



MOD-198-0000733-A

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Handling Instruction: Intelligence Material Limited Circulation

15 Dec 16

Received 16 Jan 17

RECORD OF DECISIONS FROM THE NORTHMOOR GOLD MEETING HELD AT HQ PM(A) & HQ 1 MP BDE, RAMILLIES BUILDING, ANDOVER ON Tue 13 Dec 16 AT 0930 HRS.

Present:	Sir Jon Murphy Brig D Neal Col R Morris Mr A Denison Lt Col J Harvey Mr S Kell Mr F Davis Mr P Williamson Lt Col Parke-Robinson Maj Cox	IAG PM(A) AH Tech Secretariat Gold Comd SPA SPA NCA CO SIB Regt RMP 2IC SIB Regt RMP	Chair D/Chair OOT OOT Secretary
Apologies	Nil Mr Martin Bottomley	GMP	MERT

Item	Action
Item 1 – Introductions.	
1. PM(A) opened the meeting by welcoming all and thanking everyone for their attendance. He invited attendees to introduce themselves to provide relevance to the meeting. The focus of the meeting revolved around the whole NM concept and T2 activity. T1 activity will be discussed in the NY following the IRT report.	Nil
Item 2 – Terms of Reference.	
2. Gold explained that the systematic systemic issues were to be removed from the TORs. There are other working groups, the DJEP systemic issues working Group systemic and Army Lessons & Safety Fusion Group the fusion gps, who are better placed to deal with these issues already and therefore cases would be referred to them (once criminality had been discounted or dealt with). The TORs would be distributed for comment by the 2 nd week in Jan 17. PM(A) also explained the background and previous issues in that PM(A) is head of the RMP (investigating unit) and MPS (the investigated unit).	Gold Comd
Item 3 – Factual Update.	
3. Gold briefed that IRT had produced their Draft report which he also confirmed all present had seen. The recommendations allow for prioritisation of T2 activity and focus on how the <u>Mr JUSTICE Leggatt</u> Leggett judgement is applied.	Nil
4. Gold briefed that the progress of T2 was very good and numbers were progressing. The response from the UKSF was welcomed in that they have agreed to provide the relevant information. The proposed Cyber team visit will take place on 16 Dec 16 once Bde have engaged with SPEC Ops CoC. Mr Kell Briefed that DSP thought the process was working well and understands the current issues. PM(A) reaffirmed that the press and ministerial level interest and scrutiny meant that we must deal with the T2 issues in a timely fashion.	Gold FAO Spec Ops

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<p>Item 4 – Investigative Progress and Item 5 – Review of decision making/policy.</p>	
<p>5. Gold briefed that T1 would be discussed in the Jan 17 meeting. He confirmed that the letter to LDC would be sent on the 14 Dec 16. It is not believed that the outstanding evidence in support of the complaints will be able to be produced and therefore the <u>Leggatt</u> Leggett-test will be applicable. Mr Kell acknowledged that it was likely LDC would request more time to action this letter. It was agreed that the credibility of the ABE interviews was in question. No decision on their use or exclusion was made, however the OOT would meet with WO2 Duce and her team in Jan 17 to explore the options for the cases involving ABE interviews.</p>	OOT
<p>6. Discussion was had with regards to the potential future impact of any decision regarding the use of interpreter's evidence and the media impact that this may have. Consideration should be given to a media strategy for this event.</p>	Gold
<p>Item 6 – Family/Complainant concerns</p>	Nil
<p>7. Gold briefed that there had been no approaches by any families of the complaints to any organisation or personnel and therefore no concerns.</p>	
<p>Item 7 – Community issues/Community Impact Assessment Review Authorisation for problem / subject profile commissioning</p>	
<p>8. Gold recommended that a review of the CIA should be conducted and sent out for comment. Sir <u>Jon</u> Murphy suggested that the current CIA was crossing between the external community and the internal community and that potentially there should be 2 different documents. A CIA with regards to the wider community should be separate to the Risk Assessment of the internal parties. Sir Murphy recommended that Gold makes a policy decision with regards to this once reviewed.</p>	Gold
<p>Item 8 – Resources.</p>	
<p>9. Gold explained that future structure of NM. Maj Cox would temporarily be covering the Investigations until Maj Grant was posted in. Capt Stamford would replace Capt Wright and Capt Spanton would be posted in to bolster T2. Mr Williamson reaffirmed the requirement for Silver role and the continuity of investigations which was accepted by all. Sir <u>Jon</u> Murphy also pointed out that change and fresh eyes were also an advantage to avoid a stale investigation and give focus when required.</p>	Nil
<p>10. CO SIB raised the issues surrounding personnel being in the unique environment of NM for too long and the effects on health and wellbeing. The question was raised by Sir <u>Jon</u> Murphy regarding why the location as chosen and could it be moved. AH Tech provided the rationale of the location and the reasons why the site was selected.</p>	Nil
<p>11. With regards to the wellbeing and suitability of individuals to cope with the environment, PM(A) explained that with time we will be able to identify exactly what is require and select the right personnel.</p>	
<p>12. Mr Demison asked the question with regards to the reduction in manpower and any potential timescale. Gold briefed that at this time there could be no</p>	

