
Prepared for OPEN publication in relation to the Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan



RMP-221-0008648-A

OPNM/02/Silver

31 May 18

AH NM
GOLD Comd
CO SIB Regt RMP

Internal Update Briefing Note on The Progress Of The Irt Recommendations And Actions May 18

References:

A. IRT reports for T1 dated 24/1/17 and T2 dated 2/12/16.
B. IRT Assurance report dated 22 Nov 17.
C. Internal update briefing note for the IRT on the progress of their recommendations dated 9 Nov 17.

1. The IRT recommendations at Ref A were accepted by PM(A) in Feb 17 and their subsequent Assurance visit report with Actions at Ref B were accepted by PM(A) in Dec 17. Since then the investigation strategy has been aligned accordingly. An initial note at Ref C provided an update in Nov 17 prior to the IRT visit, as to the investigative activity taken to date. This note provides an update to Ref C against the follow up IRT recommendations and Actions.

2. IRT recommendations as per Ref A and Ref B with the respective updates are listed below and highlighted in yellow:-

Non Sensitive Recommendations (6)

3. Recommendation 1. The principles outlined in Para 289 of the Leggatt Judgement be applied to the claims made by LDC.

4 Response - The principles have been applied vigorously and to good effect of the 81 claimants in Operation ELSINORE (LDC). 79 have been discontinued.

5 Recommendation 2. The principles outlined in Para 289 of the Leggatt Judgement be similarly applied to the Operation ISOPTIC complainants.

6. Response - Again the principles were applied vigorously and to good effect.

7. Recommendation 3. That the extent of detailed investigative work carried out by the Northmoor team into the time period Herricks 17 and 18 October 2012 to September 2013 be utilised to capture and illustrate all relevant systemic issues and this product be referred to the relevant department.

8. Response - A thorough detailed and professional process was applied which clearly depicted the relevant systemic issues; these and the associated documents have all now been referred.

9. Recommendation 4. Consideration is given to pending further investigation of OP ISOPTIC complainants were it is clear the complainants are unable to be contacted.

10. Response - Of the 63 complainant files, 62 complainant files have been discontinued. Other matters that were referred to the Northmoor team amounted to 15 outstanding cases, 14 have been discontinued.

11. Recommendation 5. Team 2 adopt a more focused investigative model which places their investigative activity towards existing and outstanding matters once the process as outlined in (1) (2) and (4) as above is applied. Their activity should focus on matters where corroborative evidence and or similar MO (Modus Operandi) exist or other exceptional factors are evident i.e. serious criminal matters or breaches of prohibitive techniques. In each case approval of Gold should be obtained before the investigation commences.

12. Response - The effect of this recommendation was to focus on complainants as opposed to the many and varied complaints which became the investigative model adopted by Team 2. This enabled the Leggatt Judgement to be applied and establish a real focus on the complainant. The resulting product is thorough, comprehensive and represents good practice. The IRT believe that all the non sensitive material is now fit for purpose from any challenges that may emerge.

13. Recommendation 6. Team 2 source material has been placed on the HOLMES account however their activities have not been managed utilising MIRSAP. Consequently the IRT are comfortable that no additional work in this area is required as it would not add value.

14. Response - This was compiled with; Team 2 product is readily retrievable and capable of robust search. The focus on the HOLMES account towards aligning it to the Sensitive issues being addressed by Team 1 has resulted in the account being up to date and in line with the ongoing investigation.

<u>Update</u>:- All Team 2 investigations, less the review of the interrogation footage has been completed. This work started on 9 Mar 18 and is likely to take up to 4 months. Currently To date 87 sessions out of 170 (for [redacted] and [redacted]) have been viewed (approx 149 hrs in total)

Four further laptops and all outstanding footage have been collected from [redacted] and are currently undergoing checks prior to viewing.

