

MOD-198-0000733-A

Prepared for OPEN disclosure for use only in the Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan

15 Dec 16

Recieved 16 Jan 17.

RECORD OF DECISIONS FROM THE NORTHMOOR GOLD MEETING HELD AT HQ PM(A) & HQ 1 MP BDE , RAMILLIES BUILDING, ANDOVER ON Tue 13 Dec 16 AT 0930 HRS.

Present:	Sir Jon Murphy	IAG	
	Brig D Neal	PM(A)	Chair
	Col R Morris	AH Tech	
	Mr A Denison	Secretariat	
	Lt Col J Harvey	Gold Comd	D/Chair
	Mr S Kell	SPA	OOT
	Mr F Davis	SPA	OOT
	Mr P Williamson	NCA	
	Lt Col Parke-Robinson	CO SIB Regt RMP	
	Maj Cox	2IC SIB Regt RMP	Secretary
Apologies	~~Nil~~Mr Martin Bottomley	GMP	MERT

Item	Action
Item 1 – Introductions.	
1. PM(A) opened the meeting by welcoming all and thanking everyone for their attendance. He invited attendees to introduce themselves to provide relevance to the meeting. The focus of the meeting revolved around the whole NM concept and T2 activity. T1 activity will be discussed in the NY following the IRT report.	Nil
Item 2 – Terms of Reference.	
2. Gold explained that the ~~systematic~~ systemic issues were to be removed from the TORs. There are other working groups, the DJEP systemic issues working Group ~~systematic~~ and Army Lessons & Safety Fusion Group~~the fusion gps~~, who are better placed to deal with these issues ~~already~~ and therefore cases would be referred to them (once criminality had been discounted or dealt with). The TORs would be distributed for comment by the 2nd week in Jan 17. PM(A) also explained the background and previous issues in that PM(A) is head of the RMP (investigating unit) and MPS (the investigated unit).	Gold Comd
Item 3 – Factual Update.	Nil
3. Gold briefed that IRT had produced their Draft report which he also confirmed all present had seen. The recommendations allow for prioritisation of T2 activity and focus on how the Mr JUSTICE Leggatt ~~Leggott~~ judgement is applied.	
4. Gold briefed that the progress of T2 was very good and numbers were progressing. The response from or UKSF was welcomed in that they have agreed to provide the relevant information. The proposed Cyber team visit will take place on 16 Dec 16 once Bde have engaged with SPEC Ops CoC. Mr Kell Briefed that DSP thought the process was working well and understands the current issues. PM(A) reaffirmed that the press and ministerial level interest and scrutiny meant that we must deal with the T2 issues in a timely fashion.	Gold FAO Spec Ops

Item 4 – Investigative Progress and Item 5 – Review of decision making/policy.	
5. Gold briefed that T1 would be discussed in the Jan 17 meeting. He confirmed that the letter to LDC would be sent on the 14 Dec 16. It is not believed that the outstanding evidence in support of the complaints will be able to be produced and therefore the Leggatt ~~Leggott~~ test will be applicable. Mr Kell acknowledged that it was likely LDC would request more time to action this letter. It was agreed that the credibility of the ABE interviews was in question. No decision on their use or exclusion was made, however the OOT would meet with WO2 Duce and her team in Jan 17 to explore the options for the cases involving ABE interviews.	OOT Gold
6. Discussion was had with regards to the potential future impact of any decision regarding the use of interpreter's evidence and the media impact that this may have. Consideration should be given to a media strategy for this event.	
Item 6 – Family/Complainant concerns	Nil
7. Gold briefed that there had been no approaches by any families of the complaints to any organisation or personnel ~~and therefore no concerns~~.	
Item 7 – Community issues/Community Impact Assessment Review Authorisation for problem / subject profile commissioning	
8. Gold recommended that a review of the CIA should be conducted and sent out for comment. Sir Jon Murphy suggested that the current CIA was crossing between the external community and the internal community and that potentially there should be 2 different documents. A CIA with regards to the wider community should be separate to the Risk Assessment of the internal parties. Sir Murphy recommended that Gold makes a policy decision with regards to this once reviewed.	Gold
Item 8 – Resources.	
9. Gold explained that future structure of NM. Maj Cox would temporarily be covering the Investigations until Maj Grant was posted in. Capt Stamford would replace Capt Wright and Capt Spanton would be posted in to bolster T2. Mr Williamson reaffirmed the requirement for Silver role and the continuity of investigations which was accepted by all. Sir Jon Murphy also pointed out that change and fresh eyes were also an advantage to avoid a stale investigation and give focus when required.	Nil
10. CO SIB raised the issues surrounding personnel being in the unique environment of NM for too long and the effects on health and wellbeing. The question was raised by Sir Jon Murphy regarding why the location as chosen and could it be moved. AH Tech provided the rationale of the location and the reasons why the site was selected.	Nil Nil
11. With regards to the wellbeing and suitability of individuals to cope with the environment, PM(A) explained that with time we will be able to identify exactly what is require and select the right personnel.	
12. Mr Denison asked the question with regards to the reduction in manpower and any potential timescale. Gold briefed that at this time there could be no	

