



RMP-221-00010154-A

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Witness name: Robert Hunter Morris

Statement Number: 2

Dated: 1 October 2026

Exhibits: N/A

INDEPENDENT INQUIRY RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN

WITNESS STATEMENT OF ROBERT HUNTER MORRIS

DATED 1 October 2026

(a) Introduction

1. I, Colonel (Ret'd) Robert Hunter Morris, formerly of the Royal Military Police ("**RMP**"), make this statement in response to the Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan's ("**Inquiry**") request for evidence concerning my time as Force Provost Marshal ("**FPM**") in Afghanistan - Camp Bastion - between December 2010 and June 2011. I have also been asked to set out in detail anything I consider relevant from my time as FPM in relation to the Inquiry's Terms of Reference. This statement seeks to answer those questions to the best of my knowledge and belief in light of the passage of time since I was FPM.
2. This is my second statement to the Inquiry. My first statement provided a detailed account in response to the Inquiry's Nineteenth Secret Rule 9.2 Request to the RMP. As I referenced at §3 of my first statement, I also provided

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a witness statement on behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence in the Judicial Review proceedings which were stayed once the Inquiry began around the end of 2022 and early 2023.

3. I was employed as the FPM in HQ Joint Force Support Afghanistan (HQ JFSp(A)) from 13 December 2010 to 13 June 2011. I took over from Lt Col Simon Wilson who provided me a comprehensive handover over a number of days. At the end of my tenure, I handed over to Lt Col Martin Williamson and again we conducted a comprehensive handover.

4. Lt Col Jonah McGill was originally selected to be FPM during my tour, but [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
was unable to deploy (reason given)

I was then selected for the post by the Army Personnel Centre under a similar process that I previously described in my first statement.

(b) Role and responsibilities of FPM¹

5. The FPM serves as the Provost Adviser to the National Contingent Commander, Commander Joint Force Support (Afghanistan) (“JFSp(A)”) and subordinate units. I was the senior UK Military Police Officer in Afghanistan. My responsibilities were broadly to provide provost advice to all United Kingdom Force Elements and the Chain of Command and can be categorised across the

¹ All the responsibilities I quote below are taken from my Appraisal Report for the Tour which listed my Role and Responsibilities.

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three headings of: Police Support to the Force; Police the Force; and Detention.

I recall that I was provided a written Directive by PM(A) on my duties. I don't have a copy of that Directive but there should be one available in HQ PM(A).

(c) Police support to the force

6. For every Op HERRICK deployment there was a Theatre Provost Company (TPC) who supported Task Force Helmand ("TFH"). This company delivered all the close provost support to TFH and those who deployed as the Company Commander in this role are best placed to describe their exact responsibilities. I had no formal command relationship over the Company Commander, but the responsibilities state that I was to supervise and direct them. During my 6-month tour I would have made visits to the Company Commander and been aware of what the TPC was doing.

(d) Policing The Force

7. The RMP deployed an in-theatre SIB section (61 Sect SIB) for each Op HERRICK deployment. As part of that my responsibilities noted I had the formal command relationship over them known as Tactical Command ("TACOM"). I recall that this allowed me to assign them tasks in line with their mission. My responsibilities noted that I should initiate enquiries where appropriate and take responsibility for the quality of all Level 1 and Level 2 investigations. Level 1 are in the main enquiries that are carried out by General Police Duties (GPD)

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personnel. Level 2 are the more serious enquires carried out by the SIB as trained detectives. This is similar to Uniform and CID in a civil police context. Level 1 investigations would have been conducted by the TPC and they would have kept me informed of these investigations. Level 2 carried out by 61 Sect SIB and I recall regularly speaking to their OC who kept me informed of their investigations.

(e) Shooting Incident Reports

8. I also conducted Shooting Incident Reports ("**SIRs**") as part of the FPM role. I understand the Inquiry is already aware of how these were conducted for Conventional Forces. I saw a number as FPM but on review of them didn't see any that required a Service Police Investigation in relation to conventional forces. SIRs for UKSF operations were, as I recall, carried out by Brigadier, Operational Law an Army Legal Services (ALS) officer.