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release of information on reduction in manpower and no exact timescale could be given. Mr Kell acknowledged the magnitude of the investigation requirement but it was agreed by all that a realistic aspirational timeline would be completion of T2 activity by winter 17 with the main LOE completed by Summer 17. This would allow potential exploration or reduction of manpower. This was acceptable by all as a realistic goal and would be a lever to brief into the centre.	All Stakeholders.
13. Mr Denison briefed that the BC for financial sp to NM would be submitted in Jan 17 with cost potentially going up which may draw adverse attention to the project.	
Item 9 – Disclosure issues.	
14. Gold briefed that T4 would stand up in the NY to mitigate any issues. The OOT will visit NM to discuss disclosure in Feb 17 once the team is established.	OOT
Item 10 – Media Strategy.	
15. It was agreed that the LTT were currently satisfactory and no requirement to amend at this time however once T2 have completed their work, a review should be conducted.	Gold
Item 11 – Legal advice.	
16. It was acknowledged by all that the engagement of the OOT was paying dividends and should continue.	Nii
Item 12 – Lessons learnt/IHAT.	
17. It was acknowledged that the OOT leads on lessons learnt and liaison with IHAT. Working as a team is a must. Early engagement is a must. The key outcome is to prosecute those that require it and exonerate those who are innocent.	Nii
18. AH Tech proposed that a quarterly meeting should be held with DJEP, OOT, NM and IHAT in order to capture any lessons or good practice with AH Tech lead.	AH Tech
Item 13 – Staff Welfare issues.	
19. PM(A) directed that we must look at how we “harden” our people to the task. We need to understand, review and put in place measures to ensure what is disclosed and how this is monitored (OPSEC). How we brief people as part of the induction process. Sir Jon Murphy offered to provide some resources to work alongside NM personnel to review and support this.	CO SIB lead
20. It was agreed that a people strategy needs to be compiled to include the element of security and what support from other agencies or departments e.g. Int Corps Sigs was required. CO SIB Regt volunteered to take the lead with this issue as she holds the G1 – 9 for NM.	CO SIB
Item 14 – Other Impact areas.	
21. Mr Denison briefed with regards to the concerns over the establishment of the FDHC and the potential for this not to be on line until Mar 18. He briefed that Mr Peter Ryan had been engaged and had written to DIO. It was acknowledged that the interaction over these types of issues had been at too junior a level and	

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that it needed to be dealt with higher. CO SIB requested that as the AH NM and Secretariat were now stood up that these issues be dealt with at this level and not pushed down to OC and 2IC NM in the future. This was agreed.	All Stakeholders
Item 15 – Any other business	
22. CO SIB Regt kindly requested at hat that any personnel or team wishing to visit NM ensure her HQ is informed so that expectations can be managed and that the unit is not overwhelmed or affected operationally.	All stakeholders
23. Sir <u>Jon</u> Murphy requested that he was read in-to T ₁₂ activity at the same time as the IRT in early 2017 once their clearance had been achieved.	
24. AH Tech provided confirmed that he will be provided <u>will be providing</u> a briefings to the Australian DF on NM at their request <u>as they may set up a similar inquiry into allegations against Australian DF personnel during their time deployed in Afghnaistan.</u>	AH Tech Nil
25. PM(A) summed up by confirming he was very happy with the progress and that he has deliberately given Gold space to make decisions backed by the Comd Gp.	All stakeholders
Item 16 – Date of next meeting	
26. Proposed – Post IRT read in and report on T ₁₂ – early 2017 TBC.	

