Collingwood). I managed these individuals and they were investigators within my team. I do not recall the other investigators.

9. My predecessor was WO2 Mark Dempster. As far as I recall, the handover was adequate, however the size, scope and length of the investigation meant that WO2 Dempster would have had to remain with me for months to achieve the best possible handover and the demands of the wider service meant this was not possible.

10. My successor was WO2 Lee Smith who was a SSgt in Team 1 for the time I worked with him in Op Nm. There was no formal handover as such but we worked together for some time prior to leaving Op Nm and I discussed the role with him in the months leading up to my departure so that he understood the role.

11. I was not privy to the selection and recruitment process for my role. There was no application or interview. I was told that I would be undertaking the role, like any other posting. You find out and then you go. It is possible that there would have been input from Headquarters SIB into Army Personnel Centre ("APC") in Glasgow but I am not aware of that, if it was the case.

12. I am asked to provide details of any relevant training undertaken prior to commencing and during my role. I believe the following training and experience enabled me to provide advice and direction to investigators, in a manner appropriate for an SIB WO2: Serious Crime Investigators Course, Involvement in Covert Police [redacted], Disaster Victim Identification ("DVI"), Crime Scene Investigator ("CSI"), Tier 3 suspect interviewer and Tier 3 (witness ABE interviewer).

13. During the investigation, I undertook the WO2 training course and Level 6 diploma in leadership and management. These were not investigation specific. No other training was offered or immediately available.

14. Prior to commencing my role, I had no experience as a homicide investigator. I was a serious crime investigator in the SIB in Germany and the UK investigating a full range of serious, complex and protracted investigations including sudden and unexplained death. I was deployed on Operation TELIC / HERRICK and carried out investigations as part of a team, however I was never the lead investigator for a homicide or major incident.

15. I considered that my level of training, skill and experience was adequate for that of a WO2 in an SIB section, however, I did not complete (and was not offered) the DSIO training or have a portfolio of experience in that role.

16. Op Nm was my first DSIO role. I had a broad understanding of the role from the Murder Investigation Manual, however it was hard for me to understand whether I was fulfilling that role. I had no previous experience as a DSIO to be able to compare it with and so relied on carrying out tasks that were dictated to me by SILVER. Because of this I perceived that the role in Op Nm would be similar to the role of WO2 in SIB section i.e. someone who is a senior investigator with requisite experience as an investigator along with certain managerial duties. With that experience and responsibility in SIB section I would be managing a team of investigators. In Op Nm, I was a senior investigator but was not carrying out investigative actions as my role was to ensure that the correct personnel from Team 1 were assigned. I was not given opportunity to provide input or direction into the investigation as I would have been in SIB section.

17. The nature of the investigation during my time in Op Nm was led by GOLD (Lt Col John Harvey) and SILVER (Major Matthew Cox). The investigative direction

was coming from above and I had no say on the Terms of Reference ("TOR") or Lines of Enquiry ("LOE").

18. I am asked whether my colleagues' level of training, skill and experience was adequate to fulfil their roles. I believe that the people that I regularly came into contact with, and in some cases managed, were effective and committed investigators with a broad range of experience that was adequate to the roles. I cannot comment on those above SILVER.

19. I left Op Nm as I was coming to the end of my service. I was there for approximately two years from the time of my arrival. During 2019 I began resettlement training. I left the Army in November/December 2019 and was on leave until I was fully discharged in January 2020.

Role as DSIO

20. I am asked how I approached my role as DSIO. Despite not completing the DSIO training, I ensured that Team 1 was managed to meet the needs of the investigation direction and actions were carried out.

21. As I mentioned at paragraph 16, I perceived that my role was more that of a WO2 in a SIB section, and I did not have responsibilities and input that I should have had as a DSIO. As well as managing administration, I was also supervising the quality of police work and investigative output from the investigators in Team 1. I recall mentoring and encouraging junior investigators to improve morale and I can also see this recorded in my workbooks.

22. I am asked exactly what I did in my role as DSIO during the investigation. As different actions were carried out by investigators to meet the demands of the investigation, I managed the team and resources to ensure this was done. I

would ensure that policy and TORs were read by those who needed to read them. My memories of exactly what I did are no longer present.

23. My memory has been refreshed to some degree by reviewing my workbooks [RMP-221-0006786-A and RMP-221-0006787-A] and other documents within my witness pack. I can see from my workbooks that as a new action arose, I allocated it to an investigator who I believed had the requisite experience and qualifications. I produced and dated the precise and actions had a specific action number which I recorded. I also included a precis of statements recorded by investigators.

24. The following items provide a representative sample of the work I undertook:

(a) RMP-221-0006786-A: I can see actions arising in relation to tracing witnesses, for example, pages 12-14. Page 13 appears to include actions arising as a result of evidence recovered from HQ DSF but I cannot recall anything more specific. Page 20 refers to a potential witness who would like to pass on information in confidence. I have given advice and undertaken follow-up action including a debrief but I cannot recall further information on this. I can see from page 29 that investigators have interviewed members of United Kingdom Special Forces ("UKSF"). The notes do not assist me with recalling any specific details or decisions.

(b) RMP-221-0000178-A: This refers to an action point for me which is "TTP statement for Sgt Maj's currently being reviewed in view of what was interviewees official TTP consisted of".

(c) RMP-221-0000182-A: This refers to "DSP, John Murphy and Mark Ellison also attending NORTHMOOR and will engage directly with SILVER and WO2 WILLIAMS at NM". I do not recall any further details regarding this meeting. It also states that "WO2 WILLIAMS confirmed that Tm 1 investigations ongoing and that an update will be given accordingly". I do not now recall the update.

(d) RMP-221-0000184-A: This refers to "Brief from WO2 Williams to SILVER on current MOU with [redacted]". I don't recall likely investigative activity taking place in [redacted] but this could possibly relate to the recovery of footage.

(e) RMP-221-0000192-A: This refers to "DSIO has emailed Capt Knight, OC NORTHMOOR in relation to the Big Word contract and is establishing whether this can be utilised in the forthcoming deployment to Afghanistan". The Big Word contract probably related to fixers (individuals who could assist with arranging interview locations and other logistical tasks) in Afghanistan. I cannot the specifics now and I think that Captain Pete Knight was responsible for arranging this.

(f) RMP-221-0006788-A: This document is an officer's report completed when an action is completed. This was regarding enquiries with [redacted] concerning an incident with N50. I realised I knew [redacted] as [redacted] had deployed in Afghanistan at the time. [redacted] I discussed this with SILVER and agreed to give them a call. I felt a conversation was appropriate. The outcome was they told me that they did not witness anything and it came to nothing.

25. I do recall that there were significant changes, with the different teams being made smaller with the intent to be more effective with less staff. I had some input into this to ensure that appropriately trained, and where possible experienced, personnel were in the correct team, but I cannot recall more details.

26. SILVER (Major Cox) encouraged me to speak candidly about the investigation and invited professional input, however this was always within the scope of what actions had already been directed to take place.