Sensitive Recommendations (8)

15. **Recommendation 1 High Priority. - That the planned visit to Afghanistan in an effort to obtain witness statements from both N50 BANG and N 1133 SAIFULLAH and any other available evidence be progressed. Engagement with [redacted] APU1 personnel should also be sought with a view to gathering further intelligence/evidence.**

16. **Response (Saifullah)** - An Achieving Best Evidence interview of SAIFULLAH took place at HKIA (N) Kabul, Afghanistan between 9th September, 2017 and 10th September, 2017 an Interpreter [redacted] N5973 was present throughout. A record of the video recorded interview Exhibit No [redacted] refers. On first meeting SAIFULLAH, there was an on the ground recognition that he related readily to [redacted] N2462 Discussion between the two men revealed that both were of the same age. As a consequence of this apparent bonding it was decided that [redacted] N2462 should conduct the interview. This proved to be a positive step resulting in a detailed account being obtained. Post interview it was established that the witness SAIFULLAH was having difficulty laying claim to family land as a consequence of documents being seized during N50 Op. This matter was resolved and the said documents were subsequently returned to SAIFULLAH.

17. **Response (Bang)** - N50 BANG was not well enough to travel to Kabul in September although still working as a farmer he was considered too infirm to travel. SAIFULLAH describes his uncle as having poor hearing, eyesight and he considers that he is suffering from a mental illness (though the nature of this perceived illness is not currently known). LDC has offered a Skype interview which is neither practical nor desirable as the interview should be in accordance with the

principles laid out in the Istanbul Protocol and in accordance with Achieving best evidence guidance. At present efforts are being made to carry out an interview with BANG in Kandahar which is closer to his current location. The IRT notes that from what is currently known to date BANG was not in a position to provide direct evidence of the shootings in N50 Op. The IRT take the view that obtaining his account would not assist this investigation; his solicitors LDC have previously communicated his claim.

18. **Action 1 - Only reasonable steps should be taken to interview N50 BANG in accordance with the Istanbul Protocol and Achieving the Best Evidence guidance. His account is already known via LDC, further interview is unlikely to add any further value.**

Update:- On 2 Feb 2018, MOD were approached via HQ NM, the response from MOD Ops Directorate on the 7 Feb 18 is as follows:-

> **a. To confirm, we have agreement from RS to conduct interviews at HKIA, but there is nothing to go further afield. More importantly, without UK Forces in the areas outside Kabul, there would be significant FP issues.**

SKYPE Option has now been discounted due to the security situation. LDC will be briefed on 12 Jun 18. N50 will not be interviewed unless he is willing and able to make it to HKIA this has been policied.

19. It is also noted by the IRT that the Interpreter who carried out the 'call out' in N50 Op is [redacted] being sought for interview. This interview has real potential to contextualise the requirement to interview members of APU1 and SF personnel engaged on N50 Op.

20. **Action 2 - High Priority, the interview of the Interpreter who carried out the 'call out' in N50 Op should be pursued, reference should be made to the disposition of other members of Special Forces personnel and APU1. These aspects should be addressed in an effort to reconstruct the N50 scene and to determine the relevance and significance of further interviews with APU1.**

Update:- On 17 Jan 18, N5714 was interviewed by members of NORTHMOOR. N5714 did not provide any further details in relation to the APU.

Due to the lack of information provided by N5714 and the further statements recorded stating that APU were present at the scene, the SIO deems that there is merit in attempting to TIE the APU for completeness of the investigation. If they are traceable and willing to co-operate they should have their evidence recorded. Engagement with theatre was granted on 30 May 18 to request the information regarding access to the APU. An E-mail was sent on 31 May 18 to theatre.

21. **Recommendation 2. High Priority,** efforts to recover data sets proceed by consent and not seizure, in an effort to identify relevant material.

22. **Response** - The extensive work carried out at HMS Collingwood has led to an understanding [redacted] of aerial video data. Frequently it is assessed at the time of an SF operation [redacted]. The product is not routinely retained unless specific reasons exist to do so. Recently a large quantity of video data has been located. The SIO and the IRT believe there would be considerable merit if the focus of the searches of this data should be prioritised towards N50 Op and the existing scoping of Obj 2 and 1. The anticipated timescales should be 6 months, which would bring any resulting

product into consideration of the proposed risk assessment in summer 2018 which is discussed later in this report.

Update :- **SFHQ(A) server from HMS Collingwood now sits at RAF St Mawgan, but cannot be used until after 4 Jun when accreditation will be discussed. It is assessed we are currently just over 50% through the data on the server (there are 4 separate servers which make up the SFHQ(A) dataset server ([redacted]). Currently, only one server has been uploaded to the Forensic ToolKit (FTK) database being utilised. Due to the available space on the system at this time, the other three servers haven't yet been uploaded for analysis.**

The material from ITS2 was placed onto HDs and is at MOD Main awaiting transportation to NM for analysis. MOU has been signed and confirmed transport means to RAF St Mawgan. It has not been searched yet.

