






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ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION	ACTION 	REG DATE 30/05/2019	T 530		
RECEIVERS INSTRUCTIONS					
DOCUMENT TITLE: N2108 EMAIL RE (SIBNM 30A)			SU1 STATS CONCERNS IRN: NORTHMOOR		
REGISTER TO:	N2108	PRIORITY	LOW <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MEDIUM <input type="checkbox"/> HIGH <input type="checkbox"/>		
CLASS CODE	BDM (3)	TAGGING	2011/SEN/FIOL/OBJ T1 (ALL)		
DOCUMENT SUMMARY					
<p>SECRET</p>					
FAST / URGENT ACTION REQUIRED (If YES compile ACTION precis below)		YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RECEIVER	REGISTRATION INDEXER	
			Signature  KNIGHT 30/5/19	Signature  KNIGHT 30/5/19	
FAST ACTIONS RAISED	NIL	URGENT ACTIONS	NIL	MIRSAP ACTIONS RAISED NIL	
DOCUMENT READING		DOCUMENT READER		DOCUMENT INDEXER	
INSTRUCTIONS:					
		FOOTNOTES READY	<input type="checkbox"/>	CHART COMPLETE	<input type="checkbox"/>
		ACTIONS IDENTIFIED	<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTIONS RAISED	<input type="checkbox"/>
QUALITY CONTROL		READING COMPLETE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INDEXING COMPLETE <input type="checkbox"/>	
MIR OFFICE MANAGER		DISCLOSURE OFFICER		SIO	

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EYES ONLY - LIMDIS

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N1466 ,

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As requested, PSB early analysis of SU1 stats / OPSUMs since DG Nov 10. This has taken some time and therefore I have been unable to go further back into the previous SU1 sA tenure at present.

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- There are 11 separate incidents (spanning 9 discrete operations) in which the TTP of sending a Bravo back into a building to assist with clearing it resulted in that same Bravo getting killed ('reaching for a wpn' etc from the OPSUMs). Relevant operations (Objs) are 3 (30 Nov 10), 7 (DG 11), 4 (DG 11), 5 (DG 11), 6 (DG 11), 2 (9 Feb 11), 8 (14 Feb 11), TYBURN (16 Feb 11), 9 (12 Mar 11), 10 (2 Apr 11).

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- Attached is a breakdown of the SU1 operational statistics since DG Nov 10 (not including * ops) to show the number of ops/detainees/EKIA per week. Of the 18 completed weeks of ops, on 8 occasions (weeks) the number of EKIA exceeded the number of detainees taken which doesn't necessarily mean anything, but I know one of the potential comparisons was between SFHQ(A) and PF1 stats.

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- There are 6 separate incidents (i.e. not included in the list above) in which the number of EKIA exceeded the number of wpns officially found on target. I say 'officially' because of the multitude of reasons why all weapons on target might

not have been recorded accurately for perfectly legitimate reasons (not found due to time constraints, human reporting error etc). I have included grenades as a wpn so that potentially marginal cases are not highlighted unfairly. Particular operations (Objs) are Objs QS (DG 10; 1 EKIA v nil wpns); QA (24 Jan 11; 6 EKIA vs 3 x AK47s), 1 (7 Jan 11;

9 EKIA vs 3 x AK47s), QA (24 Jan 11), 2 (9 Feb 11; 8 EKIA vs 4 x AKs); and QT (DG 11; 4 x EKIA v nil wpns). If one were not to include grenades as a wpn (of course controversial and not necessarily fair) then the number of such incidents is 11.

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- The SFHQ(A) Incident Tracker' tells an unclear story, in part because we only started the tracker in Sep 10 after 'serious incidents' started to become more frequent. There is, therefore, no easy comparison to be made to 'steady jogging' - this was simply not an issue before that point (as far as this HQ was

aware).Â

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- within the current SU1's tenure, the APU have 'refused to soldier' on three occasions: in Dec 10, Feb 11 and Apr 11 - and not necessarily in response to specific ops, but it is difficult to say with any certainty. The other times were in the previous SU1's tenure i.e. before DG Nov 10.

