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SER No 150  
**SECRET**  
Service Police Exhibit Label

MOD Form 247  
(Revised 10/09)  
X1083

Investigation Reference No: \_\_\_\_\_  
Exhibit Identifying Mark: JLW/1A  
Property Register Serial No: \_\_\_\_\_

Description of Article: Op [REDACTED] B  
REVIEW OF [REDACTED] SU1 TTPs:  
FINAL REPORT

Details of Person Originally Identifying Article:  
Number: Service Number [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]  
Name: [REDACTED] N73 Unit: NORTHMOOR

Location Exhibit Found/Recovered: Contained  
Within Exhibit JLW/1A  
Time: 1530 hrs Date: 12 May 16

Forensic Laboratory Reference No: \_\_\_\_\_  
Other Agency Reference No: \_\_\_\_\_

For Court Use Only



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20 Apr 11

DSF

Op [REDACTED] B - REVIEW OF [REDACTED] SU1 TTPs: FINAL REPORT

References:

- A. DSF: Op [REDACTED] B - Terms of Reference for Review of [REDACTED] SU1 TTPs.
- B. [REDACTED] SFHQ(A) [REDACTED] SU1 TTP Review – Operational Examples.

ISSUE

- 1. At Ref A DSF directed a review of [REDACTED] SU1 TTPs.

TIMING

- 2. Routine: DSF wished to digest the review and make recommendations prior to Comd [REDACTED] SFHQ(A) RiP (beginning 24 Apr 11).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 3. DSF is invited to note:

- a. That although the [REDACTED] SFHQ(A) / [REDACTED] APU1 friction generated by [REDACTED] SU1's compound clearance TTP is significant, there is a wide range of factors which impinge on the relationship, of which action on target is just one.
- b. That the compound clearance TTP has been developed as a FP measure to reduce the tactical risk to [REDACTED] SUs, and in the correct configuration remains fit for this purpose.
- c. That over the past 6-8 months the TTP has evolved somewhat in order to deal with tactical challenges; but that the sum of the changes has altered the fundamentals of the TTP, with unintentional effect and unwanted consequences.
- d. That the potential consequences include the negative impact on UKSF's relationship with [REDACTED] APU1; a negative perception amongst the communities in which [REDACTED] SU1 conducts its operations; the risk of undermining of the [REDACTED] APU1 CoC; and potential IO opportunities for the INS.
- e. That Afghan perception is at the heart of the issue, and that among other issues the principal concerns of [REDACTED] APU1 officers/ [REDACTED] Soldiers are driven by: their physical removal from the critical activity on target; their [REDACTED] M2 approach to custody of detainees and associated duty of care; and their expectations of cultural norms and what they consider 'normal' INS activity.

And to agree the following actions for [REDACTED] SFHQ(A)

- f. [REDACTED] SU1 retains the use of the call-out / clearance TTP as a valuable and balanced FP measure.
- g. [REDACTED] SU1 returns to the original configuration of the TTP in order to reduce some of the concerns and risks identified in the course of this review. Potential amendments include:

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- (1) Tactical positioning of APU1 personnel to ensure sight of SU actions at all times (where this is practical and does not put the SU at greater tactical risk).
  - (2) Using APU1 personnel where appropriate, to control, and if necessary accompany the detained 'Bravo' (B) selected to re-enter the compound.
  - (3) Allowing the B, where it is not appropriate to accompany him, to conduct the clearance preparation and return to the Entry without interference<sup>1</sup>.
  - (4) Refraining from using Bs to assist in the searching of the compounds, unless there is a compelling reason to do so; and ensuring Bs are outside the area when the SU begins the physical clearance.
  - (5) Making greater use of Technique TX capabilities, following the initial clearance by the selected B, to reduce further the threat prior to committing SU Assault Force.
  - (6) Ensuring the B selected for re-entry into the compound is correctly restrained (plasticuffed), to reduce his ability to handle weapons or devices.
  - (7) Using APU1 elements, where appropriate, to conduct the follow-up clearance of a building or compound<sup>2</sup>.
  - (8) Conducting SSE with a view in part to corroboration of OPSUM and rebuttal of any potential allegations.
- h. SFHQ(A) re-examines the APU1 ORM, giving consideration to the re-introduction of a dedicated SU1 support Sub-Unit.
- i. CO UKSF2 and SFHQ(A) re-examine the relative priorities of the UKSF2 campaigning Sub-Unit with a view to re-establishing a UKSF2 SU commander for SU1.
- j. SU1 scope the establishment of a APU1 training, liaison and continuity element to ensure that those APU1 FEs rotating through the SU1 task are suitably trained and prepared, and that there is continuity of contact between the SU and APU1.