Material continues to be requested from the ITS1 server and this is being co-ordinated through Name Given SO1 Info Coh HQ DSF by consent.

The DAS system continues to be searched for relevant material. Issues with classification of material still exists which is delaying the process of recovering documents for Target List e.t.c..

From some of the E-mail material viewed/ identified as relevant and recovered to date, there are additional personnel that have been identified outside the specific unit on the task, that we are looking at. These individuals may be able to provide further LOEs/evidence. Statements have been arranged for those who are traceable and wiling to speak with us.

Some FMV footage has been recovered by consent from LG (American Air Force base) in 2017 prior to destruction of material. It has not been viewed to date to confirm whether the FMV footage relates to our DDOs as currently there is no viewing platform for the out dated system.

23. **Recommendation 3. The categorisation of suspect status currently applied to N1141 and N1201 is removed.**

24. **Response** - The suspect categorisation of both N1141 and N1201 was appropriately removed by the then SIO, Captain Jason WRIGHT.

25. **Recommendation 4. That the ten similar incidents identified by N1466 [redacted] continue to be investigated in an effort to identify any evidential discrepancies**

26. **Response** - The scoping of the ten similar events identified by N1466 [redacted] and outlined in the Op A Report dated April 2011 has been thorough and appropriately focused with still images being recovered along with some associated reporting. The SIO has indicated that he would prefer to prioritise efforts towards the most interesting of these images, i.e. those contained within Obj 2 and 1. The IRT and the SIO have had lengthy discussions with regards to the significance and ongoing management of these images. Whilst the current scoping of Obj 2 and 1 is ongoing and incomplete the IRT take the view that unless there is additional material, intelligence or evidence obtained, then there would be little value in exposing what has been achieved to date. It must be borne in mind that witnesses and or other material may emerge in the future and the integrity of the material which has been gained to date does not need to be exposed to SF without a compelling argument or other reason to do so.

Update:- No interviews or SOW have so far been recorded for the other 10 DDOs. Only background information has been recovered to date.

Minimal additional work other than stated at Ref C has been achieved on this to date, with exception of war gaming of the Investigative Strategies. The focus being firmly on the N50 Op.

27. **Action 3 that the scoping of the ten similar events continues with a prioritisation towards Obj [redacted] and [redacted] with a view to:-**

a). **recovery of SINC REPS and OPSUMS**
b). **recovery of relevant SIR's**
c). **any other material that is able to contextualise each event**

28. **That prior to affording investigative status to either of these two events ([redacted] and [redacted]) a comprehensive risk assessment should be carried out upon completion of the search criteria (currently there is insufficient evidence to justify any criminal investigation). The benefits of further investigation can then be properly determined at a later date.**

Update:- Searches have been conducted on the DAS and IFDHC and a request was sent to [redacted]. All relevant SINC REPS, OPSUMS and the relevant SIRs have been recovered for Obj [redacted] and [redacted]. Images have also been extracted from the relevant documents and photographic supplements have been produced.

SILVER has attended [redacted] to conduct searches of Legal advice given at the time. Analysis of this correspondence will continue once received from [redacted].

Additional requests for SSE have been sent to DAS and focused searches will be conducted on the [redacted] server once it is restarted.

Minimal additional work has been achieved on this so far with exception of war gaming of the Investigative Strategies held. The focus remains firmly on the N50 op.

29. **Action 4 consequently it is the view of the IRT that the scoping be completed prior to seeking expert opinion outside of this enquiry.**

30. The IRT were seeking to identify discrepancies, intelligence and evidence to establish further main lines of enquiry with possible linkages to Obj T. No such product has been obtained or identified to date.

31. The ten similar events identified by [redacted] were selected as follows;

a. EKIA versus Weapon stats.
b. The number of instances where the head of the family were being invited to lead the compound clearance and were being subsequently engaged and killed.

c. No specific intelligence or evidence has led to the compilation of this list of incidents, although it is known that regard was paid to complaints, from the [redacted]

Update:- Once a decision has been made from the GOLD group as to investigation status and accounts from the relevant personnel have been recorded an evaluation of the evidence will be made. Without submitting the images to forensic specialists it is not

deemed that the scoping has been fully conducted of the other similar incidents. Therefore (dependant on the GOLD Gp direction) it is the intent of NORTHMOOR to eventually submit the images for Obj [redacted] 2 and or [redacted] 1 for forensic analysis.