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release of information on reduction in manpower and no exact timescale could be given. Mr Kell acknowledged the magnitude of the investigation requirement but it was agreed by all that a realistic aspirational timeline would be completion of T2 activity by winter 17 with the main LOE completed by Summer 17. This would allow potential exploration or reduction of manpower. This was acceptable by all as a realistic goal and would be a lever to brief into the centre.	All Stakeholders.
13. Mr Denison briefed that the BC for financial sp to NM would be submitted in Jan 17 with cost potentially going up which may draw adverse attention to the project.	
Item 9 – Disclosure issues.	
14. Gold briefed that T4 would stand up in the NY to mitigate any issues. The OOT will visit NM to discuss disclosure in Feb 17 once the team is established.	OOT
Item 10 – Media Strategy.	
15. It was agreed that the LTT were currently satisfactory and no requirement to amend at this time however once T2 have completed their work, a review should be conducted.	Gold
Item 11 – Legal advice.	
16. It was acknowledged by all that the engagement of the OOT was paying dividends and should continue.	Nil
Item 12 – Lessons learnt/IHAT.	
17. It was acknowledged that the OOT leads on lessons learnt and liaison with IHAT. Working as a team is a must. Early engagement is a must. The key outcome is to prosecute those that require it and exonerate those who are innocent.	Nil
18. AH Tech proposed that a quarterly meeting should be held with DJEP, OOT, NM and IHAT in order to capture any lessons or good practice with AH Tech lead.	AH Tech
Item 13 – Staff Welfare issues.	
19. PM(A) directed that we must look at how we "harden" our people to the task. We need to understand, review and put in place measures to ensure what is disclosed and how this is monitored (OPSEC). How we brief people as part of the induction process. Sir Jon Murphy offered to provide some resources to work alongside NM personnel to review and support this.	CO SIB lead
20. It was agreed that a people strategy needs to be compiled to include the element of security and what support from other agencies or departments e.g. Int Corps Sigs was required. CO SIB Regt volunteered to take the lead with this issue as she holds the G1 – 9 for NM.	CO SIB
Item 14 – Other Impact areas.	
21. Mr Denison briefed with regards to the concerns over the establishment of the FDHC and the potential for this not to be on line until Mar 18. He briefed that Mr Peter Ryan had been engaged and had written to DIO. It was acknowledged that the interaction over these types of issues had been at too junior a level and	

that it needed to be dealt with higher. CO SIB requested that as the AH NM and Secretariat were now stood up that these issues be dealt with at this level and not pushed down to OC and 2IC NM in the future. This was agreed.	All Stakeholders
Item 15 – Any other business	
22. CO SIB Regt kindly requested ~~at hat~~that any personnel or team wishing to visit NM ensure her HQ is informed so that expectations can be managed and that the unit is not overwhelmed or affected operationally.	All stakeholders
23. Sir Jon Murphy requested that he was read in-to T12 activity at the same time as the IRT in early 2017 once their clearance had been achieved.	
24. AH Tech provided confirmed that he ~~will be~~ provide~~ding~~ a briefing~~s~~ to the Australian DF on NM at their request as they may set up a similar inquiry into allegations against Australian DF personnel during their time deployed in Afghnaistan.	AH Tech Nil
25. PM(A) summed up by confirming he was very happy with the progress and that he has deliberately given Gold space to make decisions backed by the Comd Gp.	All stakeholders
Item 16 – Date of next meeting	
26. Proposed – Post IRT read in and report on T12 – early 2017 TBC.	