27. I am asked what challenges I faced whilst carrying out my role as DSIO. This is difficult to explain due to the amount of time that has passed. I am mindful that my memories of how I felt at the time may have been changed by media

coverage and subsequent criticism, however I do recall that I felt that my role as DSIO was diluted or less than previous DSIOs due to the investigation being smaller and perhaps coming to an end. The fact I was never offered the opportunity to complete the DSIO course was further evidence of this to me.

28. The investigation was vast and had been ongoing for a number of years and I felt that broader and more consequential decisions were made long before I arrived and there was no scope to revisit or question them.

29. I recall that I felt I had almost no input into investigation strategies, despite the best efforts of SILVER to encourage an investigational mind-set with the investigators in Team 1, so that they were engaged and effective within the confines of the direction they were being given, and I was therefore committed to ensuring the direction of SILVER was carried out effectively and timely.

30. I do recall a general feeling that enquiries were being stopped too soon and that there was no appetite above SILVER or perhaps GOLD to pursue all lines of enquiry or for anyone to be referred for prosecution, however as already stated my role and input was so removed from the actual decision making process and so much time has passed that I cannot describe this better or offer any real evidence to corroborate my feelings. This perhaps highlights a naivety or inexperience of how decisions were made by GOLD and above.

31. I believe that a WO2 in the context I worked in Op Nm was not there to say, “This is what we should be doing in the investigation”. The way I understood it was that GOLD gave direction to SILVER and it cascaded down. If there had been a real time change in the investigative avenues as a result of the actions of investigators on the ground, I would had been informed first by the team, but cannot recall that ever happening.

32. I felt dissatisfied with the role as I was only doing what I was told with regards to the investigation. However, I did my best to fulfil the role as much as I could and always fulfilled investigation tasks.

33. I am asked what I achieved during my time as DSIO. I managed the team well and ensured that investigative actions as directed to me were completed. I cannot recall more specifically than this.

Record Keeping

34. I understood that records would be kept (e.g. workbooks etc.) for the purposes of the investigation and I had attended the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and disclosure training. This training was not specific to Op Nm. This was undertaken as part of normal police training throughout my career. I cannot recall the specific dates.

35. I recall that there were conversations with seniors within the disclosure team in Op Nm to discuss my role and the responsibilities that came with that to keep records. I also received briefings both upon arrival and during my time working on Op Nm relating to record keeping and the rationale for how information was logged. I presume that the exact reasons would have been explained to me but I cannot recall them now.

36. I believe there would have been codes of practice for record keeping and broad policies and standards were followed but I cannot recall specifics. Everything was accountable. There were no private notebooks and sensitivity markings were applied. Op Nm workbooks were kept for the purpose of recording decisions and their rationale.

37. At the time of completion, I believe that I would have thought my workbooks were adequate and would have been able to use them to explain my thought processes and decisions. From looking at my workbooks e.g. RMP-221-

0006786-A, I can see that actions were allocated to Team 1 and that I have recorded a broad precis of each action. However, I have not generally detailed any justification or rationale or any of my thought process (and when I did do so it was slight). Instead I was using the workbooks as a planning and managerial tool to allocate actions to an investigator within my team. At the time these records within the workbooks were useful to me and I would have referred to them during my time as DSIO. I recorded material in a way which was useful to me at the time. Having had the opportunity to read my workbooks after 5 or 6 years have passed, I can see that in isolation from the investigative decisions being passed down to me they may appear lacking and perhaps not fit for purpose in the context of what a DSIO might be expected to put into a workbook because I did not complete the training. The workbooks do not aid me to recall particular events or discussions with the SIO or SILVER.

Op NM Terms of Reference ("TOR")

38. I was not involved in the drafting of the Op Nm TORs or any revisions. I believe that I would have read the TORs on a number of occasions and would have been able to discuss them with SILVER and the investigation team. I have no specific recollection. I can only comment on my memory at the time and I do not recall how I felt about the TORs then.

Structure

Team Structure

39. At the time I would have had an understanding of the overall team structure. However, my memory of the team structure is limited and I cannot recall the

specifics. There were 3 teams with different duties, responsibilities and tasks that broadly followed a typical SIB section in rank structure. There was also a Major Incident Room ("MIR"). Each team had appropriately trained and experienced personnel for the role.

40. I was in Team 1. At the time I would have been aware of the other teams and their responsibilities and roles. Team 1 was the investigation team, carrying out enquiries and anything that may have come as a result such as witness statements, evidence collection, suspect interviews. Team 2 was investigation support. I cannot recall if this included investigators interrogating data provided by UKSF. I believe that Team 3 may have been the disclosure team but I cannot remember if this was Team 2. The MIR was collating all the information already known.

41. I recall that there was a change in structure during my time with the investigation but I cannot remember any specifics, other than perhaps the intent was to streamline and make the investigation more effective due to the scope of the investigation being narrowed. I do not know whether this did make the investigation more effective. I recall feeling that the investigation was not as broad as it had been previously and manpower reflected that.

42. I do not recall thinking the team structure was not fit for purpose.

Leadership Structure

43. I have been asked about my understanding of the leadership structure.

44. Provost Marshal Army ("PM(A)") was Commander 1 RMP and would have set the strategic direction for the investigation and had oversight of the investigation.

45. I do not recall the specific Assistant Heads ("AH") but I was aware that there were AHs with responsibilities and input into the investigation. I cannot recall further details.

46. GOLD had oversight and direction responsibility and advised SILVER and PM(A) and was involved with risk management. I felt that my exposure was to those above SILVER was quite limited.

47. SILVER was command and coordinated the investigation.

48. I have no recollection of there being a BRONZE.

49. The role of Officer Commanding ("OC") in a British Army Unit was commanding the personnel, administrative, disciplinary etc. so that the investigation was supported. The OC was not directly involved in the investigation as far as I knew. Capt Stitson and Capt Knight undertook this role during my time on the investigation.

50. SIO was officer in charge of the investigation. Captain Jason Wright was SIO when I arrived. Shortly after this, the role of SILVER was combined with that of SIO. For the majority of my time SILVER was Major Cox. I do not know what the thought process was behind this and cannot recall if it was explained to me. Based on my experience in the service police, I had not experienced this combining of roles before. I do not know if this is appropriate.

51. I have been asked about the role of Officer in Overall Charge ("OIOC"). As far as I recall, SIO and OIOC were the same position and this was undertaken by Capt Wright. It is possible that I have recalled the use of this title incorrectly.

52. The role of DSIO was undertaken by me as previously described. I have no opinion on how the role was undertaken by the DSIO before me.

53. I have limited recall of the Warrant Officer In Charge ("WOIC") role but I remember a female Senior Non-Commissioned Officer who was focused on manpower, personal training and morale of the troops more broadly.

54. With regards to the leadership structure, I cannot recall any concerns specifically. I did have a broad feeling that external forces were directing things and there was a feeling of dissatisfaction due to the narrowing of the scope of the investigation. This was based on feelings alone and I can only speak for myself.

