

MOD-198-0003917-A

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

MOD F 1620N
(Revised 03/16)

GSCS	OFFICIAL SENSITIVE <input type="checkbox"/>	SECRET <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TOP SECRET <input type="checkbox"/>
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National Intelligence Report Form A

ORGANISATION AND OFFICER	Maj Cox OP NM		DATE/TIME OF REPORT	26 Sep 2018			
INFORMATION /INTELLIGENCE SOURCE/INTELLIGENCE SOURCE REF No. (ISR)			REPORT URN				
SOURCE AND INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION TO BE COMPLETED BY SUBMITTING OFFICER							
SOURCE EVALUATION	1 Reliable		2 Untested		3 Not Reliable		
INFORMATION/ INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT	A Known directly to the source	B known indirectly to the source, but corroborated	C known indirectly to the source	D Not KNown	E Suspected to be false		
REPORT							
PERSON RECORD:			DoB:		PNC ID:		
OPERATION NAME/NUMBER:					S	I	H
Background Information by Maj Cox On Wed 19 Oct 18, [redacted] location given [redacted], a further too witness interview was conducted by Maj Cox (SILVER Comd NM) and WO2 Williams (DSIO) of [redacted] N1466 [redacted] sets out current role(s) [redacted] He was surprised that we were still investigating but was genuinely very content that we had returned. From the very outset of the interview [redacted] N1466 [redacted] was very open with his comments and thoughts but also stated that he did not want everything he said recorded formally. It was explained to him that we wished to record a formal statement to clarify points from his original statement recorded in Jun 15. He was also briefed that should there be anything he did not want to have recorded in his statement, but was happy to discuss and then be recorded for intelligence purposes then this would also be done. I explained that as the SIO, I had full knowledge of his previous engagements with the SIB and of his previous conversation with Brig Warren and Lt Col McCallister. [redacted] [redacted] The interview was difficult in that [redacted] N1466 [redacted] wanted to provide lots of information surrounding all his knowledge of events at the time, when he was ACOS, and his opinion of certain events, decisions and personnel. This information kept crossing the line between what he wanted to disclose formally and informally. We established the ground rules and the points required were recorded in S9 format.					■	■	

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<p>In addition to this he provided the following information which were points he felt we need to be aware of but that he could not have recorded formally at this time.</p>			
<p>1. He felt that the decision made by DSF [N1802] at the time with regards to conducting a TTP review instead of investigating the issues he had brought to him was a "Cop out".</p>	■	■	
<p>2. [REDACTED] "N1466 stated that N1802 was under a lot of pressure due to an international incident (not relating to Afghanistan) and described the impact that this would have had on N1802, the unit involved and as a result he took the easy option"</p>	■	■	
<p>3. He stated that [N1788], one of his SO1s at the time and other officers who were involved in the TTP review all had the same opinion that what was going on in Afghanistan was criminal and unacceptable and that something was seriously going wrong. Although he did state that he didn't know what [N1788's] opinion was now but it may well have changed. (note [N1788] has been interviewed and a further too has already been arranged to clarify points)</p>	■	■	
<p>4. There was a general feeling and concerns about the behaviour and activity of the 2 [SUs: SU1C and SU1A] but he did not investigate [SU1C] any further. He felt the HQ was fully cognisant and fully aware that both [SUs] activities had raised concerns.</p>	■	■	
<p>5. When [Obj 1] occurred, having raised his concerns with DSF he was ordered to speak with CO [SFHQ(A)] (Then [N1786]). Once he'd had the conversation he considered that this was the higher HQ giving direction to the troops on the ground and that it had worked as it appeared the activity in question stopped briefly, but then continued. This resulted in him bringing it formally to the attention of DSF.</p>	■	■	
<p>6. As he re-read his E-mails he stated that he still believed what he had brought to the attention of DSF should have been referred to the Service Police at the time and that he regretted not being more forceful and insisting at the time.</p>	■	■	
<p>7. He went on to state that he felt the TTP review was a thinly veiled Coded message from DSF to the [SU] to stop their activities.</p>	■	■	
<p>8. When asked, he stated he did not know of any investigation conducted into the OP [A] allegations, he knew that [N1785] (at the time CO [UKSF3] had written a letter based on what one of his junior officers had told him, but at the time he couldn't remember the name of the young officer as he was kept away from OP A.</p>	■	■	
<p>9. There had been rumours of Pistols being taken into the IEF and then removed and being used on other operations, but he wasn't away of any investigations or specific incidents.</p>	■	■	
<p>10. He then started talking about and officer called [N1789] ([REDACTED]). He was investigated for his activities in [REDACTED]</p>	■	■	

