
Prepared for OPEN publication in relation to the Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan



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From: NORTHMOOR TEAM-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj)
Sent: 12 December 2016 11:49
To: NORTHMOOR TEAM-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)
Cc: Army PM-AH-TECH (Morris, Rob Col)
Subject: 20161212-GOLD_MEETING_POINTS-OCNM
Attachments: Op NORTHMOOR.docx

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Completed

Col,

Please see attached the consolidated points from NM.

Kind Regards

Tina

Maj Tina Stitson | **OC** | **NORTHMOOR Team**| RAF St Mawgan, Newquay, Cornwall TR8 4HP
Contact details
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ATTENTION: DII/F Email address due to change to SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC from 25 Nov 16.

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Op NORTHMOOR/Team 1/Correspondence Version 1.0

12 Dec 16

GOLD

Copy to:

AH Tech
MIR

NORTHMOOR TEAM GOLD GROUP AGENDA POINTS FOR MEETING IN ANDOVER ON 13 DEC 16.

AP 1 – Introductions. Nil

AP 2 – Terms of Reference. Nil

AP 3 – Factual Update. Nil

AP 4 – Investigative Progress.

1. **Issue**: **Team 1 Investigative progress**.

2. **Recommendation/Direction sought**: For situational awareness.

3. **Timing**: ROUTINE.

4. **Background**: Team 1 MLOEs remain unchanged; progress in each element is hampered by availability and access to relevant material/evidence together with the pedestrian pace of deployment to Afghanistan in order to record key evidence from Afghanistan based witnesses and complainants.

5. Relevant information and evidence continues to be identified and recovered from the limited resources available at this time. The IFDHC (HMS Collingwood) capability continues to search relevant data sets that have been made available with limited capacity to export the results.

6. Further data repositories continue to be searched with useful results (PJHQ, DAS).

7. Availability and access to the [redacted] ITS1 system has been denied; current planning indicates this data set is available today (8 Dec 16). Response due 9 Dec 16 from data owner following which authority will be sought from PM(A) to secure and preserve this relevant data repository.

8. Authorisation for the use of covert tactics has been applied for (Oct 16). This had been pended on direction from Gold since Aug 16. Direction provided that applications are unlikely to be considered until after the IRT have completed their review of Team 1 matters (circa Feb 17).

9. Executive action around declared suspects' remains pended in favour of accessing relevant data ([redacted]) and the implementation of covert tactics. This is because both areas have been significantly delayed beyond the control of the SIO; the result is little activity in progressing Team 1 investigations in a meaningful way.

10. **Issue**: **Recovery of the [redacted] server**.

11. **Recommendation/Direction sought**: Decision to be promulgated by Gold regarding action to be taken and timelines for recovering the [redacted] server.

12. **Timing**: URGENT.

13. **Background**: Relevant evidence sits on the [redacted] server. Recovery of the server has been pended due to the negative impact to operations conducted by the data owner; it is a current operational data repository which supports on-going and worldwide tasks. The [redacted] server is being replaced with all data currently held being migrated to a new server, at the conclusion of which the current server becomes redundant.

14. Agreement in principle has been reached which would see RMP recovering the redundant server in evidence. The data owners have not agreed to its release, citing security concerns and have indicated data migration will be complete as of 8 Dec 16. The intention of the data owner is to delete all data from the redundant server. Following data migration, the decision made regarding pending recovery is not relevant as the data will be held on the new server therefore recovery of the redundant server will not impact on the operational capabilities. Failure to recover the server beyond this date risks loss of evidence and may attract adverse comment at any subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

15. A restricted view of data held on the [redacted] server has previously been afforded by the data owner; the restrictions are such that render this option as being unviable. Relevant evidence exists on the server. Further information on this aspect can be provided and are not articulated here for security reasons.

AP 5 – Review of decision making/policy.

16. **Issue**: **Review of Team 1 decision making and policy**.

17. **Recommendation**: All policy to be agreed and countersigned by Gold/Silver. Policy/decision making by Gold/Silver to be recorded in accordance with MIM, MPID, MIRSAP & College of Policing standards. Once recorded, policy to be submitted to the MIR. Historic and future SIO policy should be countersigned by Gold/Silver where appropriate.