## BACKGROUND

4. **Introduction.** Since DG SU1 operations in Afghanistan have employed a tactical procedure during DDOs in which the investment of a target Compound of Interest (COI) is followed by an Afghan APU1 led call-out of the occupants. As the occupants leave, they are searched and segregated according to gender and age. Of the Bs, one is selected (usually the one professing to ownership of the compound) to re-enter the compound, confirm that no-one is left inside, and clear obstructions from windows and doorways in preparation for the subsequence clearance by the SU. In a growing number of incidents over the past 6-8 months, these Bs have managed to arm themselves, and posing a direct threat to the SU, have prompted members of the SU to engage and kill them. The increased kinetic profile of these operations, after an apparently initially successful call-out and detention, has caused concern amongst the SU's Afghan partners from APU1, and resulted in LN complaints of CivCas<sup>3</sup>.

5. **Scope and Engagement.** During the course of the review, consultations took place with multiple stakeholders including: OC SU1, SM SU1, OpsO SU1, SU1 J5, OC SU1A SU(M), CO APU1, 2IC APU1, OC APU1 SU1C, 2IC APU1 SU1C, all SU1 interpreters, OC SU2 (TELECON), SU2

<sup>1</sup> Clearly this no longer pertains if he is deemed to pose a threat through his actions.

<sup>2</sup> This is already implemented by SU1 on buildings of particular cultural or religious significance i.e. mosques.

<sup>3</sup> None of which have been substantiated or upheld.



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Comd (stand-in OC [SU2]), SM [SU2] and RSM [SFHQ(A)]. This group is judged representative of course in matters as sensitive as this, not least among the Afghans of [APU1] there will be almost as many opinions as men; even individuals' perceptions and recollections of events change over time. The review used as reference the operations detailed in Ref B (Enclosure 1) which complements Ref A in outlining concerns and potentially negative or unwanted consequences precipitated by the use of the compound clearance TTP (or a variation of it). The review is based therefore on the men and material available on the day, and reflects the findings, concerns and recommendations of the time.

6. **TTP Provenance.** The compound clearance TTP has evolved over time. Initially a Force Protection (FP) procedure developed from UKSF's experience conducting [Priority Target] operations in LG (Not A), its introduction in Afghanistan was in response to the threat to the [SU] during detention operations from SVESTs, emplaced protective IEDs<sup>4</sup> (either victim operated or otherwise), and residual armed INS who had elected to remain inside a compound following the initial call-out. In addition, the TTP also provided additional assurance that all civilian parties had left the compound prior to its clearance by the [SU] to reduce the risk of accidental CivCas. As detailed in Reference A, this is now a recognised procedure across [UKSF] and is taught during PDT.

7. **Tactical Variations.** The procedure was initially introduced on Op [C] in [Date Given] however, it has since been adapted according to commanders' tactical priorities. Pressure to reduce the time taken for each phase of an operation's execution, concern over the INS ability to tamper with evidence, as well as concern over the provision of additional opportunities for INS to prepare defensive IEDs or weapons, have understandably combined to prompt subtle changes to the original TTP over the past 6-8 months that have unintentionally resulted in unwanted consequences. For example, in order to address some of the tactical drivers listed above, [Details of SU1 TTP] to maintain a degree of control over the B selected to re-enter the compound. In certain circumstances, this development may have pressured those Bs who were INS to act precipitously, or in an ambiguous and threatening way. Recognition of the operational trends that signal areas of potential concern is not easy under the operational tempo and spectrum of activity experienced by [SFHQ(A)].