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<p>Afghanistan but cleared because [Role Given] lied for him and the incident was covered up. He did not provide any further details of the incident, but believed SIB had investigated due to its nature. He stated [N1789] was considered for [promotion] and was privy to a conversation between [N1802] and [IIA119], when his suitability was discussed. It was decided that his conduct on operations would not make him suitable [for promotion] that coupled with his personality meant there was a better candidate.</p>			
<p>11. Without prompting he then went on to offer names of personnel we may wish to speak to who had regaled other incidents to him these were as follows:-</p>			
<p>[Name Given] [UKSF3] [REDACTED]</p> <p>He described an incident whereby [UKSF1] cleared a compound and then placed all personnel in one room for safety. whilst being guarded another [UKSF1 soldier] entered the room and indiscriminately opened fire on the personnel. He was jumped on by other [soldiers] but it did result in a number of those in the room being killed. This incident was covered up. He did not give any DTG or location but stated [Name Given] might be able to give more detail and offered to make contact and see if he would speak to us.</p> <p>I stated that I would not, at this time, like him to make contact with him but should we require it I would get back to him.</p>	■	■	
<p>[Name Given joined UKSF] [REDACTED]</p> <p>He recalled an incident whereby women and children were killed. During a compound clearance a room was entered and individuals were hiding under a mosquito net. They did not reveal themselves, so the [UKSF1] shot at the net until there was no movement. When the net was uncovered it was women and children. The incident was covered up and the individual who did the shooting was allegedly given some form of award to make it look legitimate.</p>	■	■	
<p>[Details of role] (no further details were provided at the time)</p> <p>During conversations with this individual he revealed that as [SUM] commander he had been made aware of incidents (again no detail) which repulsed him.</p>	■	■	
<p>[Name Given] (possibility not his actual name but something like [Name Given])</p> <p>He was a [SU/SUMs] comd when [N1466] was ACOS. He recalled during SF briefings and discussions the real frustrations from the ground were raised. [Name Given] was vocal about the discontent and about being hamstrung with the legal ambiguity. About not being able to get detainees through to prosecution in the afghan system and the frustration that all the work was for nothing. This was regards to individuals being on the [Target List] but being brought back as detainees then released due to lack of evidence but then not being able to do anything about [them]</p> <p>[REDACTED] He recalled that the consensus was they had to find their own way of doing things. [N1466] recalled that he had stated this was not the way we do business and that this sort of action should never be considered or we became like them. He recalled he had to reiterate this with him more than once.</p>	■	■	

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12. [N1466] then went on to state that there were other incidents which had raised verbally to DSF as concerning but that he had no traction and that he finally decided on the E-mail approach to register his concerns formally and officially so they could not be ignored.	■	■	
13. [N1466] then went on to say that he recalled that following [N1785's] submission of his letter and concerns, [N2252] the then COS was not happy. He was not privy to the discussion between DSF and COS following the submission of [N1785's] letter but he recalled that he came out of the meeting and voiced his anger stating it was a disgrace and that [N1785] should never have written the letter he was very hostile to both [N1466] and [N1785]	■	■	
14. Going back to the TTP review I asked if an explanation had ever been given by DSF as to his rationale for the TTP review over a SP investigation. [N1466] said that as far as he was aware no explanation was ever given and he was just ordered to conduct a TTP review, despite his and [N1785] separate concerns and the legal advice.	■	■	
15. When asked if he looked at or had any concerns about the other [SU] in theatre at the time he sated no as they had different missions, [UKSF5] would be conducting [role given] and training they would do [REDACTED]. Those with [APU1] would do mentoring and training and any ops conducted directly by [APU1] would be Afghan planned and lead. It was only [SU1] that had the forward leaning missions.	■	■	
16. His main concern falling out of what he had seen was a contamination affect from once [SU] to the next which thankfully he did not see once the TTP review had been conducted and the [SU] finished their tour.	■	■	
17. Looking back through the photographs of the Objs he stated that in his opinion [Obj 1] looked like people had been taken back into the room and shot, but that was just his opinion and acknowledged he was not there at the time.	■	■	
18. When talking about whether or not he looked at the previous [SU] statistics (which is captured in his S9) he stated that whilst he had not as he thought there was enough with what he had seen from [SU1A] he suggested to the previous SIO that they should be looking at the statistics.	■	■	
19. He stated that he believed that there was serious weakness in leadership at the time of [SU1C] and [SU1A] deployments he felt [N1789] was not suitable to lead and [N1791] was weak commander. The NCOs ran the units. *	■	■	
20. He did acknowledge that everything recorded above and in his statement, was mostly his opinion and that unless a member of [UKSF 1] or someone who was there on the ground came forward, we would unlikely get anywhere with what he has revealed.	■	■	
21. He was asked why he came forward back in 2015, 4 years after the incidents. When Brig warren came to speak with him about NM and access to material, he stated that it had been playing on his mind for a long time. That he was part of an organisation which allowed rouge elements to act as they did outside the law. [REDACTED]	■	■	

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* The reference to N1791 is corrected to N1141 in paragraph 82 of N1466's witness statement to the Inquiry.