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As always, stats come with a health warning and any number of caveats. Also, this has been a heavily 'mandraulic' process, so I may well have missed something / made an error. Many of the metrics are inherently pre-disposed to a negative interpretation which is an important point in ensuring these examples / stats are viewed in as fair a light as possible

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Regards

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N1788

S01 J35 Campaigns HQ

DSF

Contact Details

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N2108,

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FYI - probably needs a bit of balance, but N2444 has dug out blind here.

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Obj 9 probably isn't the best example actually.

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Regards

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S01 J35 Campaigns HQ
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Contact Details

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From: SFHQ(UK) J35-CAMPAIGNS-SO2-A-S

Sent:

07 April 2011 16:45

To: SFHQ(UK) J35-CAMPAIGNS-SO1-S

Subject:

20110407 - SU1 stats - S

N1788,

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Sorry for the delay (it took longer to pore through all of the SU1 OPSUMS covering the last 5 months than I anticipated), but here is a synopsis of my findings (all cover the period since 01 Dec 10):

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- I counted 10

separate incidents (spanning 8 separate operations) in which the TTP of sending a B back into a building to assist with clearing it resulted in that same B getting killed ('reaching for an AK47 behind a blanket' etc being the sort of comment in the OPSUM). Relevant operations (Objs) are 7 (DG 11), 5 (DG 11), 6 (DG 11), 2 (9 Feb 11), 8 (14 Feb 11), TYBURN (16 Feb 11), 9 (12 Mar 11), 10 (2 Apr 11). I attach the Obj 9 OPSUM as one that in my personal opinion does not read well.

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- I have broken

down the statistics for all SU1 operations since 01 Dec 11 (not including Non-DDO ops) to show the number of ops/detainees/EKIA per week (see attached). Looking at it on a week-by-week basis, of the 18 completed weeks of ops, on 8 occasions the number of EKIA exceeded number of detainees taken.

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- I counted 5

separate incidents in which the number of EKIA exceeded the number of wpns apparently found on target. I say 'apparently' because of the multitude of reasons why all weapons on target might not have been recorded accurately (not found, human reporting error etc etc). I have included grenades as a wpn so that marginal cases are not highlighted unfairly. Particular operations (Objs) to note include QA (24 Jan 11; 6 EKIA vs 3 x AK47s), 1 (7 Jan 11; 9 EKIA vs 3 x AK47s), 2 (9 Feb 11; 8 EKIA vs 4 x AKs). If one were not to include grenades as a wpn (controversial) then the number of such incidents is more like 10. There are some trends here

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that I will discuss separately.

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- TheÂ [SFHQ(A)]

Incident Tracker' tells an unclear story, in part because we only started the tracker in Sep 10 after 'incidents' started to become more frequent.Â There is therefore not an easy comparison to be made to 'steady jogging'. Legad will have a view but my informal opinion is that there has been a different approach,

possibly producing increased accusations/SIRs etc, since [SU1C] deployed.Â New entries in the 'incident tracker' have been as follows:

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Sep 10Â - 1

([SU1] 1)

Oct 10Â - 7

([SU1] 4)

Nov 10 - 8 ([SU1]

8)

Dec 10 - 2 ([SU1]

1)

Jan 11 - 5 ([SU1]

3)

Feb 11 - 3 ([SU1]

2)

Mar 11 - 1 ([SU1]

1)

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- My final point

at this stage is that the 2 operations that have caused most angst with the APU are Obj TURTON (15 Feb 11) andÂ Obj [QG] ([DG] 11) and neither of these would stand out according to any of the above criteria.Â Both, however, resulted in the APU suspending operational support.Â The former was controversial due to the familial connection of a [APU1 Soldier] with the target; the latter for less clear reasons, though a suspicion that he was engaged very quickly in light of having only a pistol hangs in the air.Â My point here is that, if you use the Afghan conscience as your yardstick (not a bad approach as we discussed!) then the above snapshot may not tell the full picture at all.

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[REDACTED] I clearly have to issue a [REDACTED] warning with regard to all of this data.Â Many of the metrics I have selected are inherently pre-disposed to a negative interpretation.Â That said, whilst one could always commission more detailed and historic statistical research, in my view there is enough here to convince me that we are getting some things wrong right now.

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Regards,

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[REDACTED] N2444

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[REDACTED] N2444

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S02 J35 Campaigns

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