18. **Timing**: ROUTINE.

19. **Background**: Whilst the majority of policy decision making by Team 1 SIO has been made in consultation and with the awareness of Gold and PIP4, these policy decisions have not been countersigned by either Silver or Gold.

20. To date and from the inception of Op NORTHMOOR, very few policy decisions by Silver/Gold have been committed to written policy in accordance with best practice. Risk exists about the lack of an accountable record of key decisions on this complex and high profile enquiry.

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21. Team 1 are yet to be reviewed by the IRT; this is scheduled for early 2017, subject to the relevant clearance being attained. Previously, some decision making has been reviewed by GMP MCRT.

22. **Issue**: **The Big Word linguist translation of ABE interviews was found to be unreliable.**

23. **Recommendation**: Policy is required from Gold Comd regarding whether Team 2 is to continue to investigate the allegations detailed within the ABE interviews of 24 Afghanistan detainees.

24. **Timing**: URGENT.

25. **Background**: The allegations of mistreatment of UK detainees are recorded in separate three sources, one of which is the ABE interview, of which 24 were conducted. As a result of an internal review, the evidence from 3 of those ABE interviews have been deemed unreliable. Comprehensive reviews of all 24 ABE interviews have been requested to determine their accuracy, without which the exact nature of the allegation cannot be determined.

AP 6 – Family/Complainant Concerns. Nil.

AP 7 – Community Issues/Community Impact Assessment Review. Nil

AP 8 – Resources.

26. **Issue**: **Contingency planning for Cyber Lead appointment**.

27. **Recommendation**: Replacement Op NORTHMOOR Cyber Lead required to be identified and commence HO/TO w/c 16 Jan 17.

28. **Timing**: URGENT.

29. **Background**: In early Feb 17, WO2 Priddin commences final resettlement/leave on completion of his service. Currently there is no suitable replacement identified. SPCB have demonstrated that they cannot support this function and support the SJS concurrently. A like for like replacement from industry is anticipated to be hugely expensive. Without a dedicated SQEP Cyber Lead, the numerous and complex cyber tasks (inclusive of detailed preparation and end user requirements for FDHC), are at a high risk of failure. Due to the intricate commercial process involved in obtaining WO2 Priddin's service beyond his employment within the Army and the time this takes, there is risk that he will decline the offer of the Cyber Lead role.

30. **Issue**: **The mass data recovery requested by the investigation teams will require SQEP personnel to accomplish**.

31. **Recommendation**: 3 x SQEP digital forensic analysts be provided to NORTHMOOR on a permanent rather than an ad-hoc basis.

32. **Timing**: ROUTINE.

33. **Background**: The investigation teams have requested mass data recovery from a variety of sources. The data requested is a substantial amount and many of the recoveries will be complex in order for them to be classed as 'forensic recoveries' and therefore evidential rather than the simpler but still time consuming recoveries. SPCB have stated that they cannot support NORTHMOOR in these requirements without compromising support to the SJS. These data sources will require a substantial amount of time and therefore cannot be serviced on an ad-hoc basis which is currently the only way that SPCB can support NORTHMOOR. The personnel assigned would have to be SQEP and would also have to be creditable enough to engage with the all of the data asset owners and their organisations and have the required clearance. At this moment in time various lines of enquiry are essentially stalled into the personnel are provided to complete these actions. This requirement was outlined further in a loose minute provided to Gold.

34. **Issue**: **AST support to Project Zeus**.

35. **Recommendation**: A SQEP be appointed on a permanent basis to control the AST support to Project ZEUS.

36. **Timing**: ROUTINE.

37. **Background**: Project ZEUS is a complicated project to deliver and maintain. AST does not currently have the manpower to support SPCB and ZEUS concurrently on any more than an ad-hoc basis. Should ZEUS have a malfunction or crash NORTHMOOR would not be able to provide or control the assets to prioritise supporting ZEUS. The large amount of sensitive information on ZEUS could be a reputational and data security risk should there be a malfunction that we cannot support appropriately. This requirement was outlined further in a loose minute provided to Gold.