Distribution:

Gold Meeting attendees
OC Op NORTHMOOR**OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE PERSONAL**

SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-Inv2 (Cook, Stephen Sgt)
Sent: 18 January 2017 13:17
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt)
Subject: FW: 20170118-ATTACKER_Master_Archive-OS

Sir,

For your information, PSB email confirmation from [REDACTED] OF2 WA at RAF Wyton.

Essentially, there appears to be some problems that require rectification prior to the ATTACKER Master Archive being released to us, however the email does provide assurance that the ATTACKER Master Archive is being quarantined as directed in the Preserve and Protect letter sent to them by us.

Kind regards

Sgt Cook S G | Investigator
| NORTHMOOR Team, SIB Regt RMP, RAF St Mawgan, Newquay, Cornwall, TR8 4HP | [REDACTED]

Contact Details

From: JFIG [REDACTED] Post given [REDACTED] OC [REDACTED] OF2 WA
Sent: 18 January 2017 13:01
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-Inv2 (Cook, Stephen Sgt); [REDACTED] Contact Details
Cc: JFIG [REDACTED] Post given [REDACTED] Tech11 [REDACTED] OR4 AB2
Subject: RE: 20170118-ATTACKER_Master_Archive-OS

Sgt Cook,
We asked [REDACTED] TP if everything was ready for transfer to you this week. The following emails state that it was not:

Hi [REDACTED] AB2

Not yet. There are still some issues with the NAS devices that we need to resolve before the user test is repeated. Once that is done, ISS MOD Corsham will then be satisfied for Op NORTHMOOR to collect the systems.

Regards,

[REDACTED] TP

[REDACTED] TP – Systems/In-Service Engineering Lead, Post Design Support – ISR & Space Systems
UTC AEROSPACE SYSTEMS

Contact Details

Contact Details

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From: JFIG [Post given] Tech11 [OR4 AB2] [Contact Details]
Sent: 16 January 2017 09:53
To: [TP]
Cc: JFIG [Post given] OC [OF2 WA]; JFIG [Post given] SvcDesk SNCO [OR6 MS]
Subject: [External] Op Northmoor - Attkr Release

[TP]

Could you please confirm that the Attkr data is now copied and the hardware is able to be released to Sgt Cook for Op Northmoor purposes?

Regards

[AB2]

[OR4 AB2] NCO Training [Post given] Information & Engineering Unit | Joint Forces Intelligence Group | RAF Wytton | Huntingdon | PE28 2EA [Contact Details]

[TP]

Are you now in a position to confirm transfer to Sgt Cook?

I can assure that the server has been quarantined as per the letter dated 14 Dec.

Regards,

[WA]

[OF2 WA] [OC] [Post given] Information and Engineering Unit | Joint Forces Intelligence Group | RAF Wytton HQ | Huntingdon | Cambridgeshire | PE28 2EA | [Contact Details]

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-Inv2 (Cook, Stephen Sgt)
Sent: 18 January 2017 11:58
To: JFIG [Post given] OC [OF2 WA]
Subject: 20170118-ATTACKER_Master_Archive-OS

Sir,

Good morning,

I have tried to reach you by phone a couple of times now and seemed to have missed you on each occasion.

I have spoken with [TP] UTC Aerospace, who has informed me that they have completed the transfer of data from ATTACKER to BIZEN.

I believe that all we require now is formal confirmation that the ATTACKER server may be decommissioned.

Are you able to confirm whether this confirmation regarding the decommissioning of ATTACKER has been received by your department?

Also can you please provide assurances that the server has been quarantined as per the letter from Op NORTHMOOR dated 14 Dec 16.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me on the details below.

Kind regards

Sgt Cook S G | Investigator

| NORTHMOOR Team, SIB Regt RMP, RAF St Mawgan, Newquay, Cornwall, TR8 4HP

Contact Details

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Handling Instruction: Investigative Material Limited Circulation

NORTHMOOR Team/Team 1/Correspondence

20 Jan 17

SO1 NORTHMOOR Team

Copy to:

OC NORTHMOOR Team

MIR

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DELAY TO THE FORENSIC RECOVERY OF THE SERVER

ITS1

Background

1. On 25 Mar 14, direction was received from PM (A) to investigate the circumstances of numerous complaints brought by Afghan nationals who alleged varying degrees of criminal and non-criminal behaviour by UK Armed Forces personnel in Afghanistan. During the course of the investigation, NORTHMOOR Team identified the need to recover operational data from SFHQ(UK) relating to their operations in Afghanistan. This data is stored on a UK based data repository identified as the ITS1 server with full recovery being pended by the SIO on the basis that to do so would negatively affect current operations Operational detail and internationally. Following scheduled migration of SFHQ(UK) operational data in Dec 16, no impact to current operations exists; there is now an immediate requirement to forensically recover the ITS1 server in order to best preserve and protect data critical to the investigation in accordance with MPID and ACPO (now NPCC) guidelines¹.