8. **INS Response.** A key factor in the changing impact of the call-out and clearance TTP lies in the apparent change in the response of the detained B selected to re-enter the compound. Incidents of nominated males who, having been sent back into the compounds, then arm themselves and become a threat to the [SU] is a relatively recent phenomenon (past 6-8 months). Whether this a deliberate response by the INS to the TTP which they may have gradually identified over the preceding 8 months of its use is unclear, but the resulted increased number of EKIA in the post-call out phase of the operation may well have been exacerbated by understandable adaptation of the original TTP. It is certainly the case that any amelioration of the amended TTP aimed at addressing the issue must also address the potentially deliberate INS response to this TTP. In short, any solution designed to reduce the likelihood of a DDO becoming kinetic, must also fulfil the FP requirement in light of an amended INS response / threat. Thought should also be given to whether any deliberate INS response is IO related. Given the wide-ranging and significant impact that kinetic activity during a DDO can have, there is a possibility that cornered INS have deliberately chosen to damage ISAF / GIRoA reputation amongst the local and wider populace, by forcing a kinetic engagement. Consultation on this issue with [APU1] combined with ongoing cultural and intelligence assessments of the Afghan INS suggest that this is unlikely, as it inconsistent with wider Afghan or Pashtun culture. However, it cannot be dismissed, and any TTP amendments must take this into account.

9. **Wider Issues.** The potential negative impacts of the recent employment of this TTP (or variation thereof) are outlined in paragraph 10. Of key concern for UKSF in the longer term, with relevance to future relationships between UKSF and GIRoA security institutions, is the impact of the use of this TTP and its consequences on the relationship between [SFHQ(A)] and its Afghan partners, and in particular [APU1]. However it should be noted that the compound clearance TTP is only one issue amongst many affecting the UKSF / [APU1] relationship, including the following:

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- a. A generic erosion of trust between APU1 and UKSF mentors, precipitated by a number of factors including: [REDACTED] Details of changes to APU1 administrative support [REDACTED]
- b. APU1 perception of a lack of involvement in the planning and execution of ops, particularly those with SU1
- c. Concern over specific incidents of perceived lack of duty of care by APU1 CoC and by association SFHQ(A) as the UK partner force.
- d. A perceived lack of daily integration between mentor and mentored. This includes a lack of SU1 involvement in APU1 trg and preparation for ops whilst at APU1. SU2 structures and capacity are not optimised to absorb all the attendant frictions.
- e. The natural variation in quality of Afghan commanders and Judicial Officers.
- f. Perception of certain actions on target, in particular, the SU1 compound clearance TTP.
- g. M2/M1 rivalry and mistrust. There is APU1 concern about the fact that detainees from SU1 ops (and to a lesser extent SU2 ops) end up in M1 custody. Linked to this is an inherent distrust of the TGT List system.
- h. Impact of the new APU1 ORM (which represented a change from the previous model whereby a discrete element of APU1 (SU1C) supported SU1). The new ORM has exposed the entirety of APU1 to the range of issues associated with SU1 operations (ie the APU1 issues with SU1 beyond the compound clearance TTP), and has reduced the time available to commanders, in particular OC SU1, to build relationships and understanding with APU1
- i. M2 culture results in APU1 members viewing DDO initial detention as synonymous with SU1 / M2 'custody', with the natural corollary that if detained Bravos subsequently become EKIA, they have become so whilst under the SU's duty of care.