38. **Issue**: **AST request to Army Change Portal is not yet authorised and the Unisys Licensing Business Case is due to expire on 31 Dec 16**.

39. **Recommendation**: 1MP X liaise with SPCB in order to expedite this request.

40. **Timing**: URGENT.

41. **Background**: Unisys have stated they are willing to support us without payment previously however they are now expecting a purchase order. We can apply to them for extenuating circumstances on 20 Dec 16 but this is a reputational risk and Unisys could deny to support NORTHMOOR without payment. Unisys are the system provider for HOLMES2 v16. Should the licensing keys expire then the HOLMES system will be unavailable until licensing keys are procured. This will lead to severe limitations on NORTHMOOR investigative capability, the MIR will close, the Disclosure Cell will not be able to conduct its' work and NORTHMOOR's investigative teams will not be able to support the JCRP process.

AP 9 – Disclosure Issues.

42. **Issue**: **Disclosure requirements of NORTHMOOR**.

43. **Recommendation**. A meeting be held between the OOT and the Disclosure Cell as soon as possible.

44. **Timing**. ROUTINE.

45. **Background**. A meeting between the OOT and the Disclosure Cell is vital to the successful conduct of disclosure.

46. **Issue**. **Civil disclosure – The stay to civil proceedings is due to expire on 31 Dec 16**.

47. **Recommendation**. 1MP X liaise with GLD regarding the requirements for civil disclosure.

48. **Timing**. URGENT.

49. **Background**. The requirements for civil disclosure are currently unknown but due to the nature of the HOLMES incident structure there is information on Tm 1 and Tm 2 activity within the same incident and therefore the same disclosable area. Information is required in order to shape requirements and for material not to be inappropriately disclosed.

AP 10 – Media Strategy. Nil

AP 11 – Legal Advice.

50. **Issue**: **Regularity of engagement with the OOT**.

51. **Recommendation/Direction sought**: Regular and diarised meetings with between NORTHMOOR teams and the OOT.

52. **Timing**: ROUTINE.

53. **Background**: NORTHMOOR Team have dedicated legal advice from the OOT (Stephen Kell and Francis Davis), which is hugely beneficial. Unfortunately, due to competing priorities, provision of advice can be slow, causing further delay in the processing of cases. Regular meetings with the OOT would provide a forum to raise those matters which require the provision of advice.

54. **Issue**: **A review of the Hussein interrogation footage by SPA**.

55. **Recommendation**: Direction is sought in respect of who is to be in receipt of this footage following the recent handover to the Operational Offending Team as advice is to be sought as to whether any offences identified in respect of interrogation techniques should be pursued.

56. **Timing**: ROUTINE.

57. **Background**: In Jan 15, NORTHMOOR were requested to recover a laptop from [redacted] Defence Intelligence which had been presented to the Judge presiding over the Hussein Enquiry. A subsequent review of the footage was conducted by NCA E2 [redacted] who provided a report based on a psychological review of the interrogation tactics and

the effectiveness of 13 sessions. Of the 13 he classed 12 as ineffective, which included elements outside of policy. Of those 12 he classed 4 as being in contravention of policy with 1 particular interrogation being specifically noted.

58. **Issue**: **Discontinuance Procedure**.

59. **Recommendation**. OOT and Gold provide direction regarding whether these investigations be submitted to the JCRP or receive Service Police reports.

60. **Timing**: ROUTINE.

61. **Background**: The NORTHMOOR Team currently have 14 investigations that have been transferred from SIB Regt to NORTHMOOR on the completion of Op HERRICK. All of the files are from 2013 and 2014 and are for matters that would ordinarily be investigated by Tm 2. These files are currently with Tm 3 for completion and direction is now sought regarding the best means to do so.

AP 12 – Lessons Learnt/IHAT.

AP 13 – Staff Welfare Issues.

AP 14 – Other Impact Areas.