55. I was dissatisfied with my role within Op Nm as my career within the SIB had been as an investigator and I had plenty of experience in that role. Op Nm was different. It was not a standard investigation where investigators were making decisions based on where the evidence led them as I perceived that all decisions were being dictated for the investigators by SILVER (Major Cox) and above. I felt that other people shared this sentiment more broadly but I do not remember having specific conversations. Op Nm was different from my previous experience and what my training had prepared me for. This was further compounded by not having experience as a DSIO and feeling I was not being utilised in that role or either as a WO2 in a SIB section and my responsibilities were much more reduced. I was not party to a lot of key discussions, despite my previous experience of having a lot more input into the investigative direction. However, as a WO2 in Op Nm, I felt as though I could not voice these concerns, and I was also mindful that I did not want to bring morale down.

56. Prior to and by the time I arrived at Op Nm, I believe that decisions had been made to make the investigation smaller. A lot of decisions had been made which made the scope of the investigation and investigative actions being carried out smaller and the sizes of teams were smaller. I had the impression that political forces were impacting the investigation and influenced certain decisions. That was based on a feeling of how small the investigation was and

not based on knowledge of any discussions. If I had heard that there was any indication that it was being made smaller to make "it go away", I would have reported this. I was mindful that no one had been referred to the Service Prosecuting Authority ("SPA") for an offence and, as the evidential sufficiency test is low for the RMP, I recall privately questioning this. But I cannot provide specifics now. Different priorities may have influenced PM(A) (Brigadier Dave Neal) and GOLD (Lt Col Harvey) at a strategic level. I do not know what conversations took place at a political level. I assumed there was politics at play, although I was not sure about this influencing SILVER (Major Cox) and I do not think it would have done so. I never saw or heard discussions which suggested that there was any bad faith.

57. Despite these concerns, I always applied myself to the role professionally and diligently and did not allow my feelings to interfere with my day-to-day duties and responsibilities.

58. I am asked to consider whether the leadership structure was fit for purpose. My knowledge and interaction beyond SILVER (Major Cox) was very limited. I recall having full confidence in SILVER. I recall a feeling that GOLD (Lt Col Harvey) and above would have been subject to political pressure, or a desire for the investigation to end, but I cannot now articulate why. I believe this would have been based on my knowledge that the investigation was being wound down and its scope had been reduced before my arrival.

59. After I had left Op Nm and I was preparing to leave the Army, I recall that I was aware that investigators in Afghanistan had been stopped from completing actions they were sent to do. That would have been a PM(A) decision. I had left the investigation at that point. I cannot remember who told me, but recall having that memory. I was in Campion Lines, Salisbury, at the time and so would have been aware of deployments and reasons for doing so but cannot remember specific conversations regarding this. At this time I would have been preparing to leave the Army (gardening leave) so was removed from the entire process

(both in terms of my interest and access to information relating to Op Nm). I had done 24 years in the Army at that point. I was dissatisfied with the final two years for the reasons described above and wanted to leave. My experience on Op Nm concreted the fact that I wanted to leave the Army.

60. I was not privy to the rationale behind appointments made of personnel. My view at the time was personnel were posted to Op NM by APC based on qualifications and career progression considerations but not necessarily experience. Beyond that I do not know the selection process and how roles were filled.

61. Op Nm internal appointments made by Capt Wright were more purposeful as he poached personnel from other teams such as N2462 who was a very keen and engaged investigator.

62. With regard to whether leadership roles were clear and well defined, I feel I could not comment on anyone above SILVER (Major Cox) as my exposure to those individuals was limited. SILVER and below had well defined roles.

63. I am asked about whether I had any specific concerns concerning a number of named individuals and any other individuals I consider to be important to the investigation. I set out my concerns regarding specific individuals below. I did not have any concerns that I can recall about any other individuals in connection with Op Nm. Where I do not recall an individual or had no or limited interaction with them I am unable to comment.

64. Brig Robert Warren was PM(A) prior to Brig Neal and before my time within Op Nm. I recall feeling that Brig Warren would have been more independent and less likely to be influenced by political or other pressures whether within the Army or elsewhere.

65. Regarding Brig Neal, I had a general feeling at the time that he was motivated by other concerns such as his career, pressures from within the Army at a higher level and external political pressures. I cannot articulate these feelings any further.

66. I can barely recall Col Rob Morris.

67. I did not have any dealings/discussions with Col Scott Meredith during my time in Op Nm.

68. I have no recollections of interactions with Lt Col John McAllister regarding Op Nm. However, he undertook my exit interview in 2019 on my last day in HM Forces.

69. Lt Col Harvey was GOLD throughout my time in Op Nm. I felt that Lt Col Harvey was following orders/instructions based on the different advice he was given by the advisory and review teams and by Brig Neal. Because of this, I questioned whether his role was to follow the evidence or whether he was being influenced to close the investigation. Therefore, I questioned whether he was fulfilling the role of GOLD Commander.

70. My thoughts about Lt Col Harvey were further influenced by an incident involving photographs as this specific incident made me question his decision making. These photographs were images of supposed bullet holes within walls of different buildings. I cannot recall the particular operation it was a part of and I do not recall the provenance of the images. I think these photographs are referred to at item 3) on page 24 of my workbook [RMP-221-0006786-A] and this may detail some of my thoughts in relation to these photographs but I cannot be certain. Considering the note, it appears that I wanted further detail in relation to the photographs. As far as I can remember, I did not gain further information regarding the images.

71. I can recall there was one particular occasion during which the photographs were discussed. I recall at the time of the discussion the retired civilian police officers had advised the images should not be submitted for expert analysis. I do not recall the reasons. Present during the discussion was GOLD (Lt Col Harvey), SILVER (Major Cox), SSgt Lee Smith, myself and retired members of the police who had made the recommendation. I cannot recall the specifics of the conversation or when it took place. The images were discussed at length. I put forward that the images should be referred to an expert so that an opinion could be given on their placement and whether they corroborated or disproved the account given by UKSF. I do recall that some of the bullet holes caused me some suspicion as to where the Afghan male was when he was shot by UKSF. The position of the bullet holes was in some cases low to the ground so I believed that an expert should be shown the images to give an opinion whether a person was lying down or not during the engagement by UKSF. My assertion that the images should have been seen by an expert were based at the time on my experience as a crime scene investigator ("CSI") and the different scenes I attended where I obtained photographic evidence prior to Op Nm. I thought there was no reason for them not to be examined by an expert. This was the position I put forward during the discussion. The decision by GOLD (Lt Col Harvey) was that the photographs should not be looked at by an expert. I pushed back on this politely and was mindful of GOLD's rank, however I remained concerned that we were not using the evidence we had available. I believe that I presented my thoughts in a constructive and well thought out manner as I would approach any discussion regarding police work. This was the only occasion I can recall where I had the opportunity to offer advice to GOLD.

72. However, I was quickly shut down by GOLD (Lt Col Harvey) in an abrupt manner. This was orally in the meeting. I felt that this was done in such a manner that GOLD did not want to listen to counter arguments or my advice. Lt Col Harvey had reverted to rank. This is the best way to describe it. I felt that there was no way to progress the conversation as his manner had changed,

without me becoming insubordinate. GOLD shut this down so comprehensively that it appeared to me that he had already made his decision. Within the SIB it is common practice for investigators of any rank to have open and collaborative conversations with senior ranks as this is essential to the investigation process. To be shut down so comprehensively with no valid reasons was something I had not experienced during my career in the SIB.