Afghan brinksmanship has also been evident in the last few months; on a number of occasions individual Afghan officers have used one line with one UKSF officer, and another with another. More than once UKSF officers have entered into 'negotiations' – in this case specifically to secure APU1 support for SU1 operations – not knowing that Afghan direction and agreement had already been secured, passed down the chain of command, and deliberately kept from UKSF officers until late in the charade. The purpose of this behaviour is often not clear, even in retrospect. 'Nothing is as it seems'.

10. **Specific, TTP-related Issues.** Along with the impact on the attitude of the local populace to ISAF / ANSF, the perception of UKSF's Afghan partners lies at the heart of this review. Refusal to accompany SU1 on operations has occurred a number of times over the past 8 months<sup>5</sup>, and although it must be emphasised that there are many factors which impact on the state of the SFHQ(A) APU1 relationship (as described above), more kinetic resolution of certain DDOs following successful call-out has undoubtedly taken its toll. The key perceptions which have potentially damaging consequences are:

- a. **Custody.** Despite their training and operational experience, APU1 are first and foremost [REDACTED] under the jurisdiction of M2. As such they take the concept of 'custody' extremely seriously. They are fully aware that their presence with SU1 on target in some sense 'legitimises' these operations, but commensurately, they also feel implicated in any actions carried out by the SU. Once a B has exited a compound and subjected himself to detention,

<sup>5</sup> Confirmed statistics are not yet available; informally it is recalled that APU1 support for SU1 operations has been withdrawn on 5-10 occasions during this period, but restored during Pre-Op battle procedure after varying levels of liaison. Only 2 specific occasions can be recalled (TBC) where support was withdrawn for long enough to actually prevent an operation.

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search and restraint, they see him as being in their custody, and therefore subject to a certain duty of care. For him to subsequently be killed whilst in that custody, suggests in their eyes either incompetence or illegality in which they feel impotently complicit.

b. **Threat Assessment and Experience.** Many in [APU1] have been with [APU1] for five years or more, some since the nascent days of Op [G]. Whilst they understand the increased risk associated with targeting [Target List] in 'hard' areas, they have extensive experience of these areas and are veterans of previous Op [C] tours. As the recent INS response to the clearance TTP is markedly different to that seen previously<sup>6</sup> they perceive a 'credibility' gap between their experience and what they have been briefed on after operations more recently. This issue is intrinsically linked to the 'lack of witness' issue addressed at subparagraph d. below.

c. **Cultural Knowledge.** The relatively recent differing INS reaction to [SU1] DDOs in the phases following a successful call-out remains at odds with [APU1] members' recognition of Afghan culture and behaviour, whether INS or not. Clearly this is not necessarily relevant where FFs are concerned, however it can compound the [APU1] sense of unease over unusual INS actions. In particular in the opinion of [APU1] the presence of a B's family, or women and children – the norm on the majority of target compounds – would be incongruous with violent resistance and sacrifice.<sup>7</sup> The impact of reports or complaints by witness women and children on the wider community remains a key concern of [APU1] who feel the influence and legitimacy of GIRoA, [M2] more specifically, and [APU1] itself is undermined as a result.

d. **Lack of [APU1] Witnesses.** Perhaps the most significant of the factors in the mind of the [APU1 Soldiers] working with [SU1] is their physical removal from some of the kinetic actions that have occurred on target. Combined with their perception of what reasonable or likely INS activity is likely to be in a given situation, their lack of exposure to the activity in question compounds their inherent unease over any post-custody kinetic activity. Much of this has to do with a feeling of impotence and a lack of involvement. Indeed, right up to CO [APU1], there is a generic perception that they own the risk of [SU1] operations (from an Afghan perspective) without being able to influence how the ops are conducted.

e. **[APU1] CoC Authority.** [APU1] CO and [SU] Comds claim that [APU1] sub units have refused to deploy on operations as a result of these incidents and that it is this action that has forced their hand in temporarily ceasing [APU1] support to [SU1] on an *ad hoc* basis. Furthermore, they hold that these incidents have precipitated an increase in the number of [APU1] members wanting to leave [APU1], although it is not yet clear whether current retention rates are abnormal.<sup>8</sup> Most significantly, they believe the current situation with regards to the employment of the compound clearance TTP undermines their authority and the trust of their subordinates as they are seen as unwilling to challenge UK authority in Afghanistan. This feeling of isolation is further exacerbated by the perceived lack of support from [M2] and [HQ APU] when it comes to the ownership of operational, and indeed legal, risk.