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<p>N1466 could not look people in the eye and say what they did was good when he knew different. He felt this was an opportunity and he could not leave it.</p>				
<p>22. As previously (in 2015) he stated he felt he had more information that may be useful to us but wanted time to consider what he wanted to say</p>		■	■	
<p>23. </p> <p>As we were leaving he was asked if he has any concerns. N1466 sets out his concern that, whilst he stands by the opinions given, if they became known, he believed negative consequences would follow.</p>		■	■	
INTELLIGENCE UNIT USE ONLY				
HANDLING CODE		P		C
To be completed by the evaluator on receipt and prior to entry onto the intelligence system		Lawful Sharing permitted		Lawful Sharing permitted with conditions
To be reviewed on Dissemination.		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>
ACTION				
<p>A1 Covert development – Intelligence may be combined or corroborated with other intelligence but action cannot be taken directly. Permission must be sought from the originator before action is taken on any derived intelligence.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/></p>		<p>A2 Covert use – Covert action may be taken on this intelligence although the source, technique and any wider investigative effectiveness must be protected. This intelligence may not be used in isolation as evidence, in judicial proceedings or to support arrest.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/></p>		<p>A3 Overt use – Overt action is permitted on this intelligence. This information can be used for:</p> <p>TO BE SPECIFIED BY SOURCE INTELLIGENCE OWNER</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/></p>

SANITISATION					
S1			S2		
<p>Delegated authority – The originator of the intelligence permits the unsupervised sanitisation of the material in order to allow dissemination to a wider audience.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/></p>			<p>Consult originator – The originator of the intelligence does not permit the sanitisation of the material for wider dissemination without consultation being sought.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/></p>		
Reviewed by:		CROSS-REF URN		Time and Date of Review:	
Re-evaluated:	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>				
Disseminated to:		Person Disseminating:			
Detailed Handling Instructions:				PII Sought	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>
Input onto system	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	Signature (paper copy):			

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
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Confidence Level:	<input type="checkbox"/> High	<input type="checkbox"/> Medium	<input type="checkbox"/> Low
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CONFIDENCE MATRIX



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National Intelligence Report Continuation Form B

INFORMATION /INTELLIGENCE SOURCE/INTELLIGENCE SOURCE REF No. (ISR)		REPORT URN	
REPORT			
PERSON RECORD:		DoB:	PNC ID:
OPERATION NAME/NUMBER:		S	I
			H

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GSCS	OFFICIAL SENSITIVE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SECRET <input type="checkbox"/>	TOP SECRET <input type="checkbox"/>
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National Intelligence Report Continuation Form B

INFORMATION /INTELLIGENCE SOURCE/INTELLIGENCE SOURCE REF No. (ISR)		REPORT URN					
REPORT							
PERSON RECORD:		DoB:		PNC ID:			
OPERATION NAME/NUMBER:					S	I	H

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National Intelligence Report Risk Assessment Form C

FOR USE IN THE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE

1	Does the information contain confidential material or sensitive material as identified in law?	Yes: <input type="checkbox"/>	No: <input type="checkbox"/>
2	If Yes, are there any restrictions on use, or requirements for special handling, imposed by the person submitting the report?	Yes: <input type="checkbox"/>	No: <input type="checkbox"/>

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3	<p>What are the ethical, personal or operational risks which are likely to result as a consequence of any dissemination or disclosure?</p> <p><i>Consideration must be given to the risk to the source and the content of information within the report.</i></p>	DETAIL THE RISKS
4	<p>What is the purpose of dissemination or disclosure?</p> <p>Is it for a policing purpose or a legislative requirement?</p>	
5	<p>Having identified the risks, justify the decision making process.</p> <p><i>This must include the justification, authority, proportionality, accountability and necessity of a dissemination or disclosure.</i></p>	
FOR INTELLIGENCE UNIT USE ONLY		
6	In light of the risk assessment is the Handling Code correct?	Yes: <input type="checkbox"/> No: <input type="checkbox"/>
Risk Assessment and Management Plan authorised by: (Intelligence Manager)		Person Completing Risk Assessment:
Cross-ref URN:		Time/Date:

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