73. SILVER (Major Cox) did not offer an opinion during the meeting and did not talk to me about it afterwards. One of civilian police approached me afterwards, not about my advice, but about the way decision was delivered by GOLD (Lt Col Harvey). I do not recall their name. I got the impression that he was uncomfortable with the way in which GOLD had spoken to me and he said words to the effect that he had not seen anything like that before. Rationale for GOLD's decision may have been provided at the time but I cannot recall this. I did not hear anything further regarding expert examination of the photographs. Although I was dissatisfied with the outcome of the meeting for the reasons explained above, I did not hold it against GOLD and I did not take it personally.

74. Capt Wright was an excellent SIO, investigator and leader and he had a positive impact on the team. My general impression of Capt Wright was that he was frustrated and stopped from investigating effectively. He never conveyed this to me and I base this assumption on my knowledge of the investigation and the difficulties he had had prior to my involvement, for example obtaining the UKSF servers. I consider that he would have picked "fearless" investigators internally from the investigators in Op Nm – people who he had confidence in to get the job done.

75. My impression of Major Cox was that he was very person-centred and this coincided with a time when there may have been morale issues. I am not sure how Captain Wright would have handled those same issues. Major Cox cared about people's careers as investigators and soldiers as I believe he would have

been mindful that they would eventually leave Op Nm (as it was only a two or three year posting) and would want to prepare them for that.

76. I observed that Major Cox worked hard to ensure that investigators felt engaged, involved and empowered to carry out their roles within the confines of a much reduced scope of investigation. I feel he may have been subjected to pressure from above and this may have created conflict for SILVER trying to do his best for the investigation and the personnel deployed to Op Nm whilst also following the direction given to him by GOLD. I did feel as though Major Cox was simply relaying direction from GOLD but not necessarily having much input.

77. Major Cox was professional and clear in his direction to me and told me what I needed to know to ensure that actions were carried out. At no time did SILVER say that he had concerns to me about the investigation and I did not raise any with him as I felt like he could not change the course of the investigation and it would have put extra pressure on him for no reason. I did not want to make Major Cox's life harder by drawing attention to what I thought he probably already knew himself i.e. the external pressures on the investigation. It would have had no positive impact.

78. Major Moira Penman had a general reputation for being hard-headed but I have no opinion of her during Op Nm as we did not really work together.

79. I have no opinion of Major Tina Stitson as we did not really work together. She was before Capt Knight. The only interaction with her was in the building at St Mawgan occasionally when she visited. However, Capt Knight would come down to [redacted] the building more and interact with the Team. He had more visibility and brought a change of morale. He was cheerful, good with people and made an effort to interact and engage.

80. I do not recall Major Gary Ward.

81. I had no interaction with Miles Tooke.

82. Captain Joshua Stribling had a good nature and was keen and personable.

83. I have limited recall regarding WO1 Deborah Hayes. I cannot recall her role or any specific interactions with her.

84. I had no dealings with N73 [redacted] during Op Nm.

85. I do remember WO2 Zoe Duce but cannot recall specific interactions regarding Op Nm.

86. I had no concerns regarding WO2 Tom Carey, N79 [redacted] and WO2 Mark Dempster.

87. I had no concerns regarding Captain Danielle Smith. She was married to an investigator but this posed no issues.

88. I do not recall Captain Stephen Robbins.

89. I did not have any notifiable associations and was not aware that others did.

90. I did not consider there to be any potential conflicts of interest for any of those at RMP tasked with investigating UKSF, certainly not Team 1. However I suspect that there were unknown pressures and political and national security considerations and that may have influenced decision-makers i.e. Brig Neal and above and hindered the investigation because of the potential impact on national security and geopolitics. My concerns are whether Brig Neal would have been robust enough to push against these pressures and fulfil the role.

Resources

91. During my time at Op Nm, the allocation of resources, including in relation to personnel resourcing, was not within my job role so I had limited involvement in resourcing. It was the responsibility of GOLD and those above him to ensure that Op Nm had adequate overall resourcing. In terms of personnel resourcing, GOLD, OC and Capt Knight held responsibility. I did not take any actions to secure adequate overall resourcing for Op Nm and do not recall being concerned about resources.

92. I am asked whether I considered Op Nm to be adequately resourced in terms of personnel (both numbers and skill), investigative support and specialist capabilities. I consider that we had sufficient manpower within the parameters of the investigation in Team 1, although I recall moving Team 1 investigators into other teams for short periods of time to complete specific tasks. I cannot recall what those tasks are now. I felt I was doing enough and was always busy, although the investigators in Team 1 were never overly stretched. They worked hard within the investigative actions that they were allocated. I have a brief memory of there being refining of the team. People were being taken away and the end date was in sight. I got this feeling from Capt Wright or Major Cox and I cannot be more specific.

93. I believe that investigators and support personnel were professional and committed. I recall that investigators were suitably trained and there was no shortfall in skillset, however a lack of experience may have been present. The Army can sometimes be more concerned with filling positions rather than appointing those with the necessary experience. However, I was not concerned at the time and so did not raise this. I would have expected more senior investigators to mentor those with less experience.

94. From my own perspective, I had a lot of experience as a serious crime investigator. There were plenty of qualified people with lots of experience from Iraq and Afghanistan. However not all the experience was necessarily investigating homicide.

95. I consider that SIB should be more integrated with Home Office Police Forces so that investigators can gain experience on homicide investigations. I would have wanted to do a secondment there to build a portfolio of experience relevant to the role. I did do a secondment to the National Crime Agency and did crime scene investigation work which brought valuable experience. This secondment was set up by Major Cox during my time in 32 Sect SIB.

96. I consider that Op Nm was adequately resourced in terms of IT facilities and infrastructure. Responsibility for IT resourcing lay with Nm Company – I did not have responsibility within this area - and I cannot recall any concerns. My impression was that there was plenty of IT and no additional resources were required. I do not recall any steps taken to improve IT resourcing. The building was big open office with shared hot desking space and lots of computers. However, there was no privacy. Everyone could see what each other were doing.

97. I did not have to use HOLMES again after unrelated ongoing investigation, therefore I did not use it during the course of Op Nm.

98. I have limited recall now regarding the proposed Forensic Data Handling Capability ('FDHC'). I can no longer recall the exact nature of FDHC or what it comprised of or its relevance to the investigation.

99. I was HOLMES trained from my time on unrelated ongoing investigation which did give me some insight into its use and how effective it can be, but I was not involved in its use on Op Nm enough to form an opinion as to how effective it would be on Op Nm compared with a traditional type of investigation.

100. I am asked whether I considered the location and facilities allocated to Op Nm at St Mawgan to be adequate and/or appropriate. In the sense of the investigation they were appropriate and adequate such as in terms of secrecy etc.

101. I recall that the location of St Mawgan, use of the building in which the teams were located and the accommodation was a source of unhappiness for some members of the team. I spent most of my time indoors with no natural lighting in the building Junior ranks had plenty of access to personal training outside of the building. There was only a shop and cinema in the facilities. People wanted to visit home and the location made this difficult. There was a lack of internet connection. I think Op Nm personnel would have appreciated simple things like reliable internet access. There was a lot of artificial light because there were no windows. The location of RAF St Mawgan compounded the problem. It was very rainy and windy and a desolate location. Senior ranked personnel rarely went outside of the building during the working day.