Distribution:

Gold Meeting attendees
OC Op NORTHMOOR

DRAFT

SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-Inv2 (Cook, Stephen Sgt)
Sent: 18 January 2017 13:17
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt)
Subject: FW: 20170118-ATTACKER_Master_Archive-OS

Sir,

For your information, PSB email confirmation from [redacted] at RAF Wyton.

Essentially, there appears to be some problems that require rectification prior to the ATTACKER Master Archive being released to us, however the email does provide assurance that the ATTACKER Master Archive is being quarantined as directed in the Preserve and Protect letter sent to them by us.

Kind regards

Sgt Cook S G | Investigator
| NORTHMOOR Team, SIB Regt RMP, RAF St Mawgan, Newquay, Cornwall, TR8 4HP | [redacted]
[redacted]

From: JFIG [redacted] OC [redacted]
Sent: 18 January 2017 13:01
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-Inv2 (Cook, Stephen Sgt); [redacted]
Cc: JFIG [redacted]
Subject: RE: 20170118-ATTACKER_Master_Archive-OS

Sgt Cook,
We asked [redacted] if everything was ready for transfer to you this week. The following emails state that it was not:

Hi [redacted]

Not yet. There are still some issues with the NAS devices that we need to resolve before the user test is repeated. Once that is done, ISS MOD Corsham will then be satisfied for Op NORTHMOOR to collect the systems.

Regards,

[redacted]

[redacted] – Systems/In-Service Engineering Lead, Post Design Support – ISR & Space Systems
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIALITY WARNING: This message may contain proprietary and/or privileged information of [redacted] and its affiliated companies. If you are not the intended recipient please 1) do not disclose, copy, distribute or use this message or its contents, 2) advise the sender by return e-mail, and 3) delete all copies (including all attachments) from your computer. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.

From: JFIG [redacted] **Sent:** 16 January 2017 09:53
To: [redacted]
Cc: JFIG [redacted] OC [redacted]; JFIG [redacted] SNCO [redacted]
Subject: [External] Op Northmoor - Attkr Release

[redacted]

Could you please confirm that the Attkr data is now copied and the hardware is able to be released to Sgt Cook for Op Northmoor purposes?

Regards

[redacted]

[redacted] NCO Training [redacted] Information & Engineering Unit | Joint Forces Intelligence Group| RAF Wyton | Huntingdon | PE28 2EA | [redacted]

[redacted]

Are you now in a position to confirm transfer to Sgt Cook?

I can assure that the server has been quarantined as per the letter dated 14 Dec.

Regards,
[redacted]

[redacted] OC [redacted] Information and Engineering Unit | Joint Forces Intelligence Group | RAF Wyton HQ | Huntingdon | Cambridgeshire | PE28 2EA | [redacted]

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-Inv2 (Cook, Stephen Sgt)
Sent: 18 January 2017 11:58
To: JFIG [redacted] OC [redacted]
Subject: 20170118-ATTACKER_Master_Archive-OS

Sir,

Good morning,

I have tried to reach you by phone a couple of times now and seemed to have missed you on each occasion.

I have spoken with [redacted], [redacted], who has informed me that they have completed the transfer of data from ATTACKER to BIZEN.

I believe that all we require now is formal confirmation that the ATTACKER server may be decommissioned.

Are you able to confirm whether this confirmation regarding the decommissioning of ATTACKER has been received by your department?

Also can you please provide assurances that the server has been quarantined as per the letter from Op NORTHMOOR dated 14 Dec 16.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me on the details below.

