



MOD-198-0003438-A

N2252

"Never known to turn down offers of advisory visits" would describe my position.

(I think a visit is inbound anyway, as part of wider UKSF review?)

And after COs Cabal etc you know my position on pre-deployment prep: "the mechanical part isn't broken, but could do with improvement; the conceptual / contextual parts need attention".

As for vigorous supervision; given the volume of other work I suspect this would have to be delegated, to SO2 J2 in this case (one of the posts involved in this lapse - the official incumbent, for the error a few weeks ago, and the current R&R stand-in, for the recent error).

Just in passing, in the context of the ongoing SU1 TTP review, in discussion this morning N1788 and I did a mini-review just of the contents of my inbox; I get at least a handful of OPSUMs + Storyboards each day (I got NG on one day last week) - and I can only imagine how that compares to the loading on the likes of the Ops Offr and COS (who of course have to scrutinise drafts as well as the final products that I see). Several of these products are raised by people with no/minimal experience of UKSF - or much by way of wider military experience to fall back on - or any Joint / Allied staff experience - including most of those involved in this trail (who 'wouldn't know their TTP from their elbow').

We could do better - of course - and we're doing everything we can to improve the quality of the processes and the products.

Reinforcements, and temporary R&R cover, and advisories, (especially Old Boys), will always be welcomed enthusiastically by this SU commander.

Yours

N1786

Comd SFHQ(A)

Contact Details

From SFHQ(UK) COMD-COS-S

Sent: 19 April 2011 11:00

To: SFHQ(A) COMD-S

Cc: SFHQ(A) COS-S; SFHQ(UK) COMD-ACOS-PERS-S

Subject: RE: 20110418 SFHQ(A) security breach_S

OK N1786 many thanks. I am prepared to accept that the flaws were systemic - but in that case the systems need reform and greater oversight, which will need vigorous supervision by your COS. If you need an advisory visit from J2 at this HQ (which is the repository of continuity) or have any additional suggestions for pre-tour preparation, education,

or length of handovers, then please let me know. Regards.

N2252

From: SFHQ(A) COMD-S
Sent: 19 April 2011 11:30
To: SFHQ (UK) COMD-COS-S; SFHQ (UK) COMD-ACOS-PERS-S
Cc: SFHQ(A) COS-S; SFHQ(A) DCOS-S
Subject: 20110418 SFHQ(A) security breach_S
Ack N2252, N1464

Please see comments below.

Yours

N1786

Comd SFHQ(A)

Contact Details

From: SFHQ (UK) COMD-ACOS-PERS-S
Sent: 19 April 2011 08:58
To: SFHQ(A) COMD-S
Cc: SFHQ(A) DCOS-S
Subject: FW: 20110418-SFHQ(A) security breach
Importance: High
N1786,

You will not be surprised in the current climate that COS is keen to see that those who commit 'security sins' should be dealt with appropriately. You will see what he has asked me to establish in red below. Will call.

N1464

ACOS Personnel

Contact Details

From: SFHQ (UK) COMD-COS-S
Sent: 19 April 2011 09:41
To: SFHQ(UK) J2-SO2-S; SFHQ (UK) COMD-ACOS-PERS-S
Cc: SFHQ(UK) COMD-ACOS-OPS-S; SFHQ(UK) Ops other recipient; SFHQ(A) COMD-S; SFHQ(A) COS-S; SFHQ(A) DCOS-S
Subject: RE: 20110418-SFHQ(A) security breach

Prepared for OPEN publication in relation to the Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan

Name Given

N1464

, many thanks - see below. - we spoke - would you please establish the answers to two supplementary questions

1. What disciplinary or administrative action has the CO taken / does the CO intend to take against the individuals concerned?

* None.

2. If he has taken / intends to take no action, what are his reasons for not doing so?

*

Disciplinary action against an individual(s) is not appropriate in this case. The breaches were not confined any one specific individual's fault (involving repetition across two incumbents' time in one of the posts involved, a HOTO in another post, and an R&R absence).

*

The individual involved in [details of security breach] had just taken up his appointment.

It has not been possible (yet) to determine whether the breaches were a result of inadequate HOTO, inadequate PDT, or inadequate PET. (Nor has it been possible (yet) to determine whether such breaches occurred in the individual's predecessor's tenure - although a cursory check suggests not).

*

For the means/distribution that constituted the breach, another signature block was used - again suggesting a systematic/collective rather than individual fault.

Name Given

- what corrective actions have been put in place to prevent a recurrence?

*

In my judgement this was a procedural lapse; measures taken to prevent a repeat include:

*

Review of processes;

*

Re-education of those involved in the security breach;

*

Cessation of this means of distribution altogether;

*

Adoption of a new SOP to guard against a repeat.

Answers by COP Wed please, for the meeting

N1464 we spoke also about the need for, and format of, any inquiry into details of separate security breach from SFHQ(A). Again I would like to discuss the way forward with you prior to the meeting, to give the Director an agreed line. From the account given to me, there is prima facie evidence of negligence from at least two individuals. I've not yet received a report back from my team - they last briefed me after their initial investigation (haul over of signatures, accounts etc) and I expect to hear back from them shortly.

Regards

N2252

Prepared for OPEN publication in relation to the Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan

From: SFHQ (UK) J2-SO2-S
Sent: 18 April 2011 11:13
To: SFHQ (UK) COMD-COS-S
Cc: SFHQ (UK) COMD-ACOS-OPS-S; SFHQ(UK) Ops other recipient
Subject: 20110418-SFHQ(A) security breach
Sir,

SFHQ(A) have conducted an investigation into the security breach - the report can be found here

Report Link

, and also attached.

(detail deleted by COS)

Regards

Name Given

SO2 J2

Contact Details