


MOD-198-0002063-A

SECRET

SERIAL 5

20 Apr 11, TTP Review Final Report
and Op Examples

Removed by DSIO on 12 May 16

Exhibited as exhibit 

Signature 

OP NORTHMOOR

12 MAY 2016

SENSITIVE

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28 Apr 11

Comd SFHQ(A)

Op B – REVIEW OF SU1 TTPs

1. Thank you for your comprehensive report on the review of SU1's compound clearance TTPs, its consequences for UKSF's relationship with APU1 in particular, and your recommendations on how the situation might be resolved. I fully acknowledge the multitude of frictions which impact on the SFHQ(A) APU1 relationship, however, my absolute priority now is to ensure that where these factors are within our control (as TTPs undoubtedly are), we minimise divisive practises and the associated increase in our operational and strategic risk.

2. Provided that the remedial amendments you recommend are implemented, I am content for the compound clearance TTP *as it was originally devised* to continue to be employed as required. I recognise that it is a valid and effective FP measure that reduces tactical risk for our Soldiers on target, but its corruption can have seriously deleterious and unintended consequences. The Sub Units need to understand this. Whilst it may run counter to the spirit of SF sub unit Creativity which we value so highly, the potential negative consequences of getting it wrong are so great that if detailed tactical direction needs to be provided by SFHQ(A), then so be it. I will caveat my endorsement of the TTP with a reminder that the Bravo selected to re-enter the compound must do so voluntarily, and that he does so as one who is in SU1 custody.

3. Information of Significance

4. Information of Significance

5. Information of Significance

6. Information of Significance

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Information of Significance

There needs to be a cultural shift in the thinking of the Sub Units here. Tempo and the pursuit of operational statistics must be tempered with an understanding of long-term effect, care of our strategic relationships and a consistent wariness of unintended consequences. It would take much to convince me that any (viable) Priority Target was worth the refusal of the APU to soldier for the following Duration (thus eroding the tempo you were pursuing in the first place), damage to the relationship upon which our long-term strategy depends, and the potential alienation / radicalisation of the areas into which we deploy.

DSF

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28 Apr 11

Comd SFHQ(A)

Op B - REVIEW OF SU1 TTPs

Thank you for your comprehensive review of SU1's compound clearance TTPs and its useful recommendations. It is clear from the report that my intent was followed with considerable energy and that all involved responded with maturity and open minds. I believe the review process itself has been cathartic to some of the frictions in the SFHQ(A)/APU1 relationship, and our subsequent actions should ensure smoother running in the future. My response to your report will focus on two areas; the TTP itself and the involvement of APU1

Afghan personnel who emerge from compounds on our instruction and at gunpoint are *de facto* under SU1 custody from that point until allowed to leave our cordon. It is our legal obligation under the LOAC to ensure that they are protected accordingly, which includes preventing situations in which their actions may cause us to employ lethal force. It is therefore imperative that we modify our TTPs and I endorse the recommended changes in your para 3g. In particular, the return of Afghan males into compounds must be voluntary and they must be suitably restrained as to prevent the use of longer range weapons. Space must be created between those individuals and the SU both to reduce their temptation to take violent action and to increase the decision time and options available to SU members if they do. Occupants should not be involved in the subsequent clearance unless absolutely necessary, but where possible Technique TX and appropriately trained members of APU1 should be.

Information of Significance

Finally, we need to instigate a cultural shift in the thinking of our personnel. Tempo and the pursuit of operational statistics must be tempered with an understanding of the long-term effects, care over our strategic relationships and a constant vigilance towards unintended consequences. It would take much to convince me that any individual Priority Target was worth the refusal of the Afghan partner force to soldier for the following Duration the potential impact on our longer-term partnership, or the further alienation of a population which we hope to reconcile to GIRoA. In maximising our productivity, we must not lose sight of our overall goal.