32. **Recommendation 5. At present no covert tactics requiring authorisation under the provisions of RIPA 2000 should be applied for.**

33. **Response** - No such applications have been made. The move from covert to overt investigation has been positive, productive and led to an appropriately managed investigation with a realistic focus towards all outstanding issues. Those issues in regard to Obj T primarily relate to the interview of [redacted] * personnel, the interview of N50 BANG and to trace and interview the [redacted] APU1 Interpreter. The continued scoping of Obj [redacted] 2 and [redacted] 1 should permit completion of all outstanding main lines of enquiry by the summer of 2018. As a consequence of thorough analysis the investigation has been able to establish that an incident recalled by N1194 at page 6 of his statement [redacted]

Update:- From a further review of the statements it was identified that 2 individuals required to be re-interviewed N2400 and N1194.

a. **Follow up actions:**

1) **Search the content of SPNB from ALL serving RMP on Op HERRICK 13 (SIB, 158 and 156 Pro Coy) this is prove or disprove the veracity of this statement this is on going trying to locate the SPNB.**
2) **Furtherance has now been recorded from [redacted] QMS**
3) **Record statement from [redacted] SM (not present on Obj T))**

34. **Recommendation 6. An individual duty statement /report should be sought from each participant in Obj T, who is still in service (See Para 4.7 of January Review Document risks associated with personnel no longer in service. Continued use of the NCA Interview coordination Service).**

35. **Response** - The IRT's approach in requesting duty statements/reports from each individual involved in Obj T was motivated by a desire to reconstruct the scene and determine the activity and role of each individual. The essence of such an approach is opening a line of communication between those tasked with investigating and those who may possess relevant information. In this instance no crime had been committed and no suspects at the anticipated time of request, existed. Adoption of this type of tactic occasionally permits individuals and or their representatives to come forward to discuss the specifics of what they were being requested to do. A by-product from this approach can lead to the provision confidentially of valuable intelligence frequently broader that what was sought from the individual. At the time of making this recommendation the IRT considered it to be both balanced and appropriate to these circumstances. However they now appreciate, after lengthy discussion with the SIO and GOLD the logistics of why this tactic was not employed. The recent interviews and in particular the Sec 9 statement of N1194 are considered particularly useful to the ongoing civil court case.

Update:- Due to the time sensitivities of the investigations and the accessibility of those involved a comprehensive approach has been adopted whereby the "Duty statement" has been covered through initial engagement and assessment and then a S9 was recorded as per my policy.

[redacted] *NG SAS or former SAS

The below table reflects numbers of key statements recorded and people identified requiring evidence to be recorded since the investigation became OVERT in Feb 17 following the IRT recommendations. The numbers and categories are focused purely on the N50 Op. This does not include the statements recorded prior to the IRT review or superficial system statements regarding process and recovery of material e.g. DSTL/weapon recovery etc.

Category	Number of individuals	Number Spoken to so far	Number outstanding	Remarks
Serving from the Op	NG	NG	NG	Includes personnel directly on Op and Ops Room staff, who are yet to be spoken to.
Non-serving from the Op	NG	NG	NG	The outstanding Non-Serving individuals include those who have either refused to speak to investigators or where contact has been attempted multiple times and gone unanswered or ignored. Also includes NG in LG.
APU	NG	NG	NG	Arrangements in hand to TIE these individuals. Email sent to IIA719 31 May 18.
Supporting personnel	NG	NG	NG	Includes Air Sp and
Miscellaneous	NG	NG	NG	Incudes high ranking British and Afghan Officials mentioned in statements or having significant influence in Op, including legal advice. Moreover, staff involved in data/FMV retention.
Email chain personnel	NG	NG	NG	NG witnesses identified as high priority. N5459 has refused to speak to investigators. Arrangements made W/C 4 June to speak

[1] From the outset of the investigation in 2014, according to the flap sheet and ORBAT, there were NG UK personnel on the Op NG of which were not physically located on the ground at the time. They were employed as Ops Rm staff, but for briefing purposes, continue to be included in the overall figure, as this has been the figured briefed since the previous SIO.