Kind regards

Sgt Cook S G | Investigator
| NORTHMOOR Team, SIB Regt RMP, RAF St Mawgan, Newquay, Cornwall, TR8 4HP [redacted]
Contact Details
[redacted]

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NORTHMOOR Team/Team 1/Correspondence

20 Jan 17

SO1 NORTHMOOR Team

Copy to:
OC NORTHMOOR Team
MIR

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DELAY TO THE FORENSIC RECOVERY OF THE [redacted] SERVER

Background

1. On 25 Mar 14, direction was received from PM (A) to investigate the circumstances of numerous complaints brought by Afghan nationals who alleged varying degrees of criminal and non-criminal behaviour by UK Armed Forces personnel in Afghanistan. During the course of the investigation, NORTHMOOR Team identified the need to recover operational data from [redacted], relating to their operations in Afghanistan. This data is stored on a UK based data repository identified as the [redacted] server with full recovery being pended by the SIO on the basis that to do so would negatively affect current operations [redacted] Following scheduled migration of [redacted] operational data in Dec 16, no impact to current operations exists; there is now an immediate requirement to forensically recover the [redacted] server in order to best preserve and protect data critical to the investigation in accordance with MPID and ACPO (now NPCC) guidelines[1].

2. [redacted] raised concerns that full recovery of the [redacted] server is not proportionate as it holds [redacted] together with operational material not relevant to NORTHMOOR enquiries. [redacted] are unable to identify where relevant data resides on the [redacted] server; full recovery is the only course of action available to provide for an effective investigation, to do anything short of this risks not capturing key evidence.

Loss of Evidence

3. In lieu of full recovery (as highlighted in para 1), RMP directed that [redacted] were not to delete, amend, move or otherwise alter any of the data on the [redacted] server; [redacted] provided written assurance of this. On 19 Dec 16, following scheduled and complete migration of the [redacted] data to a more modern system, NORTHMOOR technical staff attended the [redacted] sub-unit location where [redacted] is held and identified that in the 2 weeks preceeding the visit, data had been permanently deleted; due to the method of deletion, it is not possible to identify what has been removed. SO1 NORTHMOOR has agreed that [redacted] should conduct an internal review to determine why the data has been deleted contrary to direction by RMP and in direct conflict with their own assurances.

Lessons

4. To delay the recovery of [redacted] creates significant risks to the evidential integrity of data created pertaining to operations in Afghanistan. Digital evidence by design is susceptible to deletion of data from both routine use and targeted deletion by individuals who may wish to conceal facts. To delay any longer, further exposes risks to loss of data beyond recovery. This is evidenced in a report produced during the Al-Sweady inquiry[2] by Professor Peter Sommer[3].

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[1] ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence - http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensics-documents/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf
[2] Al-Sweady Inquiry Report - https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/al-sweady-inquiry-report .

5. Professor Sommer, a Digital Forensics Expert, was contracted to review the digital evidence from a data repository identified as the 'Liverpool' server, for the Al-Sweady inquiry. He provided a report indicating that due to the delay in the recovery of the server and the number of deletions that had taken place between 2004 – 2006, that it was not possible to provide or recreate the information as it existed at the relevant time and would limit the ability to interpret the data with any evidential certainty.

6. ACPO guidelines for Digital Evidence state that "in order to comply with the principles of digital evidence, wherever practicable, proportionate and relevant, an image should be made of the device. This will ensure that the original data is preserved. This enables an independent third party to re-examine it and achieve the same result". This relates to the forensic preservation of digitial evidence. Further, "an audit trail or other record of all processes applied to digital evidence should be created and preserved". This demonstrates the need for the ability for any future defence counsel to examine the same evidence in its entirety.

7. In 2010 and in the course of investigating matters under the remit of Op PAVO[4] (IRN: 83224/10), similar deletion of evidence occurred. [redacted] staff forensically wiped a laptop client machine the day before RMP had the opportunity to recover it in pursuance of the enquiry. Although this matter appears unrelated to that above, the deletion of evidence immediately prior to recovery by RMP is coincidental at best; at worst, this may be deemed suspicious.

Recommendations

8. It is recommended that the NORTHMOOR Team recover the [redacted] server immediately in order to comply with best practice and guidance provided by MPID and ACPO and taking into consideration the risk posed to the original data along with our ability to recreate and interpret that data. Under S95 of the AFA 06, RMP have the lawful authority to do so. Beyond this, a Judicial Officer can be requested to make an order to enable RMP to do so. Any delay in recovery risks the loss of evidence and the ability to conduct a prompt and effective investigation, leaving the enquiry and RMP open to criticism.

