



MOD-198-0002850-A

SECRET

Statement of: [REDACTED] N1466

Form MG11(T)

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WITNESS STATEMENT

Criminal Procedure Rules, r27.2; Criminal Justice Act 1967, s.9; Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s.5b

Statement of: [REDACTED] N1466

Age if under 18: OVER 18 (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation: [REDACTED]

This statement (consisting of page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature:

Date: 19/09/2018

Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

I am the above named person.

I have been afforded the nominal N1466 which has been generated by the Operation NORTHMOOR Major Incident Room and is my unique cipher which will remain extant for the duration of the investigation. The other individual whom I will refer to in my statement is also afforded a cipher in accordance with the Royal Military Police/Special Forces Protocol.

Further to my statement dated 30 Jun 15 (30/06/2015) I would like to add the following:

I have today been visited by the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and Deputy Senior Investigating Officer (DSIO) who have asked me to clarify a number of points in my original statement.

To aid me in this, I have today been shown the following item by the DSIO, attached to which was an exhibit label marked as:

NWS/14A - EXSUMS pertaining to 11 DDOs - SECRET

I have signed and dated the exhibit label.

With regards to the content of NWS/14A, I can state that it contains Executive Summaries (EXSUMS) and photographic images. I can confirm that I would have seen the EXSUMS before, during my time as ACOS OPS, however I have never seen the photographic images before until today.

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The EXSUMS in NWS/14A are for the objectives contained within the TTP Review and would have been read by myself and N1788 when reviewing objectives, N1788 and I had reviewed the objectives together whilst in the Operations Room, HQ DSF, [REDACTED] London prior to my initial conversation with DSF as detailed in my previous statement.

When identifying the objectives of concern, they were selected due to the EKIA and weapons recovered differences and/or the use of TTP's where a male had surrendered and was sent back into a compound where the male re-armed himself and was subsequently engaged by SF and killed.

When selecting the objectives of concern, we only went back as far as we needed to show a pattern and no further. My intent was to show DSF there was a problem, not to investigate or highlight every DDO. Therefore, the 11 objectives were [REDACTED] SU1A objectives, and not the [REDACTED] SU before, as they were the most recent.

I believed at the time that the 11 objectives identified were enough for DSF to take appropriate action.

Having looked through NWS/14, I can now recall that the objective that caused me particular concern in Feb 11 (01/02/2011 - 28/02/2011) before speaking to DSF was Objective [REDACTED] ¹. This is because there were 9 EKIA and only 3 weapons recovered. Following this I then spoke to DSF.

I have today been given time to read again my email to DSF which is contained within the folio mentioned in my previous statement:

JLW/1 - Folio pertaining to DSF TTP Review and JLW/1A

I have signed and dated the labels. TAB 2 within JLW/1 is a printed copy of the email I sent.

I would now like to state that in hindsight, I should have made clear to DSF that the issue should be taken to the Service Police. As stated, this is based on hindsight and not what I knew at the time of writing the email. I would also like to add the following:

In the email to DSF I mentioned Obj [REDACTED] ¹⁰. This was as the actions of the Afghan males did not make sense. By this I mean that there were several reasons why it seemed implausible for an Afghan to throw a grenade after the call out and during the clearance phase. These reasons were:

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assaults

1. The Taliban seemed to have ceased (in general) fighting against Helicopter [REDACTED] assaults from the compounds. Their reasoning seemed to be that most suspects were released from custody after 96 hours of detention, under these circumstances, surrender was a better outcome than fighting against overwhelming odds. I would question why having reached this conclusion they then initiated contact post surrender.
2. During clearance, the Afghan males would be accompanied by members of the [REDACTED] SU with weapons trained on them throughout. The chances of successful contact under such circumstances would be extremely slim. Especially so if using a grenade. The delay in activating a grenade and waiting for it to go off would render it almost certainly ineffective when abundant cover is nearby. The individual looking to employ the grenade would almost certainly be killed before it became effective.
3. The use of a grenade seemed particularly odd in these circumstances in a country where small arms are abundant. Small arms would give a more instant effect against [REDACTED] SU members and be less pointless from an aggressive view point.
4. Given the layers of implausibilities above, the aggregate coincidence of such events on multiple targets seemed especially surprising and logic defying.

These factors all combined in causing alarm at HQ DSF Ops Room, leading me to raise concerns with DSF.

As today was the first time I have seen photographs of EKIA contained within NWS/14A, I have the following comments to make:

There are some aspects of the photographs which seem odd to me based on my [REDACTED] NG years of Regular Service (including about [REDACTED] NG years in UKSF and including combat tours in [REDACTED] LG (Not A) in Afghanistan), these 'odd' aspects include:

1. The layout and attitude of some of the bodies. By this I mean the position of the bodies, such as where a body has a blanket over it for example or where hands are crossed over the chest, (Objective [REDACTED] 6 photograph depicting EKIA 1 and [REDACTED] Obj 1 EKIA 1 and EKIA 3 respectively) as examples.

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2. The sparsity of weapons in many of the scenes and position of the weapons, by this I mean where a weapon is laid down parallel to the body (Objective [REDACTED]¹ EKIA 8 and EKIA 6 Objective [REDACTED]²) for example.
3. The high numbers of EKIA in a single room ([REDACTED] Obj 1 in particular) when a helicopter would have given ample time to disperse and take up fire positions.
4. The number of head shots on Objective [REDACTED]² when most EKIA were supposedly caused by a long burst of automatic fire.
5. The number of cases in which EKIA are found in male accommodation rooms and not elsewhere around the compound.
6. The presence of an individual (Obj [REDACTED]²) in a male sleeping quarter who had allegedly emerged from a doorway to engage the troops (EKIA 1).

All of the above factors would have added to the misgivings I had over these operations had I seen them at the time.

On being shown these photographs in exhibit NWS/14A today, I have concluded that they reinforce, rather than contradict, the concerns I raised with DSF.

SIGNED:

WO2 WILLIAMS D

SIB (RMP)

Signature:
2020

Signature witnessed by:

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