[2] These individuals will be assessed and filtered according to their evidential relevance and importance and may not be spoken to if deemed not evidentially required.

[3] As per footnote 2.

				with other NG priority witnesses.
Complainant Group	**NG**	**NG**	**NG**	**Includes N50, N1133 and family members.**

As the investigation continues and statements are recorded, there may be a number of individuals, who were not previously known to us and were not on the operation which may be identified as potential further lines of enquiry. Therefore, it is impossible to confirm exactly overall how many potential witnesses are still outstanding at this time.

We are in process of recording evidence surround Tgt List and SIRs, once we have the extant information to hand.

We intend to speak with the hierarchy and any additional peripheral personnel as deemed relevant by the SIO to prove or disprove the allegation.

We are still awaiting confirmation of access to FMV material form other agencies.

36. **Recommendation (7) an individual duty statement/report as necessary to other scenes as and when significant discrepancies have been identified.**

37. **Response** - As discussed above this course of action was considered impractical by the SIO and Gold in relation to Obj T. At this point in time this tactic has not been applied to the ten similar events as identified by N1466.

38. **Recommendation 8. That the back record conversion onto a suitable HOMES account be restricted to material relevant to the main lines of enquiry. A 'Sequence of Events Category' is developed within the HOLMES account.**

39. **Response** - The HOLMES account despite initially being populated with a mass of diverse material now appears to be focused and up to date, able to support all aspects of the main lines of enquiry pertaining to Operation Northmoor. The recent external Indexers training courses have proven to be invaluable.

40. **Response** - There is now a comprehensive and focused Sequence of Events that will be able to support any criminal or civil proceedings.

41. All IRT recommendations have been actioned where possible to date in a progressive manner with the focus continuing to be N50.

Signed on original

MA Cox
Major
SILVER Comd
OP NM
Contact Details

[4] As per footnote 2.

AGENDA FOR THE OP NORTHMOOR EXECUTIVE GROUP TO BE HELD AT SPA CONFERENCE ROOM RAF NORTHOLT FROM 0830 TO 1030 HRS ON TUE 6 JUN 18

Item	Lead
1. Introductions and opening remarks.	PM(A)
2. HQ overview. **UPDATE** a. Presentation/Policy b. D DJEP visit. c. Parliamentary Business. d. Finance	AH OP NM
3. Investigative activity. **UPDATE** a. IRT Recommendations. b. Complainant(s). c. Witnesses. d. Evidence.	Gold
4. Investigative Next Steps. **UPDATE then DECISION** a. FORM 3 - Op TYBURN b. LDC to be informed EST is unlikely to be met. c. +10 In scope Objectives (1) Update brief; (2) Further priority Objective to be investigated to see if evidence exists. If not then suspend all until positive evidence is forthcoming. (3) Restrict scoping of remaining 9 to examination of data to identify any discrepancies. d. Further IRT Assurance visit. Jul onwards	Gold/ Silver
5. FDHC. **UPDATE** a. Min AF Briefing b. Way ahead. c. iFDHC update	AH Policy
6. Executive Group observations/comment. a. Opportunity for IAG members and DSP and DJEP to make any observations or comment.	IAG Members/DSP/DJEP
7. Any Other Business.	All
8. Date of Next Meeting.	Gold

Op NM EXEC GP SPEAKING AND BRIEFING NOTES

Present will be: PM(A), AH Op NM, AH Policy, Gold, Sir Jon Murphy, Andrew Caley, Darren Read, Stephen Kell, Mark Ellison, Peter Ryan. The meeting will be run by AH Op NM who will ensure that we don't exceed the two hours. I will highlight the agenda items that are updates and those that require a decision to be made. Focus is on briefing on the +10.

AGENDA

1. **Introductions and Opening Remarks – PM(A).**

- As required: Last meeting was in mid December which agreed the IRT recomendations. Progress has been made since then with the serving witness interviews concluded and one non-serving witnesses to be interviewed. A further stay to the civil proceedings has been agreed primarily through the personal contact of Gold with LDC and has been extended from 30 Mar to 30 Jun.

2. **HQ Overview – AH OP NM**. Purpose is to highlight the environment and the factors that have been playing out in the strategic and operational space. **Update only**:

- Presentation/Public Scrutiny:
  - Little direct press interest; a couple of references wrt Harrogate CM and NI Legacy Investigations

- Parliamentary Business:
  - SofS appearance at HCDC – ambushed on legacy investigations and passing reference to Op NM
- Finance:
  - Allocation of funding is £400K; known contract uplift of £130k
  - CT is less than last year but reflects actual spend. Understanding that 'unknown' spend may be required.