In addition to the detrimental impact on the [APU1] perceptions and the obvious consequences for the [SFHQ(A)]/[APU1] relationship, there are other potential negative consequences, including: a negative perception of GIRoA / ISAF amongst the communities in which [SU1] conducts its operations; the potential to provide the INS with IO opportunities; and potentially missed exploitation opportunities.

<sup>6</sup> Those members of [APU1] interviewed were all familiar with strong INS resistance on target, but not at the stage it is now being seen i.e. following a successful call-out in which the males on target voluntarily exit the compound into [SU] custody.

Details of Combat Indicators

<sup>8</sup> Other reporting – with no reference to the compound clearance TTP – has suggested that morale in [APU1] is variable; it is considered most unlikely that TTP-related issues could be identified within the overall [APU1] PVR profile.

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11. **Tactical Solutions.** There are a number of tactical solutions which might address the key concerns and difficulties currently faced by [SU1] and [APU1]. They can be broadly categorised into 3 areas:

a. **Ensuring [APU1] Witness.** This lies at the heart of [APU1's] concerns and can be achieved by the tactical positioning of [APU1] personnel to be able to view all [SU] actions<sup>9</sup>. This would be a natural consequence of using members of [APU1] to control, and if necessary accompany the detainee where appropriate.

b. **Removing INS opportunity and motive.** In order to reduce the detainee's opportunity to become a threat to the [SU] he must counter-intuitively be provided space in which to conduct those instructions given to him when preparing the compound for the clearance. This allows the [SU] to reduce risk [Operational Details] and reduces the chances of the detainee's actions being misinterpreted. It also removes the potential drivers for the detainee to act precipitously. Failure by the detainee to comply or return [Operational Threat Assessment] Once the detainee has complied and returned [Force protection measures including possible use of Technique TX]

c. **Ensuring [APU1] involvement and buy-in.** Where appropriate, further involvement of [APU1] in [Sensitive] tasks should deepen their buy-in to the way in which the operation is executed. [APU1] elements can be used to conduct follow-up clearances of a building or compound where the risk is deemed appropriate by OC [SU1]. Furthermore, thought should be given to a dedicated [APU1] LO who can keep the OC of the Afghan FE fully informed at all throughout an operation. This role was previously fulfilled by the [UKSF2 SU] commander, and consideration should be given to re-establishing this post.

12. **Partnering and Integration.** Undoubtedly one of the key factors in the [APU1] concerns is their perception of influence and involvement in both the planning and conduct of [SU1] operations. [SU1] has already made strides in this area recently and expends considerable effort in briefing [APU1] command elements and involving them in planning. Furthermore, a serial review of TTPs has been ongoing since the [APU1] concerns came to light and the requisite remedial direction has aimed to address the issues as they have arisen. OC [SU1] believes more can be done here, with exploitation of [APU1] local and cultural knowledge in observing ISR footage [prior to an Operation]. Beyond this, however, there remains a critical 'distance' between [APU1] and [SU1] as a result of interaction being limited to operations; the [APU1] ORM minimises the interface time between each [APU1] [SU] and [SU1]. Previously, a single [APU1] sub unit ([SU1C]) was dedicated to supporting [SU1] and therefore there was a specificity about their role and training that focused their efforts. More importantly, it provided greater opportunity for [SU1] to build a [Sensitive] relationship with the [SU] and for the latter to become more inured to the risk and increased kinetic nature of [SU1] operations. A training and liaison element from [SU1] based at [APU1] could well re-establish a stronger identification between [APU1] and [SU1] as well as more appropriate expectation management.