102. The location and facilities were not part of my responsibilities. I do not know who had responsibility for selecting the location. The facility was owned by the RAF. I believe the building was previously used for a different purpose. I feel that morale was not considered when the location was being selected but secrecy and convenience were the priority for decision-makers.

103. I am asked what steps were taken to improve or change the facilities. Capt Knight brought a general change in culture. He was very cheerful and proactive in improving morale but I cannot recall anything being undertaken to change the facilities. I consider that morale did improve through the efforts of Capt Knight and the new Regimental Sergeant Major ("RSM"). Steps were taken by SILVER through interaction with investigators to improve morale. I cannot remember there being a significant change. I am asked what steps ought to have been taken to improve or change the facilities. Internet connectivity could have been better and there was a lot of talk about them putting in artificial lights but nothing came of that.

104. I felt like there was general unhappiness with the location which was relevant to morale as a whole. I cannot say this impacted on the investigation during my time as people were used to it.

Culture / Morale

105. I am asked to describe the workplace culture within the various teams in Op Nm and Op Nm overall. I felt that the investigators in Team 1 were dedicated and wanted to pursue the investigation wherever it may lead. I recall feeling that even the most junior ranks were committed and had an idea that Capt Wright had perhaps picked internally those with an investigator's mind-set, but I did not have conversations with him about this.

106. Team 1 got on really well. I hoped that there was an air of approachability in terms of my managerial style. I had good relations with the team.

107. I cannot comment on the culture and morale within other teams. I had limited interaction with Team 2 outside of my professional responsibilities due to them sitting far away. The disclosure team would sit even further away so there was no opportunity to interact other than when required to do so for the purposes of the investigation.

108. As I have mentioned already, I was not always happy with the role. I have always been police work oriented and as decisions were being made elsewhere I felt like I was not fulfilling the role of investigator or WO2 or what might be expected as a DSIO. I was very careful not to convey that to the team so as not to contribute to a fall in morale. Ideally, I would have wanted to be a WO2 sectioned in Germany as that is where my training was leading me and this was the next stage of my progression workwise. I would not have chosen to go Op Nm, if given the option. I realised quickly the role was constrained and felt I would have no real impact. A prime example of this was the photograph

incident I have referred to previously. Although it was not discussed with me, I assumed that other people had similar thoughts and feelings.

109. I got the impression that Sergeant Nick Smith was frustrated and [redacted] Provides details of Sergeant Nick Smith's personal factors when I had left and I was in HQ SIB prior to leaving the Army. I was not sure whether this was connected to the work culture and morale at Op Nm but suspected that it was. However, this did not become an issue with work during my time in Op Nm.

110. I never really shared concerns or bad thoughts regarding the role, location etc. as I did not want to impact morale. I do not consider that morale or the culture impacted on the effectiveness of the investigation.

111. I am asked about what steps were taken by me and others to improve or change the culture. There were general leadership changes and we tried to encourage the team and make it a more open team and provide space where they could voice concerns etc. If someone wanted to say they were unhappy, they were not shut down.

External Groups

112. I am asked about the National Crime Agency ("NCA"), the Greater Manchester Police Major Enquiry Review Team ("GMP MERT"), the Independent Advisory Group ("IAG"), the Independent Review Team ("IRT") and the Operational Offending Team ("OOT"). The appointment of these organisations was either before my time or I no longer recollect. I presume it was Brig Neal or his predecessor's decision to appoint these organisations.

113. I can see from the documents in my witness pack that there are references to external groups and advisers including within a number of documents including RMP-221-0006786-A, RMP-221-0000165-A, RMP-221-

0000181-A, RMP-221-0000182-A, RMP-221-0000183-A, RMP-221-0000184-A and RMP-221-0000192-A. My role extended to ensuring that my action points were carried out. I do not recall any further specific details or decisions now so long after the event save for where I have elaborated further within this statement.

114. I understand that different reviews would have been undertaken and advice sought so that any perceived inexperience of the RMP to investigate would be addressed, however, I have no insight into this. These groups would have been given TORs but were generally seen as external and separate from the team. The IRT would have had more impact on investigation and I do recall the impact of the other external groups.

115. I cannot recall the exact order of the involvement of the external groups or whether I was part of Op Nm during the involvement of these groups. I think it would have been NCA and GMP and then my memory is that this changed to the two retired police officers who were murder detectives and formed the IRT.

116. As I recall, the purpose and rationale given was to identify short comings and ensure the investigation was on the right track. It was also perhaps to ensure that public concerns were addressed and the investigation was not perceived as the Army 'investigating their own'. I cannot recall the reasons why I thought this now.

117. The nature of the work they undertook was similar to an inquiry i.e. providing recommendations and overall review.

118. I am asked whether their work was necessary and/or adequate. I consider that their work was necessary as it was important to have an independent review of the investigation. I also felt that civilian perception of the Army was important and felt it would reassure the public. I cannot comment on

whether the work of external groups was adequate as I have no other similar experiences to compare this with.

119. The IRT's work was ongoing and I am uncertain whether it was adequate. The only concern I recall having at the time was in relation to the discussion involving Lt Col Harvey regarding photographs as referred to at paragraphs 70 to 73. This incident made me question how much influence the IRT had on GOLD (Lt Col Harvey) in relation to this particular decision. I cannot comment more broadly on the influence that they had on Lt Col Harvey's decision-making process as I either did not know at the time or cannot recall now. I cannot comment on whether external groups had a positive or negative impact on the investigation. I am asked what influence the external groups had over the strategic direction of the investigation. I can no longer recall what influence the groups would have had.

120. I am asked about my involvement with a number of named individuals and whether I had specific concerns regarding them. I recall having dealings with two individuals who I believe were part of the IRT. I would have been present on a few occasions between them and SILVER (Major Cox) and GOLD (Lt Col Harvey) when some investigative decisions were being discussed. Due to the amount of time passed I cannot recollect their names and they may well be Philip Jones and Cliff Evans, however I may be incorrect in this memory. I do not recall DSI Paul Williamson (NCA), Martin Bottomley (GMP MERT), DCSI Russ Jackson (GMP MERT), Sir Jon Murphy (IAG), Mark Ellison KC (IAG), Stephen Kell (OOT), Francis Davis (OOT), Andrew Cayley KC (SPA) or Peter Ryan (DJEP).

121. I only recall one particular discussion where I had specific concerns, and I believe that this was regarding the submission of photographs to an expert. I recall stating strongly that I felt the images should be submitted for analysis, however the two members of IRT had given direction that this should not take

place. I was informed strongly by GOLD that this would not take place. I refer to this in more detail at paragraphs 70 to 73.

122. In relation to the NCA and GMP MERT, I do not recall anything further regarding the circumstances in which their involvement in Op Nm ended and do not know what impact their departure would have had on the investigation.

