



MOD-198-0000334-A

MOD FORM 247
(Revised 9/97)

Service Police Exhibit Label

Case Reference No: 02003/114Exhibit Identifying Mark: CCB/18

Property Register Serial Number: _____

Description of Article:

Email correspondence ~~Letter~~
of N2382 (SECRET)

Details of Person Originally Identifying Article:

Number: Service number Rank: Sgt Name: Bell CUnit: Northmoor, SIB Regt RMP

Location Exhibit Found/Recovered:

Northmoor, RAF St MawganTime: 1500 hrs. Date: 13 Aug 18

Forensic Laboratory Reference No: _____

Other Agency Reference No: _____

For Court Use Only

Signature of Persons Handling Exhibit

Name (Block Capitals)	Date	Signature
BEWK	13 Aug 18	Signature
		38

From: SFHQ(UK) J35-CAMPAIGNS-SO2-A-S Email Link

Sent: 18 May 2011 09:15

To: SFHQ(UK) J35-CAMPAIGNS-SO2-B-S

Subject: FW: 20110407 - SU1 stats - S

LIMDIS - PLEASE DO NOT FORWARD

N2272

When N1788 asked me to pore through the SU1 OPSUMs this was the first bit of reporting I did for him. Nothing new - you know all about this - but juts some stats that may be of interest.

Regards,

N2444

N2444

SO2 J35 Campaigns A

Contact Details

Work Mobile:

From: SFHQ(UK) J35-CAMPAIGNS-SO2-A-S

Sent: 07 April 2011 16:45

To: SFHQ(UK) J35-CAMPAIGNS-SO1-S

Subject: 20110407 - SU1 stats - S

N1788

Sorry for the delay (it took longer to pore through all of the SU1 OPSUMs covering the last 5 months than I anticipated), but here is a synopsis of my findings (all cover the period since 01 Dec 10):

- I counted 10 separate incidents (spanning 8 separate operations) in which the TTP of sending a B back into a building to assist with clearing it resulted in that same B getting killed ('reaching for an AK47 behind a blanket' etc being the sort of comment in the OPSUM). Relevant operations (Objs) are Obj 7 DG 11), Obj 5 DG 11), Obj 6 DG 11), Obj 2 (9 Feb 11), Obj 8 (14 Feb 11), TYBURN (16 Feb 11), Obj 9 (12 Mar 11), Obj 10 (2 Apr 11). I attach the Obj 9 OPSUM as one that in my personal opinion does not read well.

- I have broken down the statistics for all SU1 operations since 01 Dec 11 (not including * ops) to show the number of ops/detainees/EKIA per week (see attached). Looking at it on a week-by-week basis, of the 18 completed weeks of ops, on 8 occasions the number of EKIA exceeded number of detainees taken.

*Non-DDO

- I counted 5 separate incidents in which the number of EKIA exceeded the number of wpns apparently found on target. I say 'apparently' because of the multitude of reasons why all weapons on target might not have been recorded accurately (not found, human reporting error etc etc). I have included grenades as a wpn so that marginal cases are not highlighted unfairly. Particular operations (Objs) to note include [redacted] Obj QA (24 Jan 11; 6 EKIA vs 3 x AK47s), [redacted] Obj 1 (7 Jan 11; 9 EKIA vs 3 x AK47s), [redacted] Obj 2 (9 Feb 11; 8 EKIA vs 4 x AKs). If one were not to include grenades as a wpn (controversial) then the number of such incidents is more like 10. There are some trends here that I will discuss separately.

- The [redacted] SFHQ(A) Incident Tracker' tells an unclear story, in part because we only started the tracker in Sep 10 after 'incidents' started to become more frequent. There is therefore not an easy comparison to be made to 'steady jogging'. Legad will have a view but my informal opinion is that there has been a different approach, possibly producing increased accusations/SIRs etc, since [redacted] SU1C deployed. New entries in the 'incident tracker' have been as follows:

Sep 10 - 1 ([redacted] SU1 1)
Oct 10 - 7 ([redacted] SU1 4)
Nov 10 - 8 ([redacted] SU1 8)
Dec 10 - 2 ([redacted] SU1 1)
Jan 11 - 5 ([redacted] SU1 3)
Feb 11 - 3 ([redacted] SU1 2)
Mar 11 - 1 ([redacted] SU1 1)

- My final point at this stage is that the 2 operations that have caused most angst with the APU are Obj TURTON (15 Feb 11) and Obj [redacted] QG ([redacted] DG 11) and neither of these would stand out according to any of the above criteria. Both, however, resulted in the APU suspending operational support. The former was controversial due to the familial connection of a [redacted] APU1 Soldier with the target; the latter for less clear reasons, though a suspicion that he was engaged very quickly in light of having only a pistol hangs in the air. My point here is that, if you use the Afghan conscience as your yardstick (not a bad approach as we discussed!) then the above snapshot may not tell the full picture at all.

[redacted] I clearly have to issue a [redacted] warning with regard to all of this data. Many of the metrics I have selected are inherently pre-disposed to a negative interpretation. That said, whilst one could always commission more detailed and historic statistical research, in my view there is enough here to convince me that we are getting some things wrong right now.

Regards,

[redacted] N2444

[redacted] N2444

[redacted]
SO2 J35 Campaigns A

Contact Details

Work Mobile: [redacted]