## CONCLUSION

13. The [SFHQ(A)]/ Afghan partner relationship is subject to a multitude of frictions, and [APU1] with its remit to service multiple roles is the most vulnerable unit of all. Furthermore – and OC [SU2] would agree – the [SU1] CONOP represents the part of [APU1] operational spectrum with which that [APU1] is least comfortable. To that end, caution should be applied in laying all of the partnering difficulties at the feet of [SU1's] TTPs and associated action on target. However, this is not to make light of the issue. The concerns and resultant disruptions to [SFHQ(A)] operations generally, and those of [SU1] and [SU2] specifically are undeniably real, as are the emotions evident in members of [APU1] when discussing these issues. However, the problems are eminently soluble, and it has been a striking feature of this

<sup>9</sup> Where this is practical and does not put the [SU] at greater tactical risk.

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review that without exception members of [APU1] have remained focused on the future and what is required to improve the relationship and their success on operations. There was neither sense of retrospection nor retribution evident in discussion although it is clear that perceived grievances could easily surface if [APU1] feel that issues are not being addressed or have been allowed to return.

14. Of critical importance is the fact that the TTP in question has been developed as an effective FP measure for our [SU's] during [their] detention operations. Little has changed to the threat (although the individual [soldiers'] perceptions of it will change according to PDT, [TTP] and J2 briefs<sup>10</sup>), and therefore reduction of both tactical and operational risk to the [SUs] must remain an absolute priority. In meeting this requirement the principles of the TTP remain sound, as does its efficacy. Over time it has been understandably amended to deal with other tactical concerns; but it is now evident that the sum of these amendments has resulted in a fundamental change to the overall effect. A return to the original TTP format should address many of the concerns and issues that have arisen in recent months, as well as deal effectively with an INS seeking to adapt his actions for IO or tactical gain on target. Beyond these changes, there are a number of areas in which we might seek to systemically improve the [SU1] / [APU1] relationship via better [SU1/APU1] integration, and via greater involvement of [APU1] in the planning and conduct of operations. Such changes will provide the partnering 'cement' that can better withstand the inevitable strains of [these] operations.

**Comd [SFHQ(A)]**

Enclosures:

1. Reference B.

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<sup>10</sup> Which in the last 6 months have included numerous and increasingly frequent references to SIED.


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20 Apr 11

REVIEW OF **SU1** TTPs – OPERATIONAL EXAMPLES

Ser	Obj	Date	OPSUM	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(j)
1	3	30 Nov 10	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Successful callout: Bs, Es and Ks.</li> <li>- B leads assaulters into A and attempts to engage them with a grenade – 1 EKIA</li> <li>- No other wpns found.</li> </ul>

