
Prepared for OPEN publication in relation to the Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan



RMP-221-0007031-A

IMPACT OF OP NORTHMOOR ON RMP ACTIVITY – RTC (LIGHT) 26 SEP 16 - BRIEFING NOTE

Ser	Output	Risk
1	**General**	This initial activity to deliver Op NM as it exists today impacted the Bde in broadly two ways: 1. **HQ PM(A) and HQ 1 MP Bde Staff Capacity.** a. The staff development of NM fixed the HQ for a considerable time which removed the focus of activity from doctrine, concepts and capability development. The effect has been felt across all areas within FD. b. The specific roles of AH Tech and SO1 Inv in NM has affect ted their ability to deliver their primary role without significant individual investment. 2. **Regimental Manning and KSE.** The swift fill of high quality RMP soldiers to NM using AE PiDs resulted in manning, middle managers (SNCOs) and specific KSE being stripped from sub-units with an obvious, immediate and harsh impact. Over time, some of this impact has reduced and Regiments have adapted to the status quo, this is not without risk.
2	**GENERATE for Operational Commitments**	1. **Op TEMPERER.** Between May 15 and May 16 RMP API instructors trained in excess of 24,000 soldiers for the Op TEMPERER commitment. Op TEMPERER Instructors were among some of the KSE assigned to NM resulting in a 60% loss to capacity. This is directly affecting MP ability to deliver the Op TEMPERER training requirement. 2. **Op Escalin.** The 1 MP Bde commitment to this has been taken at risk 3. **Contribution to Army Operational Trawls.** 1 MP Bde only contributes to 5% of the activity for which it is trawled. (126 trawls in 12 months – Only 6 taken 4. **BATUS AND BATUK:** We currently have extended gaps within the BATUK and BATUS commitments – we are constantly battling to meet these rotations due to other activity. Surge atty is okay 5. **OP TOSCA:** A SNCO heavy commitment resulting in soldiers repeating tours. Reliance on Reserves to plug the gaps. 6. **Specialist KSE.** NM employs an RMP SSgt who is one of the few [redacted] with her specfic skillset within the Army. She is routinely force sensed/trawled at ADOC level. 7. **Close Protection.** 5% Loss to CP manning due to skill set being employed in NM. 177 8. **3eFP. The essential deployment of MP FE to eFP w**ill inevitably add friction to the programme and add gravitas to the risk being against the VANGUARD commitment due to double and triple hatting of VANGUARD FE.

Enhanced Forward Presence.

4 pers

3	**At READINESS to meet Current Threats**	1. **Collective Training.** a. **CT1.** Impact felt most strongly at CT1 with only 68% events conducted (8 CT1 exercises cancelled in the last 12 months). b. **CT3-4.** 23% Reduced Commitment to CT3-4. Ex ASKARI STORM 1/16 (Reduction: from Sect to 2 pax) Ex PRAIRIE STORM 1/16 (Reduction: from PI(-) to Sect) Ex PRAIRIE STORM 4/16 (Reduction from PI(-) to 0) c. **CT5-6 (Including Sp to Log Bde CAST).** Meeting minimum commitment, but: i. Ranks are often de-enriched (SSgt or WOs provided for SO3). ii. Reduced ability or unable to Generate SIB or Specialist Assets to support. iii. Support to Log Bdes is generally under developed. 2. **Extended Periods held @R.** SIB Investigators and Spec Ops assets are being held at extended periods of High Readiness (R2) due to loss of skill sets and MFD pers to NM. 3. **Under Developed G6 Capability.** Our ability to communicate using BOWMAN is underdeveloped at a general User level and throughout the specialist skill sets required. 4. **PA NTHER Conversion.** The requirement to convert to PANTHER is an added friction to the ability to train and maintain @R commitment. Noting IOC for 1 MP Bde to support its full VANGUARD Commitments is 1 Sep 17.
4	**Persistently Engaged**	1. Engagement with 1XX is under developed with resources being scarce to support Defence Engagement Activity.
5	**Police the Force**	1. **25% reduction to SIB Capability.** a) Loss of SQEP has denuded the capability held within the SIB Regt (Loss of 4 x SIO/DSIO, 10 x ABEs, 2 TIMs, 5 x SOIT). Regeneration of those skills is constrained by course allocation and budgets. b) Demand on investigative resource mitigated by introducing 'must/could/should' decision making template. The result, ceding jurisdiction to the civilian police where possible due to resource constraints, which further denudes experience. c) Historical enquiries have been further delayed as MIR capability diverted to NORTHMOOR (Op BUTE and Op GEMINI). d) Increasing time pressure is being placed on resources due to BCM and the importance of reputational investigations

		diverts focus from more complex offences, furthering delay. 2. **Specialist and Technical Capability.** The requirement to provide specialist support to NORTHMOOR particularly to cyber-crime, AST and intelligence has diminishing the ability to support not just the Better Case Management process but in some part and in particular cyber the Service Justice System. *In order to add some detail to the scale of the task ahead of 3C there is a requirement to build (reconfigure)* [NG] *hard drives at PJHQ in order then to go through the process of triaging the data prior to be able to start the data ingest process. It has been calculated that it will take one person 10 years to complete this task. Historically it has taken 5 years for an individual to be capable of that level of competence. There are a number of sites that require that level of work to be undertaken. Due to the lack of succession planning in the past we are about 4 years behind providing a number of personnel capable to undertake this activity unless we undertook a fast track system but that would require investing more personnel into the SPCB 3C or alternatively more personnel into the Scientific support hubs where we could invest in activity at level 1 and 2 for mobile devices in order to compensate the SJS requirement. You will be aware that there was a withdrawal of 3C assets to provide SJS and Accreditation support.* a) **Accreditation**. NORTHMOOR requires its own dedicated accreditation team – these resources will need to be drawn from elsewhere. Without accreditation NORTHMOOR will be unable to use data material as evidence in a court environment. This is now critical requirement and you will not the above constraint. b) **AST** activity with NORTHMOOR has resulted in other major software tasks being placed at a lower level of priority including the need to renew [IT system] – the failure of which is self-evident and could place the Service Police and SJS status in doubt; there will be a knock on effect with other agencies including such bodies like PNC and PND that assume that we are able to keep police records. 3. **Investigative Delay. To Follow ...** 4. **NIM Led Policing.** Units report a 50% reduction in NIM led policing activity (2 patrols per shift to 1). This accompanies a general reduction in routine Garrison activity.
6	**Moral Component.**	1. **Nights Out Of Bed. To Follow ...** 2. **Medical Stats. Sick at Home (SaH).** a. In the past year, medical statistics recorded on WISMIS have risen by 125. b. Specifically within this statistic, the JNCO cohort has risen by 333%. **c. Note:** The root cause of illness cannot be attributed to any one factor. The loss of this manning is an added friction with NM AE PiDs and the requirement to visit SaH nder AGAI 99, fixes the Unit CoC and welfare staff.