123. In relation to IAG and IRT, my memories are incomplete. I am asked whether I agreed with the conclusion of the IRT in their first report that there was “no evidence of a crime being committed”. I would have been able to read the IRT report in detail. I recall feeling that there was enough evidence to refer people to the SPA. I cannot recall who specifically or the reasons why I held this belief at the time. I also cannot say whether this would have resulted in a prosecution. This depends on which standard of proof/evidential sufficiency test (“EST”) is being used and the SPA make those decisions.

124. I was not part, as far as I am aware, of any discussions about whether the IAG / IRT recommendations should be accepted. These discussions happened before my time at Op Nm. I cannot recall the extent to which others outside the IAG / IRT were able or willing to challenge or debate their recommendations. I cannot recall whether the rationale for accepting such recommendations was explained to others in Op Nm.

125. I am asked what role was played by the DSP/SPA in respect of Op Nm, their impact on the investigation and their influence on the strategic direction of the investigation. I am unaware of the DSP/SPA’s role in Op Nm, if any, and cannot recall any referral being made to the SPA for a decision to charge any individuals during my tenure. I did not have any contact or meetings with the DSP as this would have been at PM(A) level, or with the SPA. I do not know whether the DSP/SPA had any impact on or influence over the investigation.

Relationship with UKSF

126. I cannot recall my feelings about the nature of the relationship between those working on Op Nm investigation and UKSF during the investigation. I am aware that UKSF provided high level evidence and cooperation to Op Nm but cannot recall the specifics or nature of this. As far as I am aware, I did not meet or have contact with UKSF. My role was not to take statements from members of UKSF or liaise with individuals from UKSF.

127. Prior to my joining Op Nm, I recall having knowledge that there had been efforts to recover one of UKSF's data servers. My understanding is that this had been difficult and I think the server had been deleted in effect by a contractor working for UKSF. The assumption by myself was that in this instance the UKSF had not cooperated; however, I have nothing to corroborate this. I was not there for Lt Col Harvey's response to this issue. However, I recall feeling that Lt Col Harvey was perhaps not as robust as he could have been as no further action was taken as far as I am aware. My feelings about Op Nm and UKSF's relationship are influenced by this.

128. I consider that investigators within Team 1 of Op NM were robust and did not show undue deference towards UKSF. I ensured that investigators within my team were robust and that they would investigate all allegations without fear or favour. This was done through checking statement plans and during briefings and debriefings either by myself or senior NCOs within Team 1 who I had oversight of. I cannot say for GOLD (Lt Col Harvey) and above. I base this on my memory of my feelings during my involvement. I do not know how those RMP personnel outside of Team 1 or before my time with the investigation interacted with UKSF.

129. I cannot recall whether I had any concerns about the communication of sensitive information to UKSF (e.g. suspect status).

130. I am asked a number of questions regarding the Special Forces Protocol. I do not recall the content of the protocol or any discussion regarding the protocol. I cannot assess what impact it had on the investigation or whether this was the appropriate mechanism for liaison between the RMP and UKSF in respect of Op Nm.

131. I cannot recall who were the Disclosure Officers involved in the interviews of UKSF during Op Nm. I presume that their presence during witness statements was to ensure that certain things would not be divulged in relation to national security matters that had no bearing on the investigation. I cannot recall the agreed parameters, if any, of the role of Disclosure Officers in relation to interviews conducted by Op Nm.

132. I am asked about whether I had any concerns about the disclosure officers during the investigation. My memories are incomplete, however I think I recall there was a specific concern where a disclosure officer was challenged by a witness regarding the manner in which he was reading out a statement. I cannot recall any other details.

Investigative Direction

133. I am asked a number of questions relating the investigative direction of Op Nm. I have tried to answer this as best as I can but often my memory of the investigation and rationale is not enough to offer an opinion. I can recall having feelings concerning the investigation and being dissatisfied as a whole, but I am unable to articulate this better.

134. As far as I can recall, I was not present for Gold Group meetings but I believe that they were held often.

135. I attended SILVER Group meetings. I recall that meetings were held quite often and were minuted. The meetings were in person [redacted] at RAF St Mawgan [redacted]. The attendance at a meeting would vary according to what actions were being carried out, however team leaders and key personnel were regularly at each meeting. The meetings allowed SILVER (Major Cox) to gain updates from team leaders and individuals within the team to ensure that his direction and orders were being carried out. It was to ensure that everyone knew what decisions were being carried out and what was happening so, for example, when you asked a question to Team 2 they had an understanding of SILVER's overall direction was). There was no real debate discussion as to how investigation was going. SILVER was more concerned about whether they were being carried out and there was no real pushback or disagreement.

136. Updates were given outside of the SILVER meeting and I would speak to SILVER daily.

137. In relation to other meetings, I am asked whether there were other categories of meeting (i.e. other than Gold or SILVER) that were of particular importance to the investigation. The answers depends on the definition of meetings. Investigators would meet and thoughts would be shared – even with other teams – on certain DDOs and the impact of evidence. There were regular team 1 meetings during which investigative actions and strategies were discussed. I believe SILVER was keen for these to take place to ensure that investigators felt engaged with the investigation and were encouraged to give input. I recall that I felt these were good for professional development but would not have altered the investigation strategy in any discernible way.

138. In relation to strategic direction, at some time the DDOs we were investigating was decided to be reduced from 11 to 1. I assume the IRT etc. would have looked at these and use their experience to advise GOLD (Lt Col Harvey). I cannot recall who made that decision and had no insight so cannot

say whether decisions were made at an appropriate level within the leadership structure.

139. In relation to lines of enquiry, my role was more managerial than investigative. I was not employed as an investigator to take statements and my role was to manage the team. For example, if an individual needed to be investigated, I ensured that this was undertaken. The LOE would have been known to me at the time. I cannot recall any specific LOE now and whether I was able to follow all LOE whilst carrying out my duties save for where identified in relation to the photograph incident at paragraphs 70 to 73. I cannot recall whether I found any evidential basis to support any conclusions outlined in the TORs, which I have not seen since my tenure of Op Nm.

140. I am asked a series of questions concerning the finding, interviewing and statementing of witnesses to the allegations of extrajudicial killing. My role did not involve the logistics of finding witnesses. I do recall that we were aware of which UKSF members were present during the DDOs due to the paperwork created by UKSF i.e. Operation Summaries, First Incident Reports, and Shooting Incident Reports and then Op Nm in liaison with UKSF could locate those individuals. Afghan witnesses would be harder to locate as Op Nm were relying on paperwork from the time and information from Leigh Day. I cannot recall the exact nature and frequency of the information provided by Leigh Day. I cannot recall how Op Nm would go about identifying new witnesses. I cannot recall any further details.

141. Investigators in Team 1 did deploy to interview and record witness statements and I had oversight of this. I cannot recall the specific discussions but I ensured that investigators and senior NCOs within Team 1 had made arrangements, including logistics, to ensure that the investigative activity was completed. I do not recall where they were deployed to and whom was interviewed and the number of deployments undertaken.

142. I am asked how those investigators assigned to interview witnesses were selected. The team was already made up of investigators to interview/review

and they were selected based on availability and experience. I cannot recall the exact decision making process but I would have been involved and the person deployed would have been suitably qualified.