2. SFHQ(UK) raised concerns that full recovery of the ITS1 server is not proportionate as it holds third party equity together with operational material not relevant to NORTHMOOR enquiries. SFHQ(UK) are unable to identify where relevant data resides on the ITS1 server; full recovery is the only course of action available to provide for an effective investigation, to do anything short of this risks not capturing key evidence.

Loss of Evidence

3. In lieu of full recovery (as highlighted in para 1), RMP directed that SFHQ(UK) were not to delete, amend, move or otherwise alter any of the data on the ITS1 server. SFHQ(UK) provided written assurance of this. On 19 Dec 16, following scheduled and complete migration of the ITS1 data to a more modern system, NORTHMOOR technical staff attended the SFHQ(UK) sub-unit location where ITS1 is held and identified that in the 2 weeks preceeding the visit, data had been permanently deleted; due to the method of deletion, it is not possible to identify what has been removed. SO1 NORTHMOOR has agreed that SFHQ(UK) should conduct an internal review to determine why the data has been deleted contrary to direction by RMP and in direct conflict with their own assurances.

Lessons

4. To delay the recovery of ITS1 creates significant risks to the evidential integrity of data created pertaining to operations in Afghanistan. Digital evidence by design is susceptible to deletion of data from both routine use and targeted deletion by individuals who may wish to conceal facts. To delay any longer, further exposes risks to loss of data beyond recovery. This is evidenced in a report produced during the Al-Sweady inquiry² by Professor Peter Sommer³.

¹ ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence - [http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensics-documents/ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence v5.pdf](http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensics-documents/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf)

² Al-Sweady Inquiry Report - <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/al-sweady-inquiry-report>.

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5. Professor Sommer, a Digital Forensics Expert, was contracted to review the digital evidence from a data repository identified as the 'Liverpool' server, for the Al-Sweady inquiry. He provided a report indicating that due to the delay in the recovery of the server and the number of deletions that had taken place between 2004 – 2006, that it was not possible to provide or recreate the information as it existed at the relevant time and would limit the ability to interpret the data with any evidential certainty.

6. ACPO guidelines for Digital Evidence state that "in order to comply with the principles of digital evidence, wherever practicable, proportionate and relevant, an image should be made of the device. This will ensure that the original data is preserved. This enables an independent third party to re-examine it and achieve the same result". This relates to the forensic preservation of digital evidence. Further, "an audit trail or other record of all processes applied to digital evidence should be created and preserved". This demonstrates the need for the ability for any future defence counsel to examine the same evidence in its entirety.

7. In 2010 and in the course of investigating matters under the remit of Op PAVO⁴ (IRN: 83224/10), similar deletion of evidence occurred. [SFHQ (UK)] staff forensically wiped a laptop client machine the day before RMP had the opportunity to recover it in pursuance of the enquiry. Although this matter appears unrelated to that above, the deletion of evidence immediately prior to recovery by RMP is coincidental at best; at worst, this may be deemed suspicious.

Recommendations

8. It is recommended that the NORTHMOOR Team recover the [ITS1] server immediately in order to comply with best practice and guidance provided by MPID and ACPO and taking into consideration the risk posed to the original data along with our ability to recreate and interpret that data. Under S95 of the AFA 06, RMP have the lawful authority to do so. Beyond this, a Judicial Officer can be requested to make an order to enable RMP to do so. Any delay in recovery risks the loss of evidence and the ability to conduct a prompt and effective investigation, leaving the enquiry and RMP open to criticism.

J L Wright
Capt
SIO Team 1

³ Appendix 10: Report by Professor Sommer – Digital Forensics Report.

⁴ Op PAVO – The investigation of alleged murder of Afghan nationals by [UKSF] personnel.

SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)
Sent: 27 January 2017 14:49
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt); SIB RMP-2InvCoy-OC (Cox, Matthew Maj)
Cc: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)
Subject: RE: 20170125-SFHQ (UK) Meeting_SIO-OSP

Jason,
Wrt your Q's:

- I am to take no action in respect of data recovery from [REDACTED] ITS1 until after the meeting highlighted at bullet 2 below, a date for which has not been arranged; you are engaging with [REDACTED] OF5 N1805 to arrange. Yes correct.
- I am to take no action in respect of the deletion of data from the [REDACTED] ITS1 server; this will be an internal investigation by [REDACTED] UKSF4 only. Correct.
- PM(A) has written to DSF but to date, no response has been received. Correct there has been no response from DSF personally.
- The IRT findings will be forwarded to PM(A) for consideration but no direction regarding proposed tactics is anticipated until after this time (likely to be week 3 or 4 in Feb 17). Wait out, dates will become clearer next week.
- I am to take no action in respect of suspect/witness engagement (for the NSO matters) until after the next Gold Group meeting. Correct.
- No replacement has been identified for WO2 Priddin (noting that upon his departure, several key cyber tasks will be halted). Correct, AH Tech is aware.
- The OF4 LO [REDACTED] N1125 is likely to be in place in Apr 17. Correct.
- No response has been received from LDC in respect of the request for further material; an anticipated reply is for 1 Feb 17. Correct.

In addition, please could you share the IRT report with me? I can arrange for Paul to have sight of it (noting the PM SECRET caveat). Not yet, once PM(A) has read and is content (I briefed him today, but he wants to read the report for himself and ingest).

Regards
Lt Col John Harvey

SO1 Op NORTHMOOR | Special Investigation Branch Regiment, Royal Military Police, Bldg 84, Lowa Road | Tidworth | Wiltshire | SP9 7BT

Contact Details

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt)
Sent: 25 January 2017 17:20
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)
Cc: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)
Subject: 20170125-SFHQ (UK) Meeting_SIO

Colonel,

To confirm our chat today and to better manage my team:

- I am to take no action in respect of data recovery from [ITS1] until after the meeting highlighted at bullet 2 below, a date for which has not been arranged; you are engaging with [OF5 N1805] to arrange.
- I am to take no action in respect of the deletion of data from the [ITS1] server; this will be an internal investigation by [UKSF4] only.
- PM(A) has written to DSF but to date, no response has been received.
- The IRT findings will be forwarded to PM(A) for consideration but no direction regarding proposed tactics is anticipated until after this time (likely to be week 3 or 4 in Feb 17).
- I am to take no action in respect of suspect/witness engagement (for the N50 matters) until after the next Gold Group meeting.
- No replacement has been identified for WO2 Priddin (noting that upon his departure, several key cyber tasks will be halted).
- The OF4 LO [N1125] is likely to be in place in Apr 17.
- No response has been received from LDC in respect of the request for further material; an anticipated reply is for 1 Feb 17.

In addition, please could you share the IRT report with me? I can arrange for Paul to have sight of it (noting the PM SECRET caveat).

Kind regards,

Jason

Captain J L Wright | Senior Investigating Officer | Operation NORTHMOOR
Special Investigation Branch Regiment, Royal Military Police, RAF St Mawgan, Cornwall, TR8 4HP

Contact Details

Please note that my email address has changed to SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO.

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)

Sent: 23 January 2017 11:17

To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt)

Cc: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)

Subject: RE: 20170113 [SFHQ (UK)] Meeting_SIO

Jason,

We can discuss when I am down on 24 Jan.

Regards

Lt Col John Harvey

SO1 Op NORTHMOOR | Special Investigation Branch Regiment, Royal Military Police, Bldg 84, Lowa Road | Tidworth | Wiltshire | SP9 7BT

Contact Details

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt)

Sent: 13 January 2017 14:07

To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)
Cc: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)
Subject: 20170113-^{SFHQ (UK)} Meeting_SIO

Colonel,

Thank you. Did ^{SFHQ (UK)} agree to release the entirety of ^{ITS1} to NORTHMOOR?

If I may, given that migration has been completed, the operational justification (interference with live operations), has gone away. If 3rd party equity remains an issue, I would seek to understand in advance of any future meeting a) who owns that material, b) what it consists of, and c) how much (size) of 3rd party material exists.

If the argument is one of collateral intrusion into non-Afghanistan based operations (i.e. RMP viewing operational material relating to other theatres), the robust triage process already agreed ^{disclosure decision maker} mitigates any leak of information.

Simply, if we are to search for relevant data on ^{ITS1} we will need to search the entire system – I believe Jim Priddin has explained the detail.