62. **Issue**: **Delivery of FDHC**.

63. **Recommendation**. Engagement required between Army Procurement, Company name 1 and SPCB in order to authorise and provide the system and functional requirements.

64. **Timing**. URGENT.

65. **Background**. During the SWG on 7 Dec 16 IIA845 warned that the delivery of ZEUS was heading towards becoming a "high profile failure". The issues mentions include;

a. A new SAC must be appointed and there will be delay until this occurs.

b. Company name 1 have not received the system or functional requirements of the system and have based their plans on the interim system. The interim system is a temporary system that was never intended to be the basis of ZEUS.

c. Company name 1 has not received the security requirements of ZEUS. IIA845 has not received any SyOPs or CONOPs.

d. Company name 1 will not take any responsibility for providing any applications and will have no responsibility for these applications due to point b, further they do not believe that they have to provide functional tests at this time.

e. No paperwork supporting software applications has been provided.

f. Previous workshops conducted have been predominantly invalidated due to the lack of security software provided.

g. A Security Meeting between SPCB, WO2 Priddin, [redacted] and [redacted] will take place on 14 Dec 16 in order to address some of these issues.

66. **Issue**: **Digital Forensic Accreditation for ZEUS**.

67. **Recommendation**: 1MP X provide direction regarding the accreditation requirements of ZEUS.

68. **Timing**. URGENT.

69. **Background**. This information has been provided to Gold in a loose minute. The COA identified are as follows:

a. COA 1 - NORTHMOOR only accreditation, this would require an accreditation team in order to do so and would have an impact on the delivery and maintaining of the system.

b. COA 2 - NORTHMOOR bolts onto SPCB accreditation, WO2 Priddin believes that this is possible but it is not currently supported by SPCB.

c. COA 3 – NORTHMOOR does not pursue accreditation and instead relies on robust practise and policies. This approach is endorsed by WO2 Priddin and the MPS are not pursuing accreditation however this could later be challenged in court.

70. **Issue**: **Data Export from IFDHC delayed**.

71. **Recommendation**: SPCB to endorse a COA regarding data export.

72. **Timing**: ROUTINE.

73. **Background**: The Data Export Standing Order that was endorsed by [redacted] has been sent to SPCB as the Information Asset Owner. SPCB have not endorsed a COA and thus data export from HMS Collingwood is delayed and has not occurred. This was discussed at the SWG on 7 Dec 16, [redacted] will liaise with WO2 Priddin regarding this. An OPBC will need to be produced and be declared a UOR in order to expedite the procurement of storage media for this process. This process is currently a slow one as SPCB have many priorities however an endorsement from them for a COA and some supporting documents will allow WO2 Priddin to begin this process and complete it.

74. **Issue**: **Infrastructure delays for** [redacted]

75. **Recommendation**: For situational awareness.

76. **Timing**: ROUTINE.

77. **Background**: The design phase for the infrastructure requirements for [redacted] will not be complete until the 6 Feb 17. This means that actual works will not be able to commence before Mar 17. Building works are unlikely to be complete until Jun/Jul 17. This will delay the installation of the FDHC. Infrastructure works were meant to be complete by Oct 16, this was then pushed back to Apr 17 and now further delays have been generated

which are pushing the date for completion back to Jun/Jul 17. No apparent progress has been made with regards to this from May 16. The delays have been generated by [redacted] outwith NORTHMOOR.

78. **Issue**: **Mental Health Issues**.

79. **Recommendation**: For situational awareness.

80. **Timing**: ROUTINE.

81. **Background**: The mental strain put on personnel to complete work is impacting on delivery and the moral component is deteriorating rapidly with symptoms appearing akin to battle fatigue. The Unit is not up to strength and with personnel in key roles of responsibility either signed off sick with stress or no longer in post due to stress, has had a significant detrimental effect on those that remain (particularly at SSgt and above level) as they seek to cover a multitude of tasks as well as their own roles. The movement of remaining key personnel within the next few months due to assignments is going to exacerbate this issue.

AP 15 – AOB: Nil.

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Maj
OC NORTHMOOR Team