DSF

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SFHQ(UK)

20 May 11

COM SU1

COS SFHQ
(A)

COM SU2


SU1 TTP DEVELOPMENT

1. SFHQ(A) and all its associated components continue to develop as the campaign progresses. Our unrelenting pursuit of excellence demands this. Campaign pressures, particularly the transition process, also impose demands for change. One tangible product of all this is the need to continue adapting SU1 TTPs. This will be done during your tenure as OC SU1 in 2 specified ways:

a. **Detained Afghans.** Afghan personnel who emerge from compounds on our instruction and at gunpoint are *de facto* under SU1 custody from that point until allowed to leave our cordon. It is our legal obligation under the LOAC to ensure that they are protected accordingly, which includes preventing situations in which their actions may cause us to employ lethal force. It is therefore imperative that we ensure our TTPs are appropriate. In particular, during clearances:

- (1) The return of Afghan males into compounds must be voluntary and they must be suitably restrained so as to prevent their obtaining or using weapons.
- (2) Sufficient stand-off distance must be maintained between those individuals and the SU both to reduce any temptation by said Afghans to take violent action and to increase the decision time and options available to SU members if they do.
- (3) Occupants should not be involved in the subsequent clearance unless absolutely necessary.
- (4) Whenever possible appropriately trained APU1 personnel should undertake the clearance task (using Technique TX as required).
- (5) Conduct SSE with a view in part to post-op consequence management and rebuttal of any potential allegations, on every operation.

Information of Significance



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Information of Significance

2. **PDT.** Your PDT was amended to incorporate some of the TTP adaptations outlined in this paper. You will ensure that, as your operations evolve, you regularly draw my attention to changes in the way you operate in order that we can make the necessary changes to subsequent PDT packages.

3. **Priority Target in Context.** Finally, we need to ensure the culturally aware thinking of our personnel. Tempo and the pursuit of operational statistics must be balanced with an understanding of the long-term outcomes, care over our strategic relationships and a constant vigilance towards unintended consequences. It would take much to convince me that any individual **Priority Target** was worth: the refusal of the Afghan partner force to soldier for the following **Duration** damage to our longer-term **Duration** partnership, or the further alienation of a population which we hope to reconcile to GIRoA. In maximising our productivity, we must not lose sight of our overall goal.

COM **SFHQ(A)**

27 May 11 09:20

From COS SFHQ(A)

N1141 N2267 NG NG

We are having to make some changes to SU1 compound TTPs, on direction from DSF. Two points, firstly N2267 and SU1D will need to get their head around what the changes mean and adapt - this will take a wee while. Secondly * will need to come over and see what's changed prior to the next PDT session. We are going to extract from DSFs note to us and issue some D&G to N2267 shortly. We'll keep you in the loop. Just wanted to give you all a heads-up.

Regards,

N889

N889

COS SFHQ(A)

Contact Details

* = PDT Training Provider

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SFHQ(A) SU1

DG Nov 11

Com SFHQ(A)

SU1

POST OPERATIONAL REPORT DG MAY – DG NOV 11

1. Commander's summary.

Information of Significance

Headlines and recommendations

2. Com SFHQ(A) is invited to **note** the following headline points:


a. SU1 has conducted NG operations resulting in NG detainees and NG EKIA.

Information of Significance

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Information of Significance

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and **endorse** the following recommendations:


Information of Significance

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Context


3. **Enemy.**

Information of Significance

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4. **FF.**


Information of Significance

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
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Operations and effect


Important Operational and Effect Details

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Important Operational and Effect Details



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Important Operational and Effect Details



Afghan force development

7. **SU1 / APU1 relationship.**

Key Afghan Organisational Details and Relationships



Key insights

Targeting Methodology Matters



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Targeting Methodology Matters

10. **Enablers.**

Resource and Organisational Details

11. **Manning.**

Resource and Organisational Details

12. **Detention and conviction.**

Detention and Conviction Details

Gaining convictions without evidence remains difficult.

However, there have been some advances on building evidential cases

Detention and Conviction Details

13. **Detainee abuse allegations.** Making allegations remains an INS TTP. There was a steady trickle of allegations during the tour, none of them serious and none were supported by evidence. RMP interviews were a chore but did not impact on operations.