For my own understanding and regarding the outcomes below (bullet 1), do you anticipate a RMP investigation into these matters? The answer will determine how we proceed in the immediate future with those who were involved in this process. I would be keen to avoid any unnecessary contact with potential suspects.

What do you anticipate the topics for consideration to be on bullet 2? Also, it would be ideal if this were before 1 Feb 17 (prior to Jim's departure). For continuity, I would recommend that his replacement be identified and is also in attendance.

What do you anticipate the ^{SFHQ (UK)} /RMP letter to include? Is this in relation to the deletion of data or concerning the recovery of ^{ITS1}?

Kind regards,

Jason

Captain J L Wright | Senior Investigating Officer | Operation NORTHMOOR
Special Investigation Branch Regiment, Royal Military Police, RAF St Mawgan, Cornwall, TR8 4HP

Contact Details

Please note that my email address has changed to SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO.

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-GoldComd (Harvey, John Maj)
Sent: 13 January 2017 11:48
To: Army PM-AH-TECH (Morris, Rob Col)
Cc: SIB RMP-2InvCoy-OC (Cox, Matthew Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-HQ-OC (Stitson, Tina Maj); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt)
Subject: 20170113-^{SFHQ (UK)} Meeting

Col,
The meeting with ^{OF5 N1805} and ^{OF4 N2311} went well yesterday. COA's as a result are as follows:

1. CO ^{UKSF4} will do an internal look at what went wrong and why data was deleted, on completion he will provide a statement and report to Op NM.

2. I have asked for a round table with their server technicians, the [REDACTED] CC1, our cyber SME together with [REDACTED] OF5 N1805, [REDACTED] OF4 N2311 and me (Jason you should also attend). Date TBC.
3. DSF letter to PM(A) will follow.

Regards

Lt Col John Harvey

SO1 Op NORTHMOOR | Special Investigation Branch Regiment, Royal Military Police, Bldg 84, Lowa Road | Tidworth | Wiltshire | SP9 7BT

Contact Details

[REDACTED]

SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)

From: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-Inv2 (Cook, Stephen Sgt)
Sent: 13 February 2017 15:30
To: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-DSIO (Dempster, Mark WO2)
Cc: SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-SIO (Wright, Jason Capt); SIB RMP-NORTHMOOR-T1-Inv1 (Smith, Nick Sgt)
Subject: 20170213-ATTACKER_Meeting_Corsham-OS

Sir,

PSB the details and outcome from the meeting had with ISS @ MOD Corsham regarding ATTACKER Master Archive System;

Present;

Sgt Cook
Sgt Smith

DB2

The meeting started with a quick brief on NORTHMOOR and on the actions that have taken place to date.

Following the explanation of the situation as it stands at present, DB2 went on to explain the issues surrounding the transfer of data from the ATTACKER Master Archive System to BIZEN.

Effectively, although the data has been copied to NAS drives, attempts to retrieve the information via BIZEN from the NAS Drives has proven unworkable. In a demonstration, analysts were able to view the library created of the products, however were unable to access, view or download the actual products (FMV) themselves.

What does this mean, in short, ISS are examining the exact details of the contract with UTC Aerospace. They are likely to attempt to argue that the terms of the contract regarding the transfer from ATTACKER to BIZEN have not been met.

The likelihood is that ISS are going to have to contract UTC Aerospace to produce a solution to this problem which will require further funds to be allocated to the project (estimated excess of £100k). This being the case, until the data is able to be replicated in a readable format, the ATTACKER Master Archive System cannot be decommissioned, meaning we will be unable to recover the Server as a whole until this process is complete. There is no time of completion of this.

Longer term, this will inevitably cause issues once we do recover the ATTACKER Master Archive System, purely due to the necessity for UTC engagement regarding our forensic exploitation of the system (3C will not be able to just copy the data and replicate the system).

DB2 has stated that he will work a clause into the new contract that will provide that UTC will assist the NORTHMOOR Team when it comes to us exploiting the evidence, however he needs a Time frame from us as this would need to be worked into the contract.

DB2 has stated that he will confirm system PM Classification for our consideration when moving the server.

Happy to discuss if you require further explanation.

Kind regards

Cookie

Sgt Cook S G | Investigator

| NORTHMOOR Team, SIB Regt RMP, RAF St Mawgan, Newquay, Cornwall, TR8 4HP

Contact Details