J L Wright
Capt
SIO Team 1

[3] Appendix 10: Report by Professor Sommer – Digital Forensics Report.
[4] Op PAVO – The investigation of alleged murder of Afghan nationals by [redacted] personnel.

SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)
Sent: 27 January 2017 14:49
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt); SIB RMP-2InvCoy-OC (Cox, Matthew Maj)
Cc: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)
Subject: RE: 20170125-[HQ DSF]Meeting_SIO-OSP

Jason,
Wrt your Q's:

- I am to take no action in respect of data recovery from [ITS1] until after the meeting highlighted at bullet 2 below, a date for which has not been arranged; you are engaging with [N1805] to arrange. Yes correct.
- I am to take no action in respect of the deletion of data from the [ITS1] server; this will be an internal investigation by [UKSF4] only. Correct.
- PM(A) has written to DSF but to date, no response has been received. Correct there has been no response from DSF personally.
- The IRT findings will be forwarded to PM(A) for consideration but no direction regarding proposed tactics is anticipated until after this time (likely to be week 3 or 4 in Feb 17). Wait out, dates will become clearer next week.
- I am to take no action in respect of suspect/witness engagement (for the N50 matters) until after the next Gold Group meeting. Correct.
- No replacement has been identified for WO2 Priddin (noting that upon his departure, several key cyber tasks will be halted). Correct, AH Tech is aware.
- The OF4 LO (Lt Col Hipkins) is likely to be in place in Apr 17. Correct.
- No response has been received from LDC in respect of the request for further material; an anticipated reply is for 1 Feb 17. Correct.

In addition, please could you share the IRT report with me? I can arrange for Paul to have sight of it (noting the PM [appropriate classification] caveat). Not yet, once PM(A) has read and is content (I briefed him today, but he wants to read the report for himself and ingest).

Regards
Lt Col John Harvey

SO1 Op NORTHMOOR | Special Investigation Branch Regiment, Royal Military Police, Bldg 84, Lowa Road | Tidworth | Wiltshire | SP9 7BT

[Contact Details]

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt)
Sent: 25 January 2017 17:20
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)
Cc: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)
Subject: 20170125-[HQ DSF]_Meeting_SIO

Colonel,

To confirm our chat today and to better manage my team:

- I am to take no action in respect of data recovery from ITS1 until after the meeting highlighted at bullet 2 below, a date for which has not been arranged; you are engaging with N1805 to arrange.
- I am to take no action in respect of the deletion of data from the ITS1 server; this will be an internal investigation by UKSF4 only.
- PM(A) has written to DSF but to date, no response has been received.
- The IRT findings will be forwarded to PM(A) for consideration but no direction regarding proposed tactics is anticipated until after this time (likely to be week 3 or 4 in Feb 17).
- I am to take no action in respect of suspect/witness engagement (for the N50 matters) until after the next Gold Group meeting.
- No replacement has been identified for WO2 Priddin (noting that upon his departure, several key cyber tasks will be halted).
- The OF4 LO (Lt Col Hipkins) is likely to be in place in Apr 17.
- No response has been received from LDC in respect of the request for further material; an anticipated reply is for 1 Feb 17.

In addition, please could you share the IRT report with me? I can arrange for Paul to have sight of it (noting the PM appropriate classification caveat).

Kind regards,

Jason

Captain J L Wright | Senior Investigating Officer | Operation NORTHMOOR
Special Investigation Branch Regiment, Royal Military Police, RAF St Mawgan, Cornwall, TR8 4HP

Contact Details

Please note that my email address has changed to Contact Details

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From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)
Sent: 23 January 2017 11:17
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt)
Cc: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)
Subject: RE: 20170113- HQ DSF _Meeting_SIO

Jason,
We can discuss when I am down on 24 Jan.

Regards
Lt Col John Harvey

SO1 Op NORTHMOOR | Special Investigation Branch Regiment, Royal Military Police, Bldg 84, Lowa Road | Tidworth | Wiltshire | SP9 7BT

Contact Details

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt)
Sent: 13 January 2017 14:07

To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)
Cc: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)
Subject: 20170113- HQ DSF Meeting_SIO

Colonel,

Thank you. Did HQ DSF agree to release the entirety of ITS1 to NORTHMOOR?