14. **Consequence management (CM).** CM has not been a feature of the tour. Two LN received GSWs from ricochets. SIRs were completed for both. The LNs were released from hospital within 48hrs and neither reported the incident or sought compensation due to their connections with the insurgency. There was one further CIVCAS allegation which was discounted

Information of Significance

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Details of TTP [REDACTED] CM, including an SIR, and an internal TTP review were conducted for best practice.
[REDACTED] Details of TTP [REDACTED]

Conclusions

Details of High Level Conclusions

[REDACTED]

Signed electronically

[REDACTED] N2267

[REDACTED]
OC SU1D [REDACTED]

Annexes:

- A. [REDACTED] SU1 Op [REDACTED] C [REDACTED] Operational Statistics and Summary.
- B. [REDACTED] SU1 Op [REDACTED] C [REDACTED] Lessons Identified.
- C. [REDACTED] SU1 Op [REDACTED] C [REDACTED] Lessons Identified Matrix
- D. [REDACTED] SFHQ(A) Detainee Conviction Statistics

Distr:

COM [REDACTED] SFHQ(A)
COS [REDACTED] SFHQ(A)

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SECRET UK EYES ONLY

SFHQ(A) SU1

DG Jun 12

Com SFHQ(A)

SU1

POST OPERATIONAL REPORT DG NOV – DG MAY 11

1. Commander's summary.

Commander's Summary Details and Effects

Headlines and recommendations

3. Com SFHQ(A) is invited to note the following headline points:

a. SU1 killed or captured NG Target List Obj in NG DDO missions

Details of Operational Effects and Targeting Process

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
Details of Operational Effects and Targeting Process



j. The **SU** worked through systemic legal issues throughout the tour: abuse allegations; **Non-Relevant Issue** ROE and LOAC. We would have benefited from a more responsive legad support meeting the requirements of an operational theatre.

and **endorse** the following recommendations:


Recommendations to Operational Capability



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
Recommendations to Operational Capability



Context

4. Enemy.


Details and Assessment of Enemy Capabilities



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
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Details and Assessment of Enemy Capabilities



6. The Changing Shape of

Operational Activity Statistics and Effects



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Operational Activity Statistics and Effects




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Operational Activity Statistics and Effects




Details of Enemy Capability issues




8. **ISAF Transition Plan.**

Details of Future Partnerships



9. **SU1 Operational Design.**


Details of Sub-Unit Improvements and Capabilities



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
Details of Sub-Unit Improvements and Capabilities



SU1


Capability Developments

Details of Analytical Capability



11. SU Targeting.


Details of Enemy Exploitation and Targeting Considerations



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
Details of Enemy Exploitation and Targeting Considerations



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Details of Enemy Exploitation and Targeting Considerations



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Details of Enemy Exploitation and Targeting Considerations

15. Detention success.

Operational Detail of DDO

16. Afghan Partner Force.

Details of Afghan Partner Force Capability and Development

17. M1 as a future Partner Force.


Partner Force Structure and Future Capability

18. SU C-IED.

Details of TTP's


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Details of TTP's



20. **Medical Treatment Facility/Trauma Care.**

Details of TTP's



Details of Intelligence TTP's and Capabilities



SU1

Capability Weaknesses

Details of Personnel Capability



23.


SU2

Trg in

Air
Asset

Watch.

Details of Personnel Capability




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Details of Personnel Capability



Details of Intelligence Capabilities



27. Detention/Exploitation Policy.

Details Of Policy Considerations




Details Of Intelligence Exploitation



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Details Of Intelligence Exploitation



Technical Support Considerations



Post Tour Analysis and Future Considerations



Signed electronically

N2270

OC SU1E

SECRET UK EYES ONLY

SECRET UK EYES ONLY

Annexes:

- | | | | | |
|----|-----|----|---|----------------------------|
| A. | SU1 | Op | C | Lessons Identified Matrix. |
| B. | SU1 | Op | C | J3 ATO POR. |
| C. | SU1 | Op | C | J4 Med POR. |
| D. | SU1 | Op | C | J6 POR. |

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