3. **Investigative Activity – Gold. Update only**:

a. Wrt Team 1 matters and particular the complaint by Bang and Saifullah (Op TYBURN), represented by LDC.

- IRT Recommendations. Good progress has been made against the majority of the IRT recommendations. (See hand out).
- Complainant(s). Saifullah has been interviewed but Bang is not likely to be interviewed due to ill health and restricted movement. There can be no interview outside HKIA due to security situation.
- Witnesses. NG personnel UK pers were on the Op, of the NG deployed and at the scene of the Op NG have been spoken to NG who is no longer serving and yet to be seen is living abroad. The remainder have refused to speak to us or are not traceable/contactable.
- There are several lines of enquiry still to be bottomed out, FMV footage, Support staff (Heli Pilots, Ops Room etc), APU pers. Approx NG witnesses in total, yet to be seen (but not necessarily present at the scene).
- Evidence. There is no tangible evidence, at this juncture, to support the allegation. A Form 3 has been submitted via OOT, for agreement that EST is not met.

Messaging – The investigation is not complete.

b. Wrt Team 2 matters all Team 2 investigations, less the review of the interrogation footage have been completed.

- To date 87 sessions out of 170 ([redacted] and [redacted]) have been viewed (approx 149 hrs in total). No evidence thus far.

4. **IRT Review– Gold. Update then Decision**:

a. FORM 3 - Op TYBURN. As stated at para 3.
b. LDC to be informed EST is unlikely to be met. Meeting is scheduled for Tue 12 Jun 18.
c. +10 In-scope Objectives
(1) Update brief;
(2) Further priority Objective to be investigated to see if evidence exists. If not then suspend all until positive evidence is forthcoming.
(3) Restrict scoping of remaining 9 to examination of data to identify any discrepancies.

d. Further IRT Assurance visit. Jul onwards

5. **FDHC – AH Policy. Update**:

- Brief to Min AF
- Way Ahead.
- iFDHC update

6. IAG Comment. IAG Members.

- Offered the opportunity as required to make any comments or observations that haven't been made throughout the meeting.

7. AOB.

8. DONM

23 May 18

AGENDA FOR THE FDHC PROJECT BRIEFING TO BE HELD AT NORTHMOOR TEAM CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1300 HRS ON MON 4 JUN 18

Item	Lead
1. Introduction by Role	Op NM AH Policy (Chair)
2. Background to Op NORTHMOOR	AH NM
3. Background to IFDHC a. Requirement b. Build c. Accreditation	OC SPCB WOIC AST
4. Inception of FDHC Phase - 1 Sep 18	OC SPCB
5. Certification Update	WOIC Inv Sp
6. IFDHC Update a. Data back-up and collapse of system b. Move of IFDHC from HMS Collingwood to RAF St Mawgan and reconstitution c. Accreditation of IFDHC	IFDHC Project Manager WOIC AST SAC
7. Walkthrough of IFDHC/FDHC Phase 1 project area [redacted] for those individuals new to the project.	IFDHC Project Manager Facility Infrastructure Manager
8. Cross-room Connectivity Update a. COA 1 – Full Certification of all [redacted] rooms b. COA 2 – High level encryption ([redacted]) of data transfer between [redacted] c. COA 3 – Commercial encryption on data transfer and additional security measures requested by the Data Owner/Accreditor	IFDHC Project Manager Facility Infrastructure Manager WOIC Inv Sp
9. Additional IFDHC COAs a. Direct connection of viewing and audit terminals to IFDHC server within [redacted]. b. IFDHC hosted completely within [redacted]	IFDHC Project Manager Facility Infrastructure Manager
10. Phase 1 Update a. Build b. Accreditation c. [redacted] d. Utility (FTK/Viewing)	WOIC AST SAC WOIC 3C

11. Requirement for ingestion and viewing of other recovered datasets/ESI.	AH NM IFDHC Project Manager
12. Any other business a. SPC Requirements.	WOIC Inv Sp

(Signed electronically)

A RIDLEY
SSgt
IFDHC Project Manager
Contact Details