If I may, given that migration has been completed, the operational justification (interference with live operations), has gone away. [redacted]

Simply, if we are to search for relevant data on ITS1 we will need to search the entire system – I believe Jim Priddin has explained the detail.

For my own understanding and regarding the outcomes below (bullet 1), do you anticipate a RMP investigation into these matters? The answer will determine how we proceed in the immediate future with those who were involved in this process. I would be keen to avoid any unnecessary contact with potential suspects.

What do you anticipate the topics for consideration to be on bullet 2? Also, it would be ideal if this were before 1 Feb 17 (prior to Jim's departure). For continuity, I would recommend that his replacement be identified and is also in attendance.

What do you anticipate the DSF/RMP letter to include? Is this in relation to the deletion of data or concerning the recovery of ITS1 ?

Kind regards,

Jason

Captain J L Wright | Senior Investigating Officer | Operation NORTHMOOR
Special Investigation Branch Regiment, Royal Military Police, RAF St Mawgan, Cornwall, TR8 4HP

Contact Details

Please note that my email address has changed to Contact Details .

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)
Sent: 13 January 2017 11:48
To: Army PM-AH-TECH (Morris, Rob Col)
Cc: SIB RMP-2InvCoy-OC (Cox, Matthew Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt)
Subject: 20170113 HQ DSF Meeting

Col,
The meeting with N1805 and N2311 went well yesterday. COA's as a result are as follows:

1. CO UKSF4 will do an internal look at what went wrong and why data was deleted, on completion he will provide a statement and report to Op NM.

2. I have asked for a round table with their server technicians, the CC1 Contractors, our cyber SME together with N1805, N2311 and me (Jason you should also attend). Date TBC.
3. DSF letter to PM(A) will follow.

Regards
Lt Col John Harvey

SO1 Op NORTHMOOR | Special Investigation Branch Regiment, Royal Military Police, Bldg 84, Lowa Road | Tidworth | Wiltshire | SP9 7BT

Contact Details

SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-Inv2 (Cook, Stephen Sgt)
Sent: 13 February 2017 15:30
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)
Cc: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-Inv1 (Smith, Nick Sgt)
Subject: 20170213-ATTACKER_Meeting_Corsham-OS

Sir,

PSB the details and outcome from the meeting had with ISS @ MOD Corsham regarding ATTACKER Master Archive System;

Present;

Sgt Cook
Sgt Smith
David (Dai) Bainbridge

The meeting started with a quick brief on NORTHMOOR and on the actions that have taken place to date.

Following the explanation of the situation as it stands at present, Dai went on to explain the issues surrounding the transfer of data from the ATTACKER Master Archive System to BIZEN.

Effectively, although the data has been copied to NAS drives, attempts to retrieve the information via BIZEN from the NAS Drives has proven unworkable. In a demonstration, analysts were able to view the library created of the products, however were unable to access , view or download the actual products (FMV) themselves.

What does this mean, in short, ISS are examining the exact details of the contract with [redacted] MOD Contractor . They are likely to attempt to argue that the terms of the contract regarding the transfer from ATTACKER to BIZEN have not been met.

The likelihood is that ISS are going to have to contract [redacted] MOD Contractor to produce a solution to this problem which will require further funds to be allocated to the project (estimated excess of £100k). This being the case, until the data is able to be replicated in a readable format, the ATTACKER Master Archive System cannot be decommissioned, meaning we will be unable to recover the Server as a whole until this process is complete. There is no time of completion of this.

Longer term, this will inevitably cause issues once we do recover the ATTACKER Master Archive System, purely due to the necessity for [redacted] engagement regarding our forensic exploitation of the system (3C will not be able to just copy the data and replicate the system).

Dai has stated that he will work a clause into the new contract that will provide that [redacted] will assist the NORTHMOOR Team when it comes to us exploiting the evidence, however he needs a Time frame from us as this would need to be worked into the contract.

Dai has stated that he will confirm system PM Classification for our consideration when moving the server.

Happy to discuss if you require further explanation.

Kind regards

[redacted] *MOD Contractor

Cookie

Sgt Cook S G | Investigator
| NORTHMOOR Team, SIB Regt RMP, RAF St Mawgan, Newquay, Cornwall, TR8 4HP [redacted]
[redacted] |
[redacted] [redacted]