(f) Detention

9. As FPM I was tasked to provide Subject Matter Expert ("**SME**") advice on all custodial matters and conducted bi-monthly checks of the main UK detention facilities known as Theatre Holding Facilities ("**THF**"). During my tour two THFs were located in Camp Bastion and one was in Kandahar. The THFs were manned by the Military Provost Staff ("**MPS**"). The MPS are the army regiment that run the UK Military detention locations. In peacetime this is Colchester

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Military Correction Training Centre. On operations they deploy and run the Theatre Holding Facilities. I had Operational Control (“**OPCON**”) of the MPS which allowed me to give them missions. I regularly visited the THFs, noting that two were located in Camp Bastion which is where I was based. I had a close working relationship with the OC of the MPS detachment. I was mandated to liaise with PJHQ and HQ PM(A) for policy advice and guidance which I recall doing on a number of occasions.

(i) **Safety of the Detainees**

10. I recall the Directive provided to me by PM(A) made clear that I was responsible for the safety of UK Detainees once they had arrived in a THF. I took this seriously and ensured that no unauthorised visits were made to the THFs. Detainees underwent interrogation by the Intelligence Exploitation Force (IEF) who were located adjacent to the THF but not within it. My report notes that *“at the IEF/THF interface he knows where the separation must be drawn but, nonetheless, encourages interaction where it benefits the operation.”*

(ii) **Detention Review Committee (“DRC”)**

11. I was a member of the daily DRC which determined whether a detainee was going to be detained for longer for further interrogation; released; or handed over to the Afghan National Directorate of Security (“**NDS**”) for further investigation by the latter. The DRC was chaired by the Deputy Detention

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Authority (“**DDA**”) who was an OF5 RAF officer and consisted of the JFSp(A) POLAD a UK civil servant, a military legal officer and me. Any detainee that had been detained in the previous 24 hours had their detention reviewed, which was informed by information provided by the IEF. A decision was then made as to what was going to happen to them as outlined in the three options above (i.e., detained for longer for further interrogation; released; or handed over). Additionally, those who had been in detention for extended periods had their detention reviewed. Any applications for continued detention beyond 96 hours were sent to PJHQ for Ministerial sign off. My role in the DRC was also to advise as to whether the NDS wished to take the detainee for further investigation. I cannot now recall exactly how my contact with the NDS was facilitated, but I can remember meeting them on various occasions.

(iii) Complaints and Allegations of Abuse of Detainees

12. Any complaints by detainees of abuse were passed to me as the FPM. 61 SIB Section then conducted an investigation. I was required to pass all allegations of abuse to PJHQ. I can’t recall how many that I had during my tour.

(iv) Inspections of the THF

13. During my tour I hosted inspections of the THFs by PM(A), HMICP and a TPE

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(d) DDOs under investigation by the Inquiry

14. The DDOs being looked at by the Inquiry did come through the DRC during my tour, which included those which were investigated as part of Operation Northmoor (“**OpNM**”) between March 2015 and July 2019 that I covered in my first statement (whether in my role as Assistant Head of OpNM, Deputy Provost Marshal (Investigations) or Assistant Head (Technical) within the Army's Provost Marshal Headquarters). I recall that on the basis of the facts that were presented at the time that I didn't have any concerns. In addition, SIRs done by non-conventional forces didn't come through to me as FPM but were sent back to the UK for review by the ALS Brigadier Operational Law (the Head of Operational Law).

15. I cannot recall directly, and I am not sure to what extent my memory is now being informed by the knowledge I acquired since I was part of OpNM, but I do have a recollection of one relevant DDO involving 4 EKIA which stood out to me at the time due to the number of EKIA. I would have been aware that this was a UKSF DDO, I do know that I must not have considered this DDO to be particularly concerning because I did not formally record any concerns or escalate the matter further. In addition, as I say above, any SIRs done at the time in relation to UKSF operations were sent back to the UK for review by the ALS Brigadier Operational Law and so I would not have seen an SIR concerning the relevant DDO.

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STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I BELIEVE THE CONTENTS OF THIS STATEMENT TO BE TRUE.

SIGNED: *RH Morris*

DATED: 1 October 2026