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6	2	9 Feb 11	Yes	[Redacted]				<p>- Callout commences – movement in adjacent guesthouse. 1 x B exits with a wpn and is engaged resulting in 1 x EKIA.</p> <p>- Automatic fire heard from inside guesthouse. <b>SU1</b> move into the guest house where 4 x EKIA are discovered believed to be as a result of red-on-red.</p> <p>- 2 x further Bs stood at back of room – move to engage the <b>SU1</b> They are engaged resulting in 2 x EKIA (7 x EKIA in total in the guesthouse).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Operational Detail</p> <p>- Blue Compound: callout successful following entry (B, Es and Ks).</p> <p>- Following detention, 1 x B sent back in to Alpha to prepare it for clearance.</p>
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										<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- B reappears in doorway armed with AK47. SU1 engage resulting in 1 x EKIA.</li> <li>- 8 x EKIA in total.</li> </ul>
7	8	14 Feb 11	Yes							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No response to initial callout. SU1 enters guesthouse. Technique TX</li> <li>- Afghan partners not present with assault Force</li> <li>- 2 x armed Bs inside are engaged by SU1 resulting in 2 x EKIA.</li> <li>- 2nd Callout on main compound continues and is successful: Bs, Es and Ks.</li> <li>- 1 x B sent back in to COI to prepare it for clearance. He reappears in the doorway with wpn and is engaged by the SU1 resulting in 1 x EKIA.</li> <li>- 3 x EKIA in total.</li> </ul>
8	TYBURN	16 Feb 11	Yes							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Activity on tgt as SU1 approaches.</li> <li>- Initial callout successful: Bs, Es and Ks.</li> <li>- Bravo is escorted back into house to assist in clearance.</li> <li>- B reaches behind a curtain and pulls a grenade moving to engage the SU1 He is engaged resulting in 1 x EKIA. Grenade does not go off.</li> <li>- Subsequent COI – callout successful: Bs, Es and Ks.</li> <li>- B moves back into COI at SU1 behest to assist in search. As he does so he moves behind a table and picks up an AK47. He is engaged by SU1 resulting in 1 x EKIA.</li> <li>- Runner confirmed by Air Asset As SU1 approach his hiding place (bush) he comes into view. His hands are hidden under his body and he moves, revealing a grenade. He is engaged resulting in 1 x EKIA.</li> <li>- SU1 approaches 3<sup>rd</sup> COI. As the SU1 approaches a B emerges from under a blanket</li> </ul>

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								<p>armed with an AK47. He moves to engage the SU1 and is engaged resulting in 1 x EKIA.                  - 4 x EKIA in total (2 x AK47s and 2 x grenades).</p>
9	1	5 Mar 11	Yes	[REDACTED]				<p>SU1 engaged from a guesthouse by AK47 fire.                  - Guesthouse is suppressed and then assaulted resulting in 9 x EKIA (4 x AK47s).</p>
10	9	12 Mar 11	Yes					<p>- Initial corralling fire by Air Asset on threatening pax. No cas.                  - Initial callout on COI successful but only following Entry Bs, Es and Ks.                  - Once in SU1's custody, B re-enters alpha accompanied by SU1 members.                  SU1 loses control of B who runs off into separate room. On entering the room, B is armed with pistol. He is engaged by SU1 1 x EKIA.                  - Callout on 2nd COI successful: Bs, Es and Ks.                  - 2 x Bs sent back into COI to prepare it for clearance. As they enter the building, they take up firing positions (1 x AK47) and are engaged by SU1 resulting in 2 x EKIA.                  - A further B is waiting and moves to pick up the dropped AK47. SU1 engage resulting in 1 x EKIA.                  SU1 enters compound. On entry they are confronted by a further armed B. He is engaged resulting in 1 x EKIA.                  SU1 moves to 3<sup>rd</sup> COI. Following escalation details of Call Out procedure Bs, Es and Ks leave the building.                  SU1 enters the COI without using Bs to prepare clearance. 1 x B emerges armed with</p>

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								<p>an AK47 and engages the <b>SU1</b>. He is engaged resulting in 1 x EKIA. A second B uses the distraction to pick up a grenade. He moves to throw it and is engaged resulting in 1 x EKIA. - 8 x EKIA in total.</p>
11	10	2 Apr 11	Yes					<p>- Initial Callout successful: Bs, Es and Ks.                  - Elder warns <b>SU1</b> that there are 2 x Bs in outhouse. They exit.                  - 1 x B is escorted back in to facilitate clearance. <b>SU1</b> loses control and B rummages under blankets and pulls out an AK47. He is engaged resulting in 1 x EKIA.                  - 2<sup>nd</sup> COI callout successful: Bs, Es and Ks.                  - 1 x B is escorted back into COI. <b>SU1</b> lose control and B moves to some blankets and begins to prime a grenade. He is engaged by <b>SU1</b> resulting in 1 x EKIA.                  - 2 x EKIA in total.</p>



SU1