143. The difficulties in locating and interviewing witnesses were that UKSF members were based all over the world and the nature of their role meant that they were not easily contactable at times. Witnesses were in generally dangerous locations. We also relied on Leigh Day to locate Afghan witnesses. New witnesses would have been difficult to get to and interview and we would have had to rely on fixers for civilian witnesses due to language, geographical, and cultural barriers and security sensitivities. I cannot recall any specific details regarding this or whether any civilian witnesses were spoken to during my tenure.

144. I cannot recall the reason for the decision made in March 2017 to restrict interviews in Afghanistan to Saifullah Yar and Mohammed Bang. This was before my tenure on Op Nm. I do not recall who made this decision and the rationale for this. I cannot recall now (although I would have been aware at that time) the reason Saifullah Yar was not interviewed by investigators until September 2017.

145. I cannot recall the reason witness statements were not taken from UKSF on Objective [redacted] 1, Objective [redacted] 2 and Objective TYBURN until late 2017 onwards. I cannot recall whether there were any investigative steps that ought to have been taken in respect of this line of enquiry, but were not.

146. I am asked what efforts were made to obtain relevant data and digital and media evidence in relation to allegations of extrajudicial killing e.g. video footage from DDO operations. I cannot recall now what efforts were undertaken and these were likely to have taken place before my arrival. I presume that the SF Protocol and discussions between GOLD/PM(A) and UKSF would have taken place to facilitate the recovery of media evidence.

147. I presume that if there were any difficulties in obtaining relevant media evidence this would have been the result of push back from UKSF due to their assertion that there would have been data that did not need to be disclosed. This is not based on any distinct memories on my part.

148. I am asked whether there were any investigative steps that ought to have been taken in respect of this line of enquiry but were not. Prior to my arrival Capt Wright had tried to recover data sets and in my view GOLD was not robust in the legal right to recover this and this did not happen during my tenure. I previously referred to this at paragraph 127 of my statement.

149. I do not know what enquiries were carried out in respect of imagery analysis in relation to dropped weapons.

150. I was aware that FMV was viewed but am unsure of the extent of this and do not recall what records were kept.

151. I am asked how and what keywords were selected for the interrogation of ITS4. I am uncertain of which data sets were looked at during my time in Op Nm but there would have been keywords and software used to find specific emails etc. I am unsure how they were selected. I remember suggesting some keywords and there would have been a folder of keywords and these would have been agreed on and signed off by SILVER (Major Cox). I may be confusing ITS4 with FDHC due to the amount of time that has passed since my role on Op Nm.

152. I cannot recall Attacker/server 2, DAS, ITS2 and [redacted].

153. I am asked whether I encountered any specific difficulties in relation to data recovery. I cannot recall anything specific.

154. In relation to the forensic analysis of images taken on DDOs, I can only recall images of persons who had been killed and bullet hole photographs which I discussed at paragraphs 70 to 73. I cannot recall whether these were subjected to forensic analysis save for the bullet hole photographs, which were not, and the reasons for this.

155. I am asked questions in relation to [redacted] ITS1. I do not recall the names [redacted] ITS1 and [redacted] ITS1, however, I assume that this concerns UKSF servers. I am aware that the data would have been related to operations by UKSF. I believe this was before my time with Op Nm, however, I think I recall being very dissatisfied with the conclusion of that particular LOE. I am asked what I thought was the appropriate course of action in relation to obtaining this server. This should have been seized as it was relating to the investigation. As previously mentioned, I am aware that there was alleged deletion of material from this server and that it had been explained by UKSF at the time that it was not deliberate but this caused some suspicion because of the timing as it was immediately before it was to be seized. I am unsure whether I had this feeling at the time or since exposure to material in the media. I am asked whether I was ever provided with rationale from Lt Col John Harvey (GOLD) in relation to ordering an independent investigation into the deletion. I cannot recall being provided with any rationale. I recall there were questions around why it was deleted and GOLD had a number of ways forward which included an SIB investigation or internal investigation by UKSF (which I would have considered less satisfactory of the two options). These options were not discussed with me. Since then I have questioned the robustness of GOLD's response to the SIO's report that data had been deleted before it could be recovered. I cannot recall anything else at this time.

156. In relation to the declaration of [redacted] N1201 and [redacted] N1141 [redacted] as suspects, I presume that this would have been GOLD's decision. I do not recall the rationale for the decision, whether I agreed with the decision

and the reason declaring those individuals as suspects rather than significant witnesses was preferred. I do not recall whose decision it was to no longer treat these individuals are suspects, the rationale for this decision and I cannot provide an opinion on the decision.

157. I do not recall the rationale for the decision to deploy covert policing tactics [redacted] or whether the use of a covert policing [redacted] policy came at the expense of an overt investigation policy. In relation to the decision to no longer pursue a covert surveillance strategy, I presume that this would have been GOLD (Lt Col Harvey's) decision. I do not know the rationale for the decision and I cannot provide an opinion on the decision.

158. In relation to the decision not to "link" the investigation, I cannot recall whose decision this was, the rationale for the decision and whether I agreed or disagreed with this decision. I not know what consideration was given to "linking" the investigation into the allegations of extrajudicial killings. I do not recall what advice was received from external advisors. I am asked whether there was adequate consideration given to the possibility that the deaths that were being investigated formed part of a wider pattern of extrajudicial killings by UKSF. I presume that there must have been some consideration but I cannot say exactly what and cannot comment on whether this was adequate.

159. I do not recall anything concerning 'systemic issues' and the 'Systemic Issues Working Group' ("SIWG") in connection with the TORs and the Op Nm investigative strategy. I cannot assist the Inquiry on these issues.

160. I cannot recall the reason for a decision made to prioritise Objective [redacted] 1, Objective [redacted] 2 and Objective TYBURN above other DDOs in November 2017. Other DDOs would have been looked at by GOLD and taken advice on whether to proceed with investigating those DDOs and the answer would have been "no". I think that this process would have taken place but I cannot recall. I do not recall who made the decision, the background to it, its

rationale, my view of the decision and whether investigation into those three objectives determined the extent of the investigation into other eight DDOs.

161. In relation to the decision in November 2018 which deemed the other eight DDOs as low priority, I do not recall who made the decision, although I assume it was based on advice given by the IRT. I do not recall the background to it, the rationale for the decision and my view on the decision at the time.

162. I recall that consideration was given to the possibility that the circumstances of any deaths in the course of DDOs being investigated were covered up by UKSF (and others). However, I cannot say to what extent this was considered.

163. From what I recall, there was a whistleblower within UKSF and it took some time to be reported to the RMP. I do not recall their name or any other identifying feature about them, when they forward and to whom they reported concerns. I recall nothing further in relation to this. This was before my tenure and triggered what eventually became Op Nm.

164. I understood that within UKSF there was a portfolio containing emails referring to the DDOs and tactics used and internal concerns within UKSF. I cannot recall the time period, any specific parties' names or operation names and I cannot recall anything further. This comes down to inference and feeling. I did not personally see any hard evidence that could be investigated to prove that there was a cover up by UKSF otherwise it would have been investigated**.** If there were formal conversations about a possible cover up by UKSF, I was not part of them. If they happened, these would have taken place at a higher level. I recall that there were conversations about whether commanders were aware and their culpability but I cannot recall who those conversations were with and the content of any conversations. In relation to any UKSF cover up, there was no tangible evidence uncovered. My feeling was that if there was enough evidence into extrajudicial killings, the commanders should have also been interviewed.

Operation CESTRO

165. I was not directly involved in Operation CESTRO and I was not part of the investigation team. Whilst employed on [redacted] (prior to 2014) I recall an occasion where manpower was sought from other teams within Campion Lines. I believe I was selected as I was available and for no other reason. I was in the office when manpower was required. I recall taking part in a search of a vehicle at [redacted], however nothing was recovered during the search. I cannot recall the reasons why, however I believe this may have been related to Operation CESTRO, although I may be mistaken in this and it may be for another investigation.

Other Investigations

166. I had no involvement in or knowledge of Operation PAVO, Operation SHIVERWOOD, [redacted], and TELEMETER 2.

Ending the Investigation

167. I cannot assist with the reasons for Op Nm ending in August 2019 as I left in June 2019. I have been asked about my awareness of outstanding lines of enquiry. I was aware that the team was deployed in Afghanistan but before interviewing they were told to return but at that point I had already left and I cannot provide any further detail such as who made the decision. I was not aware of any discussion or debate at the time between those working on Op Nm about the investigation ending as I was not longer working on Op NM. I am asked whether I considered it appropriate to end Op Nm at that time. I was not there when it ended but I have a general feeling that there were other factors influencing above the rank of SILVER that would have wanted it to end. As far as I can recall, I was not involved with the drafting of an Executive Summary in

relation to Op Nm. I do not know the reason why a detailed closing reporting was not produced.

Other matters

168. I was not involved in briefings, meetings or liaising with DSP / SPA, MOD officials / civil servants, Government ministers or Members of Parliament. I do not recall doing so in relation to UKSF / DSF. I would not know what was discussed or decided, the individuals involved and whether there are associated minutes. As I was not involved in any interactions with these bodies and individuals, I cannot give an opinion on whether there was any risk in briefing these figures.

169. In relation to CGS / DCGS / other senior members of the armed forces, I accompanied SILVER when taking a statement but cannot remember the individuals involved. The purpose was to consider the extent of DDO reviews and why these were limited to 11. 11 DDOs were reviewed internally by UKSF. Due to the rank of the person providing the statement, it was undertaken by SILVER, as usually investigators below the rank of SILVER would take those statements. This formed part of the investigation progress. As far as I can recall, this is the extent of my involvement with senior members of the armed forces in respect of Op Nm.

170. I am asked whether I am aware of any external pressure applied by others outside of the RMP in an effort to influence the outcome, or any other aspect, of Op Nm. I was aware of only a general feeling as I have already mentioned.

171. I am asked whether I agreed with the decision to apply the Leggatt Test in relation to Team 1 matters and, if not, the reason, and what I thought the impact of the decision was on the investigation. I do not recall the details of the

Leggatt test. I would have been aware of it at the time. I cannot assist the Inquiry with these issues.

Overall Impression

172. I am asked whether I consider that Operation Nm was properly conducted, comprehensive, effective and progressed expeditiously. As detailed a number of times above, I recall a feeling of dissatisfaction throughout my time with Op Nm, and a feeling that GOLD and above were subject to pressures that would have impacted strategic decisions. However, I cannot articulate why now, and at the time it would have been based on my observations that the investigation was much reduced prior to my arrival.

173. I am asked to consider whether the RMP was the right organisation to conduct this investigation. I consider that SIB investigators at the time, in Op Nm and SIB Regt, were dedicated and committed to investigating effectively and with integrity and had proven themselves as capable of doing so in conditions in which Home Office Police would fail e.g. on deployed operations. However, I question whether political and other pressures on PM(A) and other senior RMP commanders would have impacted decisions at a strategic level. This is based on memories of how I felt at the time and cannot be substantiated.

174. I am mindful of a perception that civilians have of the Army “investigating their own”. In my view, although the SIB should be part of the British Army, they should be more independent. The SIB (or today’s equivalent) is the only organisation who can deploy suitably trained investigators with the specialist pre-deployment training required to be go theatre and are uniquely equipped to investigate in dangerous areas. A civilian police force cannot do that. It is not simply putting a police officer on a plane. However, to further enhance and improve we should be more integrated with the Home Office police force who have experience with murder investigations. That is the short fall.

175. I am asked whether Op Nm received adequate support but I am unable to comment on this as I was not aware of the support provided by the MOD or senior echelons of the Army.

Other information

176. I have answered the questions to the best of my own knowledge and ability and using my own recollection in conjunction with the documents within my witness pack. I do recall viewing some limited media some time ago such as a Panorama documentary and The Times podcast before my witness statement was requested by the Inquiry but I have not sought out any material outside of my witness pack to provide my evidence.

177. I am aware that a lot of my answers are incomplete, or I am unable to answer in detail. I am mindful that this includes investigative decisions that, although I would have no part of formulating, I would have read the justification and rationale for, however I am unable to recall that now. Part of this is due to the size and complexity of the investigation, however the main reason is due to the amount of time that has passed and the complete change in my circumstances over the last 5 or 6 years. I left the Op Nm investigation mid-2019 and then the Army at the end of 2019.

178. I did have some periods of absence during my time at Op Nm. Provides details of personal factors [redacted] I undertook resettlement training and resettlement leave in 2018 and 2019. In the Army, leavers start attending courses two years before the end of your career. This ramped up in 2019. This did not impact my performance but it did mean I had periods of time away, sometimes for weeks at a time.

179. Furthermore, I recall feeling dissatisfied and unhappy during my time with Op Nm. The investigation left a bad taste generally with me personally for a number of reasons.

180. Most importantly, I was frustrated by the lack of resolution for the alleged victims and their families. If members of the forces had committed offences as has been alleged, they are not only breaking the law, it is also contrary to the standards and values of the British Army. If that had not been investigated properly and effectively by the RMP, then that is contrary to the standards and values of the RMP which, in my belief, is held to a higher standard than the rest of the Army. My whole career had been based on moral authority and an understanding of what is right and wrong and the rule of law. I was dissatisfied that this was the conclusion of my career.

181. In addition, I felt that I was not fulfilling the role of a DSIO or even that of a WO2 in an SIB Section which was something I had aspired to be for most of my career. I also had a general feeling of powerlessness regarding the direction of the investigation. SILVER asked for opinions and included the team but it did not feel like these mattered in the general sense. I felt that input was not taken into consideration. Ultimately GOLD made the decisions and it did not matter the input that was given by investigators. I felt like SILVER encouraged and engaged with investigators to make them feel included but their opinions would not lead to any changes or progress the investigation.

182. Although I believe my feelings of dissatisfaction did not impact my commitment whilst there, it did mean that when I left, I was keen to move on and not think about my time with Op Nm again. I then retrained and moved completely away from police work and experienced various changes in my life, so that even trying to put myself back in the mind-set I had then is not possible.

Statement of truth

I believe the contents of this statement to be true.

Ref (to be inserted by Inquiry)

Signed: DELME JOHN WILLIAMS